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Abstract
“Entrepreneurial universities,” in which academic research is commercialized and
technology transferred through patents, licensing, and university-based business
startups, are increasingly touted as the key driver of city and regional economic
development. This paper reviews the relationship between research universities and
local economic development in 55 major US regions, and finds no meaningful
correlations between any gauges of entrepreneurial university activity (research
expenditures, patents, or licensing) and core measures of city and regional economic
well-being. Notwithstanding tendentious accounts of “success stories” such as Silicon
Valley or Boston’s Route 128, as if they represent the general historical pattern, these
data as well as case studies such as Johns Hopkins University and Yale University reveal
that even world-class research universities are neither necessary nor sufficient in
promoting local economic development. University research parks are particularly
oversold as engines of local economic growth.
While proponents of academic commercialism routinely overstate its economic benefits
for cities and regions, they rarely mention the significant costs. These include potential
undermining of the system of basic research and open science that has been the
cornerstone of scientific discovery in the US, and, ironically, undercutting innovation.
Contrary to claims by many university leaders that research commercialization will
generate revenues for their institutions, for most universities tech transfer is a moneylosing proposition. Tech transfer is a classic example of jackpot or casino economics,
with very few big winners, and over half of US universities lose money in academic
commercialization. Research funding and commercialization revenues are heavily
skewed to the same “top 15” universities that have dominated these statistics for
decades, and, as one expert has argued, outside of this top group most universities are
getting nothing out of tech transfer “except a lot of economic development rhetoric.”
This paper also includes an in-depth case study of efforts to transform the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) into an entrepreneurial university. All of the dubious
claims regarding the impact of entrepreneurial universities on local economies and the
revenue-generating potential of academic commercialism have been advanced by UWM
leaders, with little debate, analysis, or public scrutiny.
“Entrepreneurial” UWM is pursuing two core “economic development” initiatives: 1) a
suburban technology park, oriented around biomedical engineering; and 2) a School of
Freshwater Studies, to propel Milwaukee as the alleged “Silicon Valley of water
technology.” The economic logic underpinning both initiatives, however, is deeply
flawed. Biomedical engineering is not a field in which the Milwaukee region or UWM
either start in an advantageous position or have obviously propitious prospects. The
suburban Wauwatosa technology park has been vastly oversold as a potential engine of
economic development. Urban universities have increasingly become anchor
institutions in city economies, yet UWM plans to invest an estimated $150 million
outside a city that has been buffeted over the past 30 years by growing joblessness,
poverty, and the suburbanization of industry. Ironically, for an initiative deemed crucial
to the economic future of Milwaukee, UWM’s suburban tech park, by disinvesting in the
4

city, will help undermine the economics of agglomeration that economists and urban
planners concur is a central ingredient of economic development.
UWM is already a major research institution in the field of Great Lakes ecology and
freshwater science, and the new school will build on this tradition. But the economic
development arguments for the SFS as the centerpiece of an emerging Milwaukee water
technology “hub” are based on spurious claims and, to borrow a phrase, “irrational
exuberance.” The key points: 1) Measured by the location of water company
headquarters, plants, or offices; the generation of water technology patents; or jobs in
the industry, there is little evidence that Milwaukee is a “hub” or even an “emerging
hub” of the industry; 2) The job creation potential of water technology in Milwaukee has
been vastly exaggerated by boosters; in fact, the two leading companies of the local
water lobby have created more jobs outside of Milwaukee than in it over the past
decade; 3) UWM’s water school will be neither a unique presence nor a “first-mover” in
the field of water technology already brimming with university and corporate research
facilities; and 4) As evidenced by the politics of locating a building for the SFS, the risks
of excessive industry influence over the new school are significant.
The essay concludes with a call for alternatives to entrepreneurial universities.
Although the economic logic of the entrepreneurial university is highly flawed, that does
not mean that universities and university research are irrelevant to local economic
development and urban vitality. Educating students and generating human capital;
nurturing talent and intellectual curiosity; supporting the research commons through
open, public science; and helping solve real-world, community problems – these are the
ways in which engaged universities, rather than entrepreneurial ones, have historically
contributed to community economic well-being.

5

Introduction
Across the United States (as well as Europe and Canada), academic leaders now
routinely promote research universities as “engines” of local economic development.
“Entrepreneurial universities,” in which academic research is commercialized and
technology transferred through patents, licensing, and university-based business
startups, are touted as a sine qua non for cities and regions in the 21st century
knowledge-based economy. Indeed, in many economically struggling cities, the
entrepreneurial university is portrayed as nothing less than an “economic savior.”
(Fischer, 2006). Improving regional economic competitiveness by forging partnerships
with local businesses and commercializing university-generated knowledge is now
regularly cited as one of the core missions of the modern university (Slaughter and
Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005).
In Milwaukee, similar rhetoric has accompanied efforts in the last decade to
reorganize the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) into a center of academic
commercialism with, in the current chancellor’s words, a “research portfolio that can
truly transform this region” (Santiago, 2009). An entrepreneurial UWM has been
heralded as a “driver” of the regional economy (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2009c); an
“economic piston” (Schmid, 2005) and “idea hatchery” (Haynes, 2008) whose
commercialized research would be a “game changer” for Milwaukee (Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, 2009a); and a future “hothouse” of patents, licenses, and business
spinoffs (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2009b) that “will drive Milwaukee’s economic
reinvention” and “create jobs throughout southeastern Wisconsin” (The Business
Journal of Milwaukee, 2009).
Such characterizations have taken on an aura of conventional wisdom, not only in
Milwaukee but also in cities across the country. They have been embraced by civic
leaders and trumpeted in media accounts, almost always accompanied by tendentious
references to the classic entrepreneurial university success stories: Stanford and Silicon
Valley, MIT and Boston’s Route 128, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park. Yet,
as Joshua B. Powers perceptively notes, fervor over academic commercialism strongly
resembles the “irrational exuberance” of the bubble economy: hyperbole about
economic benefits, based on surprisingly little evidence or analysis (Powers, 2006).
6

In fact, as I shall argue, the contribution of university-based technology transfer to
local economic development has been wildly exaggerated. Although it has become
almost a cliché for entrepreneurial universities and regional leaders to boast of
becoming “the next Silicon Valley,” a systematic review of the historical record reveals
that the celebrated success stories of university-led economic development are more the
exception than the rule. Far more typically, the commercialization of academic research
and investments in university technology transfer have had little discernible impact in
reshaping the economic trajectory of cities or regions. Nor, for most universities, have
university-generated patents and licenses produced the internal returns envisioned by
proponents of academic commercialism. In the last analysis, the case for the
entrepreneurial university as a “game changer” or “driver” of local economic
development is more chimerical than compelling.
This paper is divided into two main sections. First, I examine the economic logic of
the entrepreneurial university, assessing the extant literature and presenting data on
research universities and economic performance in a sample of 55 large cities and
regions. In addition, I review the evidence on the degree to which university technology
transfer, which began in earnest after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, has
produced the patenting and licensing returns predicted by advocates of academic
commercialism. At the same time, I briefly discuss some of the serious costs generally
overlooked and even disregarded by boosters of the entrepreneurial university model:
the privatization of the intellectual “commons,” an erosion of the productive American
tradition of open, public science, and growing concerns about conflicts-of-interest that
threaten the integrity of university research.
Second, I present a case study of recent efforts to transform the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee into an entrepreneurial university. In the mid 2000s, in a city
battered by deindustrialization, job loss, and inner city poverty, university leaders
unveiled –and civic leaders embraced—a UWM “growth agenda,” boldly selling the idea
that university research, patents, and licensing could be the catalyst of a new Milwaukee
economy. I analyze the economic assumptions underpinning the UWM “growth
agenda,” and examine, in particular, the “irrational exuberance” animating the agenda’s
two key components: 1) a suburban technology park, oriented around biomedical
engineering, and 2) plans to transform Milwaukee into the “Silicon Valley of water
7

technology,” with entrepreneurial UWM research as the centerpiece. The UWM story is
an especially instructive case study of the perils of academic commercialism for socalled “mid-tier” universities.
Finally, in a short concluding section, I summarize the case against the
entrepreneurial university and briefly highlight alternatives. Although the economic
logic of the entrepreneurial university is highly flawed, that does not mean that
universities and university research are irrelevant to local economic development and
urban vitality. Educating students and generating human capital; nurturing talent and
intellectual curiosity; supporting the research commons through open, public science;
and helping solve real-world, community problems – these are the ways in which
engaged universities, rather than entrepreneurial ones, have historically contributed to
community economic well-being.
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Part I:
Entrepreneurial Research Universities and Local Economic
Development: A Review of the Evidence
Universities, as numerous studies have shown, are key economic institutions in cities
and metropolitan areas, through their purchasing, employment, real-estate
development, and other investments (Initiative for a Competitive Inner City and CEOs
for Cities, 2002; Amirkhanian and Habiby, 2003). Simply as an employer, for example,
colleges and universities “are becoming increasingly important for cities as they struggle
to keep their share of jobs in the metropolitan area;” indeed, universities now rank
among the largest employers in many big cities (Harkavy and Zuckerman, 1999, 1).
Almost every university president can pull an “economic impact study” out of his or her
pocket showing, for example, that the eight research universities of metropolitan Boston
“had a collective regional economic impact of more than $7 billion in 2000” (Appleseed.
Inc, 2002), that Harvard itself produced a $4.5 billion impact in metro Boston in 2009
(Harvard University, 2009), or that spending by the 16 colleges and universities in
Baltimore’s “Collegetown Network” produced, directly and through multipliers, a
regional economic impact of $17 billion and 162,000 jobs in 2008 (Clinch, 2008).
In addition, by educating students and generating human capital, universities boost
private sector productivity and stimulate future economic growth. This has been the
historical record nationally (Schultz, 1961; Goldin and Katz, 2008) and, to the extent
these productivity gains are localized, urban and regional growth in jobs and income is
likely to follow (Blackwell, Cobb, and Weinberg, 2002, 91).1 This local effect, of course,
is contingent on whether college graduates stay in the region – or whether the region
attracts “human capital” from other regions. To the extent this local nurturing and
clustering of talent occurs, productivity enhancements from a skilled labor force will
stimulate regional economic growth. Moreover, a kind of labor force-based “tech
transfer” occurs, as “young scientists and engineers who stay in the area help to transfer
university findings to local firms or they may work in industrial labs that create
knowledge that is valuable to local businesses” (Hill, 2006, 11).
Thus, Jesse Shapiro estimates (Shapiro, 2006, 324) that “from 1940 to 1990, a 10
percent increase in a metropolitan area’s concentration of college-educated residents
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was associated with a 0.8 percent increase in subsequent employment growth” (with 60
percent of the employment growth effect of college graduates flowing from enhanced
productivity growth). As Edward L. Glaeser and Albert Saiz conclude, in a highly
influential paper, “The Rise of the Skilled City”: “Human capital predicts population and
productivity growth at the city and metropolitan area level as surely as it predicts
income growth at the country level. High skill areas have been getting more populous,
better paid and more expensive. Indeed, aside from climate, skill composition may be
the most powerful predictor of urban growth” (Glaeser and Saiz, 2003, 42). This
tendency appears to have become more pronounced since 1980.2
The entrepreneurial university approach, however, envisions a university role in
economic development going well beyond these purchasing power, employment, and
human capital impacts. Instead, what some call “academic capitalism” entails a direct
insertion of market-oriented university research in the production process as the
primary university contribution to economic growth. Implicitly, the entrepreneurial
university “model” amalgamates three theories of economic development: 3
1)

2)
3)

“Endogenous growth theory,” which argues that the stock of knowledge and
technological innovation are the key determinants of the rate of economic
growth; that ideas and technological change produce “increasing returns” (not
the diminishing returns from traditional factors of production in neoclassical
economics) (Romer, 1990; Warsh, 2006, 289-326);4
“Competitiveness” theory, popularized by Michael Porter (1998), in which
regional prosperity flows from establishing competitive advantage for local
firms in particular industry “clusters” (Paytas, Gradeck, and Andrews, 2004)5;
“Market triumphalism,” in which the university becomes part of an “everything
for sale” culture (Kuttner, 1997; Block, 2008, 196); the university focuses “on
knowledge less as a public good than as a commodity to be capitalized on in
profit-oriented activities” (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004, 29). A strong private
market-orientation of universities, including “partnerships” with local
businesses and extensive business elite involvement in university
management, purports to serve the wider community interest by promoting
economic growth.

Some have dubbed this the “triple helix” model -- a partnership of industry,
government, and university science in promoting growth in a “global knowledge
economy” via technology transfer (Etzkowitz, 2008; Campbell et al, 2004)--although
this appellation seems to be more about catchy labeling than articulation of a rigorous
theory of universities and economic development.6 In any event, as Hill and Lendel
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point out, “science-based and technology-based economic development policies are
attempts to build absolute regional economic advantage, or competitive advantage, in
industries that emerge from the laboratories of universities or academic hospitals” (Hill
and Lendel, 2007, 224).
If the production of knowledge is the really important thing in economic growth and
the competitive advantage of local firms, then it follows that the research university, a
creator of knowledge par excellence, becomes a cornerstone institution generating
commercially relevant research and transferring it to the private sector, frequently to
“clusters” of firms (such as biotechnology or electronics) targeted by local economic
development policy. At entrepreneurial universities, this economic development role
typically includes some or all of the following activities: patenting, licensing, research
consortia, spin-off enterprises, research parks, start-up firm incubators, consultant
services, and venture-capital funds (Matkin, 1997, 32).
The critical question, of course, is whether this entrepreneurial activity really
delivers the economic development outcomes envisioned by proponents --- and at what
cost? To what extent is the economic value of the knowledge created in research
universities likely to be “captured” locally? The underlying assumption of academic
commercialism is that “universities create local technology spillovers, which are then
captured either within a state or metropolitan area…If spillovers are not captured
locally, the benefits from [science and technology] investments will be quickly diffused
to other regions and countries” (Bania, Eberts, and Fogarty, 1993, 761).
Curiously, despite the headlong rush of universities into academic commercialism,
there is little systematic empirical research supporting the central premises of the
strategy. For the most part, claims from representatives of the tech transfer profession
such as the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) about “x thousands
of jobs created” or “x thousands of businesses spun off,” sprinkled with the usual
anecdotal evidence of “success stories,” have served as the “empirical” rationale for
entrepreneurial university investments (Greenberg, 2007, 62; Goldstein and Renault,
2004, 734).
Here is a typical statement from a report extolling the seemingly self-evident
economic virtues of entrepreneurial universities: “Academic research and development
is a $1.1 billion industry in Wisconsin. It is driving the creation of thousands of jobs,
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directly and indirectly, and helping our core industries stay competitive in a changing
world” (Wisconsin Technology Council, 2009, 1). Then, as if on cue, the report cites the
usual entrepreneurial success stories –Silicon Valley, Route 128, and the North Carolina
Research Triangle—as well as a few others (Austin and the University of Texas; Atlanta
and Georgia Tech; and, closer to home, the city of Madison and the University of
Wisconsin-Madison).
As is always the case with tendentious and self-interested reports of this sort, there is
no systematic, methodologically defensible analysis establishing a causal relationship
between the commercialization of university research and indicators of regional
economic performance. In fact, most of these types of reports, typified by AUTM, consist
mainly of a recitation of “program outputs” (e.g. licenses, patents, and spinoffs), not an
analysis of economic development outcomes (Goldstein and Drucker, 2006, 29). The
simplistic economic development argument seems to be: Austin and Atlanta –to take
two examples-- are doing well economically; the University of Texas and Georgia Tech
are entrepreneurial research universities, producing patents, licensing, and business
spin-offs; ergo, the entrepreneurial university drives economic growth.
But such observations are incomplete and potentially misleading. There is no effort
to control for the myriad of factors other than university entrepreneurialism shaping
the economic performances of these cities and regions. There is no attempt to
disentangle and weigh the various mechanisms of university impact on the local
economy, or even the various mechanisms by which university-generated knowledge
spillover occurs. Assume, for example, that Austin’s economic prosperity is indeed
related to the University of Texas: how much is due to research commercialization and
tech transfer activity, as opposed to the human capital effects noted above, or simply the
impact of the general dissemination of knowledge from open scientific research?7 And
finally, there is no effort to specify the conditions under which university
entrepreneurialism might or might not pay off and thus affect the likely efficacy of the
model in one setting as opposed to another. It is assumed that entrepreneurial
university activities stimulate growth, no matter the state of the local economy (“weak
market” v. “strong market”) or no matter the type of university; these assumptions, as
we shall see, are highly debatable. In short, these non-academic “impact” reports,
despite their cascade of statistics on tech transfer, offer little reliable analysis on how
12

much or even whether academic research commercialization significantly affects urban
and regional economic performance.
As it turns out, there is scant support in the academic literature for the proposition
that entrepreneurial universities are “drivers” of local economic development. At best,
some studies show that under some conditions, certain types of universities --pursuing
certain types of research activities and located in certain types of cities or regions-- may
exert a modest influence on local economic development. Kent Hill’s thorough survey of
the literature concludes that the economic effects of university research are “discernible
and statistically significant,” but “skewed and modest.” These impacts are likely to occur
“when faculty are on the cutting edge of revolutionary commercial technologies, when
graduate programs in science and engineering are top notch, and when the university is
located in a large urban area with an existing concentration of industrial R&D and high
tech production. These conditions are difficult to replicate” (Hill, 2006, 3). Moreover,
Hill admits that even under these circumstances there is little evidence that the
influence of tech transfer and other commercial activities is decisive, compared to the
traditional university functions of conducting basic research or educating students.
* * * *
Since Adam Jaffe’s seminal work (1989), there has been a burgeoning literature of
econometric studies, based on “knowledge-production models,” analyzing the economic
impact of university knowledge creation (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993;
Anselin, Varga, and Acs, 1997). Typically, these models have found some relationship
between university research (measured by R&D expenditures) and indicators of
innovation (typically measured by corporate patents).
However, in two major ways, this literature is highly problematic in assessing the
economic impact of entrepreneurial universities. First, these studies don’t provide any
direct evidence on the proponents’ central claim: that the commercialization of
academic research decisively influences the economic trajectory of cities or regions. In
fact, the measures they use are “doubly indirect” – first, relating university R&D to
“innovation,” and in turn, using patents as a proxy measure of innovation and
knowledge spillover. However, patents are, at best, a highly imperfect indicator of
innovation; scholars tend to use them as a measure of innovation or knowledge creation
mainly because data are readily available (Drucker and Goldstein, 1007, 33). As Hall,
13

Jaffe, and Trachtenberg (2001, 6) note, innovations “vary enormously in their
technological and economic importance” and simple patent counts are deficient in
capturing this variation. Even careful studies that take this into account by looking at
patent citations instead of simple counts don’t fully solve the problem; although
citations may give a better sense of “quality” patents which, presumably, represent
genuine innovation, the fact remains that patents are just one indicator of “knowledge”
production. As Drucker and Goldstein (2007, 33) point out: “Not all knowledge is
patentable. For instance, codified knowledge is embodied in copyrights, trade secrets,
and scientific papers as well as patents, whereas tacit knowledge and shared expertise
may be as important to localized spillover effects as codified knowledge but are largely
unmeasurable.”8 In short, a focus on patents may produce a misleading analysis of the
level of innovation in a community.
Even assuming, however, that patents are a robust measure of innovation, the key
question is: how well does this indicator correlate with real economic outcomes in a city
or region, such as employment, incomes, or regional GDP growth? In fact, as we will
examine shortly, empirical data suggest there is little relationship between either
university R&D expenditures or the number of patents registered in a region and
general measures of economic well-being.
Second, these studies all employ university R&D as the independent variable in their
production-function equations. But this measure, again, doesn’t get at the underlying
claim of entrepreneurial universities: that traditional “blue sky” academic research is
insufficient to produce economic development, and that research commercialization,
involving university-generated patents, licensing, and spin-offs is how the modern,
entrepreneurial university drives regional economies. By not separating different types
of research activities, let alone the myriad other ways in which universities contribute to
local economies, these econometric models do not actually test the entrepreneurial
university strategy of economic development.
There have been just a few studies that look explicitly at the impact of university
research –and, to some extent, the impact of the specific mechanisms of knowledge
spillover (entrepreneurial versus traditional) – on regional economic outcomes. In an
early, cross-sectional study, Bania, Eberts, and Fogarty (1993) looked at the relationship
between university R&D and new-firm startups in six industries in 25 metropolitan
14

areas between 1976-1978. They found the contribution of university research linked to
growth in only one high tech industry (Electronic Equipment); for all other sectors,
including another high tech industry (Instruments and Related Products), the results
were statistically insignificant (765). Their conclusion: “The evidence presented in this
paper suggests that states cannot generalize from the Route 128 and Silicon Valley
experiences” (765).
Harvey A. Goldstein and his co-authors have published the most in-depth and
systematic analyses so far of the regional economic development impacts of universities.
Goldstein and Renault (2004) and Goldstein and Drucker (2006) construct multivariate
regression models to compare, across 313 metropolitan areas (MSAs), the regional
economic impact of several university-related variables to other indicators that plausibly
influence economic development. The university-related variables include research
expenditures, university-based patents, and the “production” of science and engineering
graduates (degrees at the undergraduate and graduate levels); the non-university factors
include the basic educational level of MSA population, level of local entrepreneurship,
quality of life, and indicators of agglomeration or geographic/economic centrality. Both
studies measure the regional economic impact of these factors by assessing their effect
on changes in real average annual earnings per worker in MSAs, an indicator of “the
quality of regional jobs” (Goldstein and Drucker, 2006, 28).
On the whole, Goldstein’s studies provide no support for the vision of
entrepreneurial research universities as engines of regional economic development. For
the entire pool of 313 MSAs, Goldstein and Drucker (2006) found a very modest positive
impact of university research expenditures on regional wage growth. But the model
showed no impact at all of entrepreneurial university activity, measured by universitybased patents, on changes in average annual earnings per worker in MSAs; thus, the
results provide scant support for notions that “academic commercialism” as opposed to
traditional, open science university research, is indispensible for regional economic
development. Moreover, the small effect of university R&D expenditures on regional
earnings growth was dwarfed by the importance of human capital variables, such as the
overall level of educational attainment in the MSA or graduate-level share of degrees
awarded in science and technology fields. In addition, standard economic development
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factors –agglomeration economies and industry structure—were much more important
than university R&D expenditures in explaining changes in regional earnings.
The Goldstein-Drucker model also breaks down the pool of MSAs by size, with some
interesting results. University R&D has a slightly more positive effect on regional wage
growth in medium-sized metropolitan areas (75,000-200,000 employment) than in
large ones (employment over 200,000) – a result hardly astonishing to even casual
observers of “college towns” like Madison, Ann Arbor, Charlottesville, or ChampaignUrbana.9 University patenting, though, while showing a modestly positive relationship
to wage growth in large MSAs in the model, has a strongly negative relationship to wage
growth in medium-sized areas, a puzzling variation.10 Nevertheless, notwithstanding
small and relatively isolated signs of an economic impact of university research or
commercialization, these factors pale beside the influence of human capital and industry
structure variables in Goldstein-Drucker’s regression model, no matter the size of the
MSA. To take one striking example: in large MSAs, whether or not a region is an “air
hub” is a much more important influence on regional wage growth than either university
R&D or university patenting.
In short, Goldstein’s work seriously undercuts the characterization of
entrepreneurial universities as “engines of economic development” in two main ways.
First, among university activities themselves, the generation of human capital –not
research expenditures or commercial activity—appears to be the most important
university-related factor influencing regional economic fortunes. This confirms the
saying that “the best form of technology transfer is the moving van that transports the
Ph.D. from his or her university laboratory to a new job in industry” (Lester, 2005, 11).
Second, and most importantly, Goldstein’s research reveals that, by a wide margin,
the most significant factors shaping the economic trajectory of regions are nonuniversity ones. “[F]actors external to universities, including the stock of business
services and the educational attainment level, remain the most influential determinants
of regional economic progress over all size regions. Agglomeration economies, such as
those measured by business services and the base employment level, are significant as
well” (Goldstein and Drucker, 2006, 37). This is an especially important finding to keep
in mind as local policymakers embrace the entrepreneurial university as the “next big
thing” in economic development strategy.
16

A final set of studies germane to the impact of entrepreneurial universities involves
university science research parks. There are currently 174 university research parks in
the United States and Canada, according to the Association of University Research Parks
(AURP), an organization that promotes the development and operations of research
parks in the same way AUTM promotes university-based technology transfer activities
(AURP, 2009). Link and Scott (2007) define a university research park (URP) as “a
cluster of technology-based organizations that locate on or near a university campus in
order to benefit from the university’s knowledge base and ongoing research. The
university not only transfers knowledge but expects to develop knowledge more
effectively given the association with the tenants in the research park” (Link and Scott,
2007, 662). As Daniel Felsenstein points out, the aim of university-related science parks
is to function as “seedbeds” of innovation and “catalysts in urban and regional growth”
that will lead regions “into a spiral of propulsive expansion” (Felsenstein, 1994, 93-94).
Research parks seek “to play an incubator role, nurturing the development and growth
of new, small, high-technology firms, facilitating the transfer of university know-how to
tenant companies, encouraging the development of faculty-based spin-offs and
stimulating the development of innovative products and processes” (Felsenstein, 1994,
93).
Like AUTM, the AURP churns out descriptive statistics on the economic impact of
URPs, claiming they cumulatively housed 4,380 tenants in 2007, and reported total
employment of 271,366.11 When multiplier effects are tallied, AURP estimates that URPs
generate almost 680,000 jobs nationally (Battelle, 2007, 17-18), most in high-tech,
high-wage fields. There are numerous similar “impact reports” released for individual
URPs (see, for example, Lim, 2007; RESI, 2008, 12-13). And, of course, there are many
accounts of the biggest recognized research park success stories: the Stanford Research
Park and the Research Triangle Park (RTP) in North Carolina, cases that are invariably
cited when any university embarks on building a URP (Luger and Goldstein, 1991, 7699; 122-154; Weddle, 2007; O’Mara, 2005, 97-141).
There are, however, few academic studies analyzing either the actual impact of URPs
on regional economic development, or under what conditions URPs are likely to succeed
or fail. Moreover, as Wallsten points out, “notably absent from the literature on science
parks is any real discussion of their costs or estimates of public expenditures on them”
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(Wallsten, 2004, 4), although a recent report for the AURP admitted that most parks
have “limited or no profitability” (Battelle, 2007, 5). In any event, as Link and Scott
conclude: “URPs are not well understood and attendant research on them is just
beginning to burgeon” (2007, 662).
Measuring the economic development impact of URPs is methodologically tricky. It
is more complicated than simply counting the number of tenants or jobs in research
parks and then measuring multiplier effects, or even identifying the number of new
firms with URP provenance. No matter how large a research park may be, the
underlying purpose of developing URPs is to generate regional economic dynamism
outside the park – otherwise, URPs may simply function, at best, as subsidized
“enclaves” of innovation, not “seedbeds” of economic development (Felsenstein, 1994).
As Wallsten points out, “in order to generate economic growth, a science park would
have to encourage firm growth that would not have happened without the park or
generate spillovers that would otherwise be absent” (Wallsten, 2004, 5). Yet:
Cities and research park organizations routinely count as “success” any
firms or employment in the park, with no regard to whether that
economic activity was new to the region or simply relocated into the
park, and no analysis of whether that activity would have been likely to
occur without the park. Moreover…the costs of the park (many of which
might be hidden, such as the opportunity cost of the land) are rarely
calculated. In other words, cost-benefit analyses of research parks are
likely to count as benefits any economic activity in the park regardless of
whether it is, in fact, a net benefit, and ignore the costs altogether
(Wallsten, 2004, 5).
Wallsten’s study (2004), although limited in a number of ways, nevertheless
provides one of the only systematic empirical analyses of the regional economic impact
of research parks. He compares trends in high tech job growth and venture capital
formation in a set of “matched” counties across the United States: “treatment counties”
that built research parks after 1986, and economically similar “control counties” without
research parks. Wallsten found little difference in the economic performance of the two
sets of counties, and concluded that establishing a research park has no net impact on
job growth of the amount of venture capital attracted to the county. “While success
stories do exist, the analysis suggests that successes are the exception rather than the
rule. Thus, policies intended to promote cluster development by subsidizing science or
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research parks are unlikely to be effective” (Wallsten, 2004, 15). Wallsten’s findings
confirm the assessment in Luger and Goldstein’s 1991 study that “research parks are not
likely to reverse the fortunes of regional economies whose industries have already
shown distress” (Luger and Goldstein, 1991, 48).
In fact, for every Stanford, RTP, or University of Utah URP success story, there are
languishing parks where dreams of becoming the next Silicon Valley have been dashed.
Indeed, even the AURP’s data show that only seven university research parks –roughly 5
percent of the URPs on which data was collected-- account for 54 percent all URP
employment in North America (Battelle, 2007, 6); this highly skewed distribution
means, of course, that many universities have cumulatively invested billions in a nontrivial number of thinly populated, low impact research parks. Boosters may conjure
visions of mega-successes like Stanford or the RTP, but rarely mention the more typical
range of URP outcomes. For example:
•

The Texas Research Park, a University of Texas-San Antonio operation that opened
in 1990 was supposed to spark a biotech boom in San Antonio, with 100 companies
and 30,000 employees by 2020; by 2003, there were all of 15 for-profit companies
in the park, and 300 employees (Hundley, 2003).12 San Antonio remains a
peripheral player in the biotechnology sector (Cortright and Mayer, 2002; Bailey,
2005).

•

The University of South Carolina’s “Innovista,” a $250 million research park, was
launched with great fanfare as a “transformational” project in the city of Columbia,
a “campus developed by the university, centered on research in areas like hydrogenpowered fuel cells and biotechnology. The aim is to cluster research labs, private
companies, and condominiums” in a creative “live-work-play” setting (Goodman,
2008; Innovista, 2009).
Three years after launch, the project already looks like a classic case of URP
oversell: construction has been delayed on nearly every major Innovista capital
project, and tenants and private investors have been slow to materialize (Aiken,
2008; Aiken 2009; Hammond and Jackson, 2007). Moreover, one of the research
centerpieces of the project, commercial development of hydrogen-powered fuel cell,
may be seriously compromised by the decision of the Obama Administration to
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slash funding for hydrogen-car research (Aiken, 2009) – a potentially painful and
expensive lesson in the foibles of university administrators picking research clusters
based on commercial prospects.
In a telling comment on the burgeoning fiasco, one critic put it: “How does this
kind of thing happen? I think the root of the problem is that Innovista is not
innovative. Instead, university and state officials just tried to copy what someone
else had done. Specifically, they hoped to replicate the Centennial Campus, the
wildly successful research campus project at North Carolina State University in
Raleigh. Apparently the thinking went something like this: Raleigh is a state capital
and Columbia is a state capital; N.C. State is a big state school and USC is a big state
school; it worked there, so it will work here. Let’s throw tax money at it and see
what happens” (Fisher, 2008). As we shall see, this kind of shallow, “mimicry-as
analysis” on universities and economic development is not limited to South
Carolina. Meanwhile, Columbia’s economy was the subject of a recent New York
Times headline: “Reeling South Carolina city is a snapshot of economic woes”
(Goodman, 2008). By August 2009, after the embarrassing firing of Innovista’s
developer, USC’s president acknowledged “struggles” and the need for a “fresh
assessment [of Innovista] in light of what we have learned in the past few years”
(Washington, 2009).
•

In the 1980s, under the visionary and entrepreneurial leadership of president
George Low, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) launched an effort to explicitly
replicate the Stanford-Silicon Valley model in the Capital District of New York State,
encompassing the cities of Albany, Troy, and Schenectady. “Hewlett-Packard and
Stanford – that’s the model,” stated Low, in launching the Rensselaer Technology
Park as one of his core initiatives (Leslie, 2001, 256). With the park, Low argued,
the Capital Region “will be counted among a few select places in the nation where
technology flourishes,” and the park was envisioned as a crucial institution in
arresting regional decline and transforming the economic culture of the region
towards entrepreneurialism and dynamism (Leslie, 257). The park had some
modest success, launching a number of high tech companies (such as Raster
Technologies), and in 2009, 28 years after breaking ground, reporting 70 tenants
and 2,400 employees (Rensselaer Technology Park, 2009). But no one would
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seriously argue that the region became one the nation’s “few” high tech centers, or
that the park –or RPI’s other entrepreneurial initiatives, for that matter—
dramatically altered the economic trajectory of its region. “Troy may have been the
‘Silicon Valley of the Nineteenth century’,” writes Stuart W. Leslie. “Today its
economic future looks as bleak as the view from RPI on a winter afternoon” (Leslie,
2001, 236).
In short, university research parks are anything but sure-fire investments in urban
or regional economic prosperity. Success is relatively uncommon, as Wallsten’s impact
study makes clear. “Game-changing” success – the kind that remakes a regional
economy—is even more rare, the product of unique historical factors, good luck, and
timing. For example, the North Carolina Research Triangle Park’s oft-cited (and oftemulated) success, “was built around its first-mover status in the field of science parks,”
generous state and federal funding, and a uniquely patient multi-decade commitment by
political leadership – and even with all those difficult-to-replicate factors in its favor, it
took more than 30 years to see evidence of the cluster development attributed to the
park (Weddle, 2007, 7). Universities that cavalierly pursue and oversell URPs as
“transformational” economic development investments risk creating white elephants
and misallocating millions of dollars that could be better invested bolstering the core
missions of their institutions.
*

*

*

*

To more fully examine the relationship between research universities, academic
commercialism, and local economic development, I have assembled data for a sample of
55 of the nation’s largest metro areas.13 I have collected four different types of data to
measure the extensiveness of university research operations as well as
commercialization activities:
•

Total academic research and development expenditures, published by the
National Science Foundation.14 NSF collects the data for universities; I have
aggregated the university data by metropolitan areas. In addition, I have
collected the data for all years since 1985;
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•

University research expenditures per capita in metropolitan areas, to control
for region size. Presumably, $1 billion in research expenditures is a more
influential economic factor in a region of 250,000 residents than in one of 5
million;

•

University-generated patents, again published for each university (by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office) and then aggregated by me by metropolitan
area. I have collected these data for all years since 1985, and broken them down
per 100,000 population in metropolitan areas.15

•

Revenues generated through the licensing of university research and inventions.
These data are published annually by the Association of University Technology
Managers’ survey of university licensing operations; I have aggregated the 2007
university data by metropolitan area, broken down per 100,000 population, as an
indicator of the level of university-based “entrepreneurialism” in a region.16

To analyze how these university research and commercialization variables affect
local economic development, I have collected data on four key measures of city and
regional economic performance: job growth in the city proper; the growth in employed
residents in the city (a composite measure of demographic and economic dynamism);
growth in employed residents in the metropolitan area; and growth in overall economic
activity in the region, measured by change in metropolitan area gross domestic product.
The entrepreneurial university strategy rests on two key, testable premises: 1)
Research universities are the linchpins of city and regional economic development in the
modern, global, “knowledge-based” economy; and 2) The entrepreneurial “tech
transfer” activities of licensing and patenting are the key mechanisms by which
university-generated knowledge spillover to the larger city and regional economies
occurs. In short, for the entrepreneurial model to be credible there should be a strong
correlation between levels of university research expenditures and city and regional
economic well-being; more importantly, as a test of the mechanism of academic
commercialism, there should be a strong relationship between levels of university
patenting and licensing and overall city and regional economic performance.
Tables 1 and 2 array some of the basic data on university research,
entrepreneurialism, and the economic performance of regions and their central cities. A
broad scan of the tables reveals a variety of scenarios.
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On the one hand, the data confirm that metropolises popularly portrayed as
successful “cities of knowledge,” such as Boston, Austin, San Francisco, and Raleigh,
rank very high in research expenditures, university patent production, and most of the
indicators of regional economic well-being.17 These data, of course, say nothing about
the causal link between academic commercialism and regional economic success in
these places (more on that below) – but they do support popular characterizations of
these regions as centers of university research, knowledge commercialization, and
economic growth.
However, although boosters of the entrepreneurial university strategy constantly
refer to these celebrated “success stories” as if they represent a general historical
pattern, Tables 1 and 2 make clear that there are many other scenarios and that the
“success story” outcome is hardly the most common. There are many regions with highranking research universities and weak overall economic performance. What’s more,
contrary to the deterministic view that entrepreneurial research universities are a sine
qua non for regional economic success, there are numerous regions with minimal
university R&D expenditures, little or no university entrepreneurial activity, and yet
among the highest levels of job creation and GDP growth in the country. In fact, Table 3
shows that among the 10 metropolitan areas in the sample registering the highest GDP
growth between 2001-2006, only San Diego and Sacramento ranked near the top in
academic R&D expenditures per capita between 1985-2006.
Tables 4 through 7 focus on these scenarios a little more directly, looking at the two
key economic indicators: overall regional growth (measured by GDP), and job growth in
the urban core (measured by central city job growth). The tables highlight cases of high
university R&D and high regional economic performance; high university R&D and low
economic performance; and low university R&D and high economic performance. The
latter two scenarios are much more common than the first, casting considerable doubt
on the “research university as a growth machine” argument. In fact, as Table 7 shows,
the top quintiles of metro areas, ranked by university R&D expenditures, actually
registered lower rates of GDP growth, metro area employment growth, and job growth
in the urban core, than did the regions in the bottom quintiles – places essentially
lacking major research universities. This is hardly a ringing confirmation of the
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Table 1:
University Research Expenditures and Commercialization Indicators
In Selected Metropolitan Areas18
Metropolitan Area

Baltimore
Boston
New York
Los Angeles
Raleigh
San Francisco
Chicago
Detroit
Philadelphia
San Diego
Atlanta
Washington, D.C.
Seattle
Pittsburgh
Minneapolis
Newark
Houston
Oakland
Columbus
St. Louis
Sacramento
New Haven
Austin
San Jose
Dallas
Rochester
Birmingham
Cleveland
Nashville
Buffalo
Miami
Cincinnati
Salt Lake City
Providence
Portland
Tampa
San Antonio
Milwaukee
Phoenix
Richmond
Omaha
Louisville
Orlando
Toledo
Norfolk
Las Vegas
Memphis
Akron
Kansas City
Denver
Charlotte
Boise
Greensboro
Jacksonville
Des Moines

Total Academic R&D
$, 1985-2006
(in billions $)

Total # of Universitygenerated patents,
1985-2005

$23.387
21.547
18.587
17.781
15.766
15.401
13.548
13.099
11.463
10.694
10.135
9.416
9.233
8.129
8.016
6.708
6.687
6.640
6.588
6.586
6.514
5.693
5.641
4.502
4.388
4.233
3.940
3.752
3.503
3.435
3.320
3.062
3.044
2.605
2.603
2.568
2.016
2.015
1.965
1.827
1.113
1.035
1.006
.643
.480
.479
.464
.368
.328
.226
.154
.070
.053
.019
.010

University Patents
per 100,000 pop,
1990-1999

1014
3378
1589
N/A
1324
N/A
729
934
1,113
N/A
736
527
480
618
701
670
175
N/A
379
507
N/A
348
1529
N/A
24
250
240
224
221
N/A
101
167
432
177
214
210
3
63
108
102
N/A
20
188
79
6
0
2
120
0
5
0
3
0
0
0

Sources: National Science Foundation; United States Patent and Trademark Office
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39.7
99.2
17.1
N/A
111.4
N/A
8.8
21.0
21.8
N/A
17.9
10.7
19.9
26.2
23.6
33.0
4.2
N/A
24.6
19.5
N/A
64.2
122.3
N/A
0.7
22.8
26.1
10.0
17.9
N/A
4.5
10.1
32.4
14.9
11.2
8.8
0.2
4.2
4.5
10.2
N/A
1.9
11.5
12.8
0.4
0
0.2
17.3
0
0.2
0
0.7
0
0
0

University patents as
% of metro area
patents, 1990-1999
8.2%
6.6%
6.7%
N/A
14.3%
N/A
1.3%
2.7%
4.3%
N/A
4.6%
3.4%
3.6%
4.2%
4.6%
4.3%
0.6%
N/A
6.6%
4.4%
N/A
4.8%
10.8%
N/A
0.1%
0.7%
14.8%
1.8%
9.9%
N/A
2.4%
1.3%
4.5%
4.5%
1.9%
3.3%
0.0%
0.7%
0.8%
4.5%
N/A
0.7%
4.1%
5.1%
0.5%
0
0.1%
4.7%
0
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0

Table 2:
Academic R&D and Economic Indicators in Selected Regions19
Rank

Metropolitan Area

Academic R&D
$ Per Capita,
1985-2006

% change
City Jobs,
1992-2004

% change
Employed
Residents in
City 19902008

% change
Employed
Residents in
Metro Area
1990-2008

% change
Real Metro
GDP
2001-2006

1
Raleigh
$13,271
+8.2
+68.0
+70.9
+17.5
2
New Haven
$10,500
-25.7
-12.7
+1.5
+9.3
3
Baltimore
$9,160
-3.8
-19.6
+13.4
+14.7
4
San Francisco
$8,896
+0.6
+8.3
+9.6
+11.9
5
Boston
$6,324
+17.1
+2.1
+7.5
+8.3
6
Austin
$4,513
+9.5
+56.5
+83.2
+22.8
7
Birmingham
$4,277
+7.4
-16.9
+18.8
+9.3
8
Columbus
$4,277
+20.0
+18.5
+25.3
+8.3
9
Sacramento
$4,001
+6.8
+19.9
+37.7
+29.6
10
Rochester
$3,854
-16.2
-15.8
-0.1
+9.5
11
Seattle
$3,823
+2.1
+23.0
+32.2
+13.3
12
San Diego
$3,801
+15.3
+23.7
+27.1
+23.7
13
Pittsburgh
$3,446
-0.4
-7.5
+6.0
+6.0
14
Newark
$3,300
-2.4
-9.5
+3.2
+7.2
15
Detroit
$2,949
-8.7
-11.0
-1.1
0.0
16
Buffalo
$2,935
-9.9
-15.2
-1.0
+9.4
17
Nashville
$2,845
+15.9
+15.8
+41.1
+23.2
18
Oakland
$2,775
+0.2
+9.0
+9.6
+11.9
19
Minneapolis
$2,700
-3.5
+3.4
+23.8
+11.6
20
San Jose
$2,676
-6.5
+3.7
+1.5
+13.1
21
St. Louis
$2,529
+4.0
-13.6
+6.8
+5.7
22
Atlanta
$2,464
+29.1
+25.0
+57.8
+13.8
23
Salt Lake City
$2,282
-6.7
+37.7
+58.2
+16.7
24
Philadelphia
$2,247
+0.7
-11.2
+7.9
+12.4
25
Providence
$2,192
+12.0
+2.4
+6.2
+12.8
26
New York
$1,996
+11.4
+20.2
+10.3
+12.2
27
Washington, D.C.
$1,913
+8.7
-0.7
+27.2
+20.9
28
Los Angeles
$1,868
-0.3
+5.0
+10.5
+19.2
29
Cincinnati
$1,860
-15.4
-5.7
+17.6
+7.5
30
Richmond
$1,833
+0.1
-2.4
+27.4
+8.2
31
Cleveland
$1,667
-11.2
-9.1
+3.4
+6.0
32
Chicago
$1,638
-2.1
+2.4
+15.4
+7.6
33
Houston
$1,601
+15.4
+20.0
+37.4
+15.2
34
Omaha
$1,552
+24.0
+29.5
+25.8
+17.5
35
Miami
$1,473
+3.7
+12.7
+38.4
+22.0
36
Portland
$1,357
+17.1
+26.2
+35.0
+26.2
37
Milwaukee
$1,343
-3.5
-7.3
+7.2
+8.2
38
San Antonio
$1,266
+36.0
+46.1
+45.5
+18.2
39
Dallas
$1,247
+6.6
+3.4
+37.8
+16.6
40
Tampa
$1,071
-13.2
+12.5
+27.4
+23.3
41
Toledo
$1,040
-7.0
-9.7
+1.3
+5.2
42
Louisville
$1,009
-2.0
+0.7
+12.9
+9.5
43
Orlando
$612
+62.0
+46.3
+62.5
+33.9
44
Phoenix
$604
+37.6
+59.6
+81.1
+29.5
45
Akron
$530
-2.9
+3.9
+16.5
+10.4
46
Memphis
$409
+10.2
+7.8
+18.5
+14.3
47
Las Vegas
$306
+85.7
+98.5
+138.0
+43.9
48
Norfolk
$305
+12.0
+3.3
+22.5
+16.8
49
Kansas City
$185
+8.0
-0.8
+17.8
+10.2
50
Boise
$163
+51.6
+54.9
+77.8
+27.8
51
Denver
$107
+12.1
+28.5
+47.8
+12.1
52
Charlotte
$103
+28.8
+49.8
+43.3
+24.9
53
Greensboro
$42
-2.2
+18.9
+14.7
+6.4
54
Des Moines
$22
-4.9
+0.2
+30.4
+22.6
55
Jacksonville
$17
+25.7
+26.4
+41.2
+27.4
Sources: National Science Foundation; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Table 3:
University Research Expenditures in Fastest Growing Regions in Sample
(Academic R&D Rank in “Top Ten” GDP Growth Metros)
Metropolitan Area

Las Vegas
Orlando
Sacramento
Phoenix
Boise
Jacksonville
Portland
Charlotte
San Diego
Tampa

Real GDP Growth, 20012006

Total Academic R&D,
1985-2006
(in billions$)

Rank Among 55 Regions
in Academic R&D Per
Capita

43.9%
33.9%
29.6%
29.5%
27.8%
27.4%
26.2%
24.9%
23.7%
23.3%

.479
1.006
6.514
1.965
.070
.019
2.603
.154
10.694
2.568

47
43
10
44
50
55
36
52
12
40

Table 4:
The Classic Success Stories
Metropolitan Area

Raleigh
San Francisco
Boston
Austin
San Diego

Academic R&D Per Capita,
1985-2006
Rank

City Job Growth,
1992-2004
Rank

Metro Area GDP Real
Growth, 2001-2006
Rank

1
4
5
6
12

23
32
11
21
15

19
33
44
12
9

Table 5:
High University R&D… But Low Economic Performance
Metropolitan Area

New Haven
Baltimore
Birmingham
Rochester
Pittsburgh
Newark
Detroit
Buffalo
St. Louis
Philadelphia

Academic R&D Per Capita,
1985-2006
Rank

City Job Growth,
1992-2004
Rank

Metro Area GDP Real
Growth, 2001-2006
Rank

2
3
7
9
13
14
15
16
21
24

55
44
25
54
36
40
49
50
28
31

41
24
41
38
52
49
55
40
53
30
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Table 6:
Low University R&D… But High Economic Performance
Metropolitan Area

Academic R&D Per Capita,
1985-2006
Rank

City Job Growth,
1992-2004
Rank

Metro Area GDP Real
Growth, 2001-2006
Rank

55
54
52
51
50
49
47
44
43
39

8
45
7
16
3
24
1
4
2
27

6
13
8
32
5
36
1
4
2
22

Jacksonville
Des Moines
Charlotte
Denver
Boise
Kansas City
Las Vegas
Phoenix
Orlando
Dallas

Table 7:
University Research Expenditures and Regional Economic Outcomes
(Averages on economic indicators, by academic R&D rank quintiles
QUINTILE/ACADEMIC R&D
EXPENDITURES

% CHANGE
CITY JOBS, 19922004

% CHANGE
EMPLOYED
RESIDENTS IN
CITY 1990-2008

% CHANGE
EMPLOYED
RESIDENTS IN
METRO AREA
1990-2008

% CHANGE
REAL METRO
GDP
2001-2006

Top quintile (regions ranked 1-11)

+2.4

+11.9

+27.3

+14.0

Second quintile (ranks 12-22)

+3.0

+2.2

+15.9

+11.4

Third quintile (ranks 23-33)

+1.2

+5.3

+20.1

+12.6

Fourth quintile (ranks 34-44)

+14.7

+20.0

+34.1

+19.1

Fifth quintile (ranks 45-55)

+20.4

+26.5

+42.6

+19.7

centrality of entrepreneurial research universities in generating regional economic
development, or in alleviating urban economic distress.
Table 5 provides an especially vivid snapshot of what Heike Mayer calls economic
development “failure in the presence of universities” (Mayer, 2007, 41). These are all
regions characterized by: 1) strong (and, in most cases, world-class) research
universities; 2) rank at the top of metro areas in the amount of academic research
dollars secured; 3) substantial university commitment to tech transfer, including
patenting and licensing; and 4) location of the major research university (or
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universities), in most of the cases, in the region’s core city. If entrepreneurial
universities could spur urban and regional prosperity, these should be the cities and
regions where the evidence of such impact would be palpable.20 Yet, as table 5 shows,
they all rank poorly on key indicators of urban and regional economic health. Taken as a
group, the metropolitan areas in table 5 posted an average real GDP growth rate since
2001 only 40 percent as high as the remaining regions in the pool (6.8 percent
compared to 16.8 percent). The record on urban job growth in these “research
university cities” was even worse: the group of metro areas in table 5 reported an
average decline of 6.7 percent in the number of jobs located in the city since 1992; by
contrast the remaining regions reported a 10.9 percent increase in the number of urban
jobs.
A brief closer look at two of these individual cases, Baltimore and New Haven, is
instructive, underscoring how much boosters oversell the notion of research universities
and academic commercialization as engines of city and regional economic development.
Baltimore. If any city and region should be reaping the benefits of world-class
university research and commercial spillovers it would be Baltimore. Between 19852006, the region posted more than $23 billion in academic research expenditures; one
university --the Johns Hopkins University-- generated around $20 billion of this total.
Johns Hopkins, with a main campus and a world-renowned medical school in the
central city, and an “Advanced Physics Laboratory” in the suburbs, is the unambiguous
powerhouse of U.S. academic R&D funding in science and engineering: it has topped the
NSF rankings in research expenditures for 29 consecutive years. The numbers are
staggering: between 1999-2006, Johns Hopkins accounted for 3.1 percent of all
academic R&D expenditures in the United States, and 4.5 percent of all federally-funded
R&D expenditures. To put these totals in perspective, Johns Hopkins’ R&D
expenditures since 1999 have been 66 percent higher than the second ranked university
(UCLA), and 80 percent higher than such top-ranked research institutions as the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The Johns Hopkins University’s R&D expenditures
since 1999 have been larger than for Stanford and MIT – the archetypes for the
“university research as engine of economic development” trope-- combined.
In addition to the Johns Hopkins research machine, Baltimore is home to: 1) the
growing research operation of the University of Maryland, Baltimore (located in
28

downtown Baltimore, with over $2 billion in research expenditures between 19992006); 2) the University of Maryland Baltimore County (located in suburban
Catonsville, with over $350 million in R&D between 1999-2006); and 3) a campus of the
University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute (UMBI), located in the revitalized Inner
Harbor area of downtown (Hopkins, 2007).
In short, by any measure, Baltimore is America’s urban capital of academic research
funding: indeed, only Boston approaches Baltimore’s aggregate university research
expenditure since 1985 (see Table 1). Baltimore has a flow of university research funding
that few cities and regions can even dream of approaching. Yet, the data make clear that
university-based research has not automatically translated into an economic
renaissance in Baltimore: the region ranks in the middle of the pack in metro area GDP
growth, and, despite a heralded downtown revitalization program and neighborhood
gentrification around the harbor waterfront, the city remains one of America’s most
economically troubled (Levine, 2000). Maryann Feldman, who has studied the impact
of research at the Johns Hopkins University on local economic development, argues that
Baltimore “has not captured the benefits of proximity to a research university” (Feldman
and Desrochers, 2003, 6) and that Hopkins is the counterfactual case to Stanford and
MIT: a world-class research university that “has not been a catalyst for the location of
industrial R&D facilities” or spin-off companies in Baltimore (Feldman, 1994, 70).
Moreover, despite Johns Hopkins’ scientific reputation as well as the ambitious UMBI
established in 1985 to create a “Maryland version of Silicon Valley” in biotechnology, 25
years later Baltimore does not rank among the nation’s top biotechnology centers
(DeVol, 2009; Walker, 2009).
Feldman and others assert that a history of “disdain for profit-making enterprises”
among Johns Hopkins scientists, and an aloofness “from the needs or wants of business
and industry,” have been the primary factors explaining this limited regional economic
impact (Feldman and Desrochers, 2004, 14; Bishop, 2007). This argument, however,
exaggerates Johns Hopkins’ aversion to commercialization, particularly in recent years,
and is not persuasive. Although Johns Hopkins has historically manifested a tenacious
and admirable commitment to open, public science, it has hardly boycotted tech
transfer. Although Johns Hopkins has not embraced entrepreneurialism with perhaps
the same fervor as, say, Stanford, UW-Madison, or MIT, it nevertheless ranks fairly high
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among U.S. universities in “research commercialization.” Johns Hopkins ranks 6th, for
example, among all universities in patents secured since 1969 (USPTO, 2005). Among
the metropolitan areas examined in this paper, Baltimore ranks 5th in patents per
100,000 population (see Table 1).21 Moreover, according to data on the licensing of
research products by universities published by AUTM, which I have aggregated by
metropolitan area, only Boston, Raleigh, and Seattle reported more university licenses
per 100,000 population in 2005-2007 than did Baltimore (although data were not
available for cities such as San Francisco, San Jose, and San Diego that likely ranked
higher than Baltimore).22 The allegedly “non-entrepreneurial” Johns Hopkins
University took in $42.7 million in gross licensing revenues between 2004 and 2007
(AUTM, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Finally, Hopkins has recently embarked on a
massive $1.8 billion redevelopment project that is the quintessence of university
entrepreneurialism: bulldozing slum-ridden neighborhoods around its medical campus
to build a biotechnology park that “will transform the east side of Baltimore into a shiny
new corporate Mecca for drug developers, medical device makers and gene decoders”
(Barbaro, 2003).
In short, insufficient academic commercialism is not a plausible culprit for
Baltimore’s desultory aggregate economic indicators – let alone, for the relentless urban
decay afflicting wide swaths of the city’s neighborhoods, including the one surrounding
the Johns Hopkins Medical campus in East Baltimore. On the contrary, Baltimore may
be the archetypical case demonstrating the degree to which entrepreneurial research
universities have been oversold as engines of local economic revitalization, particularly
in stagnant, older urban centers.
New Haven. The presence of Yale University, one of the great research universities
in the world, has not prevented the relatively small city of New Haven from experiencing
steep economic decline (Rae, 2003). If the “research portfolio” of entrepreneurial
universities can truly “drive” local economies, then presumably small cities such as New
Haven –much like small and mid-sized “college towns”—should be even more
susceptible to research-led transformation than larger, more economically complex
places such as Baltimore (or, for that matter, Milwaukee). But, revival in New Haven has
been elusive: as Tables 2 and 5 show, despite posting the 2nd highest per capita academic
research expenditures among the 55 metro areas analyzed in this paper, New Haven’s
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economy continues to shrink economically, to the point that Yale University’s weight as
an employer and real-estate developer has turned the city virtually into a “company
town” (Prevost, 2009).
There is ample evidence that Yale’s real-estate policies have created pockets of
revitalization in New Haven, particularly, as intended, in the area surrounding the
campus (Branch, 2009; Wilson, 2007). But, to what extent is Yale leading a researchdriven economic renaissance in New Haven? Yale was once notable for scorning the
“steering [of] its academic research down marketable avenues,” Stanford or MIT-style,
but that is no longer the case (Woelber, 2006; Lueck, 1986). Yale’s tech transfer
operation, the Office of Cooperative Research (OCR) is recognized as an aggressive,
entrepreneurial unit – by 200o, with nearly $41 million from 100 licenses of its research
products, Yale ranked third among U.S. research universities in licensing income
(Fellman, 2001). As OCR director Jon Soderstrom put it: “I looked around the country
and figured that if there was ever going to be another Silicon Valley or Route 128, New
Haven was as likely a place as any” (Fellman, 2001). An article in the university’s alumni
magazine breathlessly declared: “Ever since the gun factories left, Yale’s host city has
been searching for new economic engines to replace them. A surge in biotechnology may
point the way” (Fellman, 2001). In the last ten years, according to the OCR, Yale tech
transfer has helped start 34 new companies in New Haven and the surrounding area,
with a total investment of $3.3 billion (Fellman, 2009).
In the early 1980s, Yale launched “Science Park,” a biotech incubator in an
abandoned Winchester firearms factory not far from the university’s main campus,
intended to attract research and technology-driven businesses and startups. Science
Park’s turbulent history initially was marked nearly two decades of struggle to attract
tenants and consistent annual operating losses (Kaplan, 2007). However, by the end of
the 1990s, a $100 million infusion of funds from the State of Connecticut and
partnership with a prominent developer of biotech complexes (Lyme Properties) helped
kindle something of a biotechnology “explosion” at the park, with higher occupancy and
successes like Alexion pharmaceuticals (although Alexion ultimately left Science Park
for headquarters in suburban Cheshire, 15 miles north of New Haven, and a
manufacturing facility in Rhode Island). Nevertheless, by 2007, one 266,000 squarefoot building in Science Park, renovated at a cost of $30 million, was only partially
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occupied; Lyme’s other Science Park holdings, including over one million square feet of
the former Winchester factory, remained vacant and largely in disrepair (Kaplan,
2007).23 New Haven biotech growth had stalled, and OCR’s Soderstrom acknowledged
“really difficult times.” Critics suggested that “biotechnology, the once-touted savior of
the Elm City, is ebbing,” and that “New Haven –unlike its counterparts in Cambridge
and Palo Alto—has been unsuccessful in developing a self-sustaining [biotech] cluster
effect” (Woelber, 2006). By 2009, Yale was scrambling to bolster Science Park by
moving 600 university workers there, relocating a data center, a copy center, its
commercial printing and graphics office, and a facilities management office to the site –
hardly the stuff of high tech economic development (O’Leary, 2009).
This is not exactly surprising. Yale and New Haven are simply one among many
university-city tandems to discover, as Joseph Cortright and others have documented,
that chasing biotechnology is a treacherous local economic development strategy
(Cortright and Mayer, 2002; Dewan, 2009). “Besides being trendy,” notes one observer,
biotechnology is an industry “that has never been profitable,” provides surprisingly few
jobs, and is concentrated in just a few, path dependent regions (Hoover, 2005; Hoover,
2005a).24 Nationally, the vast majority of biotechnology companies lose money, and just
two companies –Amgen and Genentech—garner the lion’s share (over 50 percent) of
industry profits (Pisano, 2006, 115).25 By OCR’s own estimates, Yale spinoff companies
operating in New Haven support only 800 jobs; indeed, of the six companies founded
on Yale research that have gone public over the past decade, only two remain in New
Haven – a sign of how even the economic successes of university tech transfer
frequently “leak” out of the city, particularly in weak-market cities, and thus ultimately
provide little local economic benefit.
Yale continues to forge ahead along the path of academic commercialism, looking to
turn research in nanotech, genomics, and environmental engineering into “useful
products” and spinoff businesses. It has recently acquired, for $100 million, the state-ofthe-art labs of the 136-acre former Bayer HealthCare campus in suburban West Haven,
7 miles west of the university’s main campus, (Arenson, 2007); a university official
heralded it as a site for “some interesting partnerships” (Fellman, 2009), although
presumably the advancement of scientific research, whatever its ultimate commercial
potential, was the primary purpose of the acquisition (Christofferson, 2007).26
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Moreover, despite its difficulties, Science Park continues to attract interest from
developers (Macmillan, 2009).
Nevertheless, in terms of economic development, as one writer sympathetic to Yale’s
academic commercialism admitted: “The biggest question is whether the [Yale] startups
will ever have a serious impact on the employment picture in New Haven” (Fellman,
2009). 27 years after the opening of Science Park and Yale’s first steps towards
academic entrepreneurialism, the data in Tables 2 and 5 in this paper offer little
evidence that commercialized research from one of the world’s finest research
universities can turn around an economically troubled city or region.
*

*

*

*

The Yale/New Haven and Johns Hopkins/Baltimore stories exemplify the elusive
connection between research universities, academic entrepreneurialism, and local
economic development. Almost without exception, the same narrative of overselling and
disappointment recurs – especially, as Table 5 highlights, in older, historically industrial
cities. In Rochester, as former employment stalwarts such as Kodak and Xerox have
slashed employment, political and academic officials have trumpeted the eminent and
entrepreneurial University of Rochester as “turbocharging a local economy…[with] new
discoveries at the university spinning off local companies…and scores of skilled jobs” in
sectors such as digital imaging (Richardson, 2000; Safford 2005).27 In Pittsburgh, the
conventional narrative now is that “this is what life in one American city looks like after
an industrial collapse:” major research universities, Carnegie Mellon and the University
of Pittsburgh, fueling a technology-driven renaissance in computer software and
biotechnology to replace steel (Streitfeld, 2009; Dyrness, 1998; Jordan and Kornblith,
2009). Rochester and Pittsburgh-- as well as St. Louis (with Washington University),
Newark (with Rutgers and Princeton in vicinity), and Philadelphia (with the University
of Pennsylvania and fast-rising Drexel University)-- have attracted billions of dollars in
academic R&D since the 1980s and rank high among universities in churning out
patents, licenses and business spinoffs.
Yet, the economic indicators for these cities and regions, as arrayed in Tables 2 and
5, are no more impressive than in older industrial cities without top-tier levels of
academic R&D expenditures, such as Kansas City or Milwaukee. There’s little evidence
supporting the popular narratives, in places such as Pittsburgh, for example, of city or
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regional economic development success driven by commercialized academic research.
In fact, according to the “Pittsburgh Indicators Project,” the new university researchfueled Pittsburgh economy has consistently posted since 2002 the lowest new business
formation rate of the forty largest regions in the United State.28 As Table 2 illustrates,
only three regions among the 55 analyzed in this paper have posted lower rates of metro
area GDP growth since 2001 than Pittsburgh. The “Pittsburgh turnaround” narratives
also never mention that, while this university-driven renaissance was supposedly
occurring, the city went bankrupt in 2003 and remains in financial receivership to
Pennsylvania’s state government.
Yale, Johns Hopkins, Rochester, Pennsylvania, et al. are not just “any” research
universities; they are acknowledged as among the best research universities in the
world. Yet, there is little evidence that their efforts to bring science to market have been
transformative for their local economies. This is a crucial point, as universities that will
never reach the levels of research funding or scientific eminence of places like Yale or
Penn make major investments in academic entrepreneurialism, profoundly reshaping
their institutions, in the name of economic development. If such world-class research
universities have had limited impact in bending the economic trajectory 0f their cities or
regions, what is the plausibility that less endowed institutions will do so?
Table 8 provides the most salient summary statistics on the connections between
research universities, academic entrepreneurialism, and economic development in
medium-to-large U.S. metropolitan areas. For the 55 regions, I have calculated bivariate
correlations between the key independent variables on entrepreneurial universities
(levels of research expenditures, patents, and licensing) and a series of dependent
variables representing economic development outcomes (city job growth, employment
city and metro area residents, and metro area GDP growth). The correlation coefficients
between these variables are arrayed in Table 8.
The results are eye-popping. There are no meaningful correlations between any of
the entrepreneurial research university variables and any of the gauges of city or
regional economic well-being; indeed, only a few of the coefficients are even slightly
positive, but these are far too low to suggest any relationship. Simple correlation
analysis, added to the descriptive statistics presented earlier, reveals no support for
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rhetoric that entrepreneurial research universities are engines of local economic
development.

Table 8:
University Research Expenditures and Regional Economic Outcomes
Correlation Coefficients
UNIVERSITY VARIABLES (BY
METROPOLITAN AREA)

%
CHANGE
CITY
JOBS,
1992-2004

% CHANGE
EMPLOYED
RESIDENTS IN
CITY 1990-2008

% CHANGE
EMPLOYED
RESIDENTS
IN METRO
AREA
1990-2008

% CHANGE
REAL
METRO GDP
2001-2006

Aggregate University Research
Expenditures, 1985-2006
University R&D Per Capita,
1985-2006
University Patents per 100,000,
1990-1999
University Licenses Per 100,000,
2007

-.196

-.194

-.243

-.236

-.287

-.099

-.128

-.203

-.174

+.094

+.062

-.124

-.119

-.132

+.071

-.097

Why Do Entrepreneurial Research Universities Fail as “Engines” of
Urban and Regional Economic Development?
The review of existing studies, statistical evidence, and short case studies presented
in this essay confirm Mayer’s assessment that “world-class research universities are
neither necessary nor sufficient in growing high-technology regions… or creating
economic growth” (Mayer, 2007, 43, 47). This conclusion, of course, runs counter to the
conventional wisdom derived from stylized popular accounts of the classic “success
stories” of Silicon Valley or Boston’s Route 128. Why, for most cities and regions, have
entrepreneurial research universities historically not been the engines of local growth
claimed by boosters of academic commercialism?
At the outset, it is important to recognize the atypical nature of the classic success
stories. All of the cases arrayed in Table 4 arose out of highly unusual and rarely
replicated combinations of specific historical circumstances, regional political economy,
local economic culture – and luck. These factors, in turn, became “initial conditions”
that, through path dependency, shaped future regional economic trajectories (David,
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1985; Krugman, 1991). Take Stanford and Silicon Valley, for example. Saxenian (1994)
and Kenney (2000), among others, have detailed the unique and not-easily-replicated
culture of competition, collaboration, and community in Silicon Valley that was so fertile
for high technology development. Several studies point to the decisive role of Cold War
political economy –in particular, the massive infusion of defense contracts and research
expenditures—in the making of Silicon Valley and entrepreneurial Stanford (O’Mara,
2005); as Leslie puts it, the Department of Defense was the original “angel investor” in
“turning both Stanford and its surrounding industrial community into high technology
powerhouses” (Leslie, 2000, 66). Indeed, the atypicality of the Silicon Valley model was
underscored when Frederick Terman, the Stanford provost acknowledged as the
“father” of the model, retired in the mid 1960s and began consulting around the country
on how to replicate the Stanford-Silicon Valley model. “As it turned out,” writes Leslie,
“he couldn’t, despite some sizable investments by business groups and state agencies in
New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Oregon (Leslie, 2000, 66-67). Terman
“overemphasized the university’s value in the Silicon Valley equation” (Leslie and
Kargon, 1996, 469) and failed to recognize the unique historical circumstances that gave
rise to this success story. Small wonder that the field of regional economic development
is littered with failed “next” Silicon Valleys and “next” Stanfords. In short, as Richard
Lester cogently puts it: “Not all local economies are like Silicon Valley; not all industries
are like biotechnology or software; and not all universities are like Stanford” (Lester,
2005, 28).29
Two factors stand out in explaining why academic commercialism is generally
ineffectual as a “driver” of economic development in most cities and regions. First, while
boosters promote research universities as “hothouses” of patents and business startups,
in fact even the most entrepreneurial universities produce a trivial share of a region’s
stock of patents or new businesses. Nationally, university-owned patents represented
less than two percent of all utility patents issued in 2005, and only 3.5 percent of all USowned patents in that year (USPTO, 2005). Despite the surge in university
entrepreneurial activity in recent years, this percentage has actually been declining since
the late 1990s. As Table 2 shows, in very few of the 55 metropolitan areas examined in
this paper did university patents constitute as much as one-tenth of the total stock of
regional patents generated in the 1990s; on average, for these MSAs, university patents
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represented 3.3 percent of the regional stock. And all this assumes that regional patents
actually translate into meaningful regional economic development; in fact, for the MSAs
examined in this paper, there is a -.182 correlation between MSA patents per 100,00
residents (1990-1999) and metro GDP growth (2001-2006), and even less of a
correlation between regional patenting and job growth in the urban core (-.240). The
relationship between where patents originate and where they have an economic impact
is highly complex and, in any event, universities are minor contributors to the regional
stock of patents.
Not only are university-owned patents a trivial share of the regional patent stock, but
patenting and licensing – the “marquee” activities of entrepreneurial universities— also
account for a small portion of university knowledge-transfer. A study by Agrawal and
Henderson of patenting in the Department of Engineering at MIT –one of the most
unabashedly entrepreneurial of major US research universities—found that patenting
plays a small role in the transfer of knowledge from university labs to industry;
traditional, non-entrepreneurial mechanisms such as publishing (“open science”) and
consulting were much more important (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). Even at MIT, “a
small fraction of faculty patent at all” and these faculty estimate that patents were
responsible for only 7-10 percent of the knowledge transferred from their labs (Agrawal
and Henderson, 2002, 44-45). These findings were confirmed in a Carnegie Mellon
survey of R&D labs in manufacturing across the U.S.: published science was, by far, the
dominant mechanism of university knowledge transfer (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh,
2002).
Similarly, despite the well-publicized stories of business startups generated by
entrepreneurial universities, “new business formation around university science and
technology is a very small fraction –probably no more than 2-3%-- of the total rate of
new business starts in the US” (Lester, 2005, 10). Even this estimate may be much too
high. The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis points out that the entrepreneurial
University of Minnesota has averaged three licensed startups a year since 2003; yet, in
2007 alone, over 28,00 new businesses registered with the secretary of state’s office.
The Minneapolis Fed, whose district includes not only the University of Minnesota but
also the entrepreneurial powerhouse of WARF at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
concludes:
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The benefits that these activities bestow on universities and their
communities are questionable. A headcount of startups that have come out of
district research universities over the past decade shows that TTOs
[technology transfer offices] have had limited success in creating new
companies through technology licensing…The relative rarity of universitylicensed startups means that their effect on regional economies is
minimal…And the inherent risks of investing [university] resources in
embryonic enterprises cast doubt on business formation as a tech transfer
strategy” (Davies, 2008, 8).
The second and most important factor explaining the limited economic development
impact of entrepreneurial universities relates to what might be called the “absorptive
capacity” of the city and region (Florida and Cohen, 1999, 605). As noted earlier, the
assumption underlying arguments about research universities as “engines of growth” is
that the innovation and inventions flowing out of university labs will be “captured”
locally; in the parlance of economics, there will be a geographic localization of
knowledge spillovers. As Fogarty and Sinha write: “R&D spillovers associated with new
technology will become a source of long-run economic benefit only if the local industry
R&D network draws from the technology, if commercialization occurs locally, and if the
region’s industries capture the technology through diffusion and investment” (Fogarty
and Sinha, 1999, 474).
It turns out, however, that the extent to which spillovers remain localized is highly
contingent on the overall economic “ecosystem” in which a university is located.
University patent and licensing counts, of course, tell us nothing about “how tech
transfer activity translates into new products, increased company sales, bigger payrolls,
and rising products” (Davies, 2008, 5). Nor do these counts tell us where these
economic outcomes are located.
As it happens, there is considerable evidence that commercialized research, instead
of “driving” local economic development, more frequently “leaks” from the university’s
home community. Simply because a professor at a given university makes a patentable
discovery doesn’t mean that it will be licensed to a local firm, manufactured or marketed
locally, or ultimately produce any local jobs. For example, a survey by the Minneapolis
Fed found that 74 percent of licensees of University of Minnesota research were located
out-of-state, and 63 percent of WARF licensees were located outside Wisconsin (Davies,
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2008, 4), leading the Fed to conclude that “this perception of technology licensing as an
engine of regional economic development is overblown” (6).30 Cortright gives the
example of a potential blockbuster anti-leukemia compound developed at the Oregon
Health Sciences University in Portland: “The economic impact in the Portland area is
zero because the rights to manufacture and market this drug were already owned by
Novartis” (Dewan, 2009).
Perhaps the most illuminating analysis of the geography of university research
spillovers is Fogarty and Sinha’s study of Cleveland, where university-industry
partnerships have been at the heart of local economic development strategy. Cleveland
has attempted to channel university R&D spillovers -- centered around Case Western
Reserve University (CWRU), a “top 40” research university nationally, with almost $4
billion in R&D expenditures since 1985— to generate economic development in three
technology-driven clusters: Functional Electrical Stimulation (FES); Polymer Displaced
Liquid Crystals (PDLC); and Microelectro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS). The efforts,
however, failed: Cleveland’s stagnant economic ecosystem did not have the
infrastructure to absorb the research spillovers, and the technological breakthroughs
generated at CWRU and other Cleveland labs rapidly diffused to other regions – notably
Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York, as well as Japan; places with the
requisite infrastructure of production facilities, industrial R&D, and labor force skills.
Thus, Fogarty and Sinha conclude that older, economically stagnant regions cannot
“imitate” Silicon Valley, mechanistically apply the entrepreneurial university model, and
expect that university-generated knowledge spillovers will be captured locally and
generate economic development. On the contrary, they argue that Cleveland’s
experience of “limited absorption” of research spillovers has been reproduced in places
like Detroit, Philadelphia, and Baltimore (Fogarty and Sinha, 1999, 501). Certainly, we
saw evidence of this in the case of New Haven, where a striking share of Yale-related
biotech startups have ended up leaving New Haven. Historian Stuart Leslie found
“striking confirmation” of Fogarty and Sinha’s arguments in his study of academic
commercialism at Rensselaer Polytechnic in New York State’s economically depressed
“Capital Region”: “For all they accomplished in transforming RPI, they could not
overcome the regional disadvantage that kept them from competing effectively with
emerging high-technology centers in other parts of the country…Without a strong
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regional industrial base to capture and hold their innovations being generated…RPI
ended up exporting its best ideas and best graduates to other places, including Silicon
Valley itself” (Leslie, 2001, 237).
Joan Fitzgerald’s recent work on “green” economic development and urban job
growth also demonstrates the complex ways in which regional absorptive capacity
mediates the local economic impact of research universities (Fitzgerald, 2009). In
Austin, she points out, “all the elements are seemingly in place to make the city a
pioneer in the use of energy as a catalyst for economic development,” including a cleantechnology research program at the University of Texas’ flagship Austin campus. Yet,
she points out, “even with all these elements in place, Austin is not seeing the hoped-for
development of a large scale solar-energy industry;” production and design centers are
locating in neighboring states that are offering attractive incentives packages.
Conversely –and quite ironically, given Austin’s much more dynamic regional
economy—Toledo, Ohio has emerged as a solar-energy industry center, felicitously
combining traditional industrial infrastructure in glass technology and manufacturing
with research at the University of Toledo, which has spun off seven solar-energy
startups. Clearly, in these two cases, regional absorptive capacity matters as much, if not
more, than university research: “Toledo’s glass specialists have been able to retool to
meet the needs of thin-film solar-panel producers, while Austin’s info-tech
specialization evidently does not translate well into the skill sets needed in solar-energy
production” (Fitzgerald, 2009, A6). Yet, even in the salutary case of Toledo, there are
storm clouds on the horizon: will the university continue to generate spinoffs, will the
spinoffs stay in Toledo (companies are building plants in Asia and Europe), and will
other public policies support the local industry retooling necessary to create
manufacturing jobs in the city (Sterzinger, 2009)?
The implications of these studies are clear – and consistent with the data on research
universities and the economies of older, industrial cities presented in Tables 2 and 5.
Entrepreneurial universities are not “engines” of local economies; local economic
development is a complicated, multi-faceted process in which research universities are a
small component; and academic commercialism is not a panacea for stagnant, older
industrial cities and regions. Ironically, the entrepreneurial university, churning out
patents, licenses, and startups, is increasingly sold to policymakers as a sine qua non not
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just for regional growth, but for the economic turn-around of declining regions; yet, for
a variety of reasons, these are precisely the places where academic commercialization is
least likely to have a decisive economic impact.
In fact, university research-driven economic development has figured integrally in
the economic turn-around of only one stagnant, historically industrial city and region:
Boston, since the 1970s. And, as in the case of Silicon Valley, Boston’s renaissance,
particularly around biotechnology, was the product of a “highly contingent” and not
easily replicated regional economic ecosystem, one which “grew from a commitment to
open science, in which information, knowledge, and human capital irrigated a broad
community” (Powell, Owen-Smith, and Colyvas, 2007, 139). Dense “knowledge
networks” in Boston, resting on a unique economic culture as well as path dependency
from historical flows of government funding, made it likelier that “technology spillovers”
of economic value would be absorbed in the region than in, say, Cleveland or Milwaukee
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004).31 But what’s fascinating is Powell’s argument that the
Boston model works because, although there is plenty of academic commercialism in the
region, Boston’s economic culture is not dominated by entrepreneurial treatment of
university knowledge as a proprietary commodity. “In this exemplary case,” he argues,
“universities and hospitals played an essential role in the creation and expansion of
biotechnology precisely because they acted like the traditional university, an open
institution where knowledge readily spilled over into the surrounding community”
(Rhoten and Powell, 2007, 364. Emphasis added).
In any event, the unique Boston economic ecosystem has not been replicated in any
other older, historically industrial city. And the historical record in other cities and
regions suggests that the benefits of the Boston model are unlikely to be garnered by
universities simply building an “off-the-shelf” research park, or beefing up their
engineering school to go out and chase patents – in the absence of the underlying
components of the Boston economic culture.32
In short, the scenario of economic development failure in the presence of world-class
university research and academic commercialism is not an anomaly; indeed, it is a much
more common outcome than the vaunted success stories constantly invoked when
university leaders embark upon entrepreneurial strategies. For academic
commercialism to meaningfully influence the local economy, a “coincidence of special
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conditions must occur that are difficult to create” (Hill, 2006, 31); moreover, these
conditions almost never are found in the “weak market” cities and regions now pursuing
academic entrepreneurialism as the new “silver bullet” of local economic development.
The university is a component in a complex local economic ecosystem, not an
“engine” that can propel a local economic turn-around. As Goldstein and Drucker’s
regression analysis noted earlier clearly showed, factors such as agglomeration
tendencies, levels of human capital, and local industrial structure all are significantly
more influential than university research or commercialization in shaping local
economic development. Thus, “strong market” regions (e.g. Denver, Jacksonville,
Charlotte, Las Vegas) do well despite lacking major research universities; regions such
as Portland or Boise thrive as “knowledge-intensive” economies, with private R&D, not
universities, providing the lion’s share of technology spillovers (Mayer, 2007); and most
“weak market” regions, despite entrepreneurial, world-class research universities,
remain stagnant. University patents, licensing, and startups, for all the hype, constitute
a small fraction of local economic activity almost everywhere. And, in most
communities, the local economic impact of university research is generally mitigated as
scientific knowledge and subsequent commercialization “leak” to other regions – only in
very particular cases does the local absorptive capacity permit significant local capture
of these knowledge spillovers. Consequently, academic entrepreneurialism and
university-industry partnerships will almost “never generate the returns that politicians
and administrators covet” (Powell, Owen-Smith, and Colyvas, 2007, 141) and “as a
regional development strategy, university research programs almost never live up to
their founding promises” (Leslie, 2001, 264).
The Costs of Academic Entrepreneurialism
While proponents of academic commercialism routinely overstate its economic
benefits for cities and regions, they rarely mention the potentially significant costs. This
is not the place for a full discussion of the dangers of academic entrepreneurialism: the
potential undermining of the system of basic research and open science that has been
the cornerstone of scientific discovery in the US over the past century; the threats to the
“intellectual commons” from “selling private rights to public knowledge” (Powell, Owen-
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Smith, and Colyvas, 2007, 121); and a full range of potential damage to the fabric of
universities, from excessive corporate influence and over-commercialization, to
rampant conflicts-of-interest and, in rare but troubling cases, outright corruption
(Washburn, 2005; Greenberg, 2007; Rhoten and Powell, 2007; Shapin, 2008). There is
a burgeoning literature addressing these subjects in some detail. But, as universities
plunge headlong into entrepreneurialism, in the name of putative local economic
benefits that we’ve already seen are largely chimerical, we should highlight at least some
of the costs that they risk incurring – costs that entrepreneurial university leaders
invariably ignore or gloss over.
Ironically, a major cost is financial. This is especially curious since many university
leaders explicitly advocate commercialization activities as a revenue-enhancing strategy
for their institutions, especially at public universities where state support over the past
two decades has shrunk as a proportion of university operating budgets. Such leaders
paint rosy visions of increased extramural research funding (including support from
private industry)33, remunerative royalties from the licensing of university discoveries,
and lucrative equity shares in start up companies. A “gold rush” fever has developed
among entrepreneurial-minded university leaders, fueled by well-publicized blockbuster
returns from: 1) drug discoveries such as Emory University’s $525 million royalties
from Emtriva, New York University’s $650 million from Remicade, or Yale’s $277
million for D4T-Zerit; 2) techniques, such as Stanford and UCSF’s $250 million for
gene-splicing technology, Columbia’s $400 million for the “cotransformation”
biotechnology technique, or UW-Madison’s estimated $200 million potential in stem
cell patents (Gallagher, 2008); or 3) returns from equity in university-generated
startups, such as Stanford’s $336 million from the sale of Google stock or Carnegie
Mellon’s $60 million windfall from its equity in Lycos (Greenberg, 2007, 62; Masterson,
2009). As we’ve noted, AUTM produces an annual survey on the income generated by
university licensing and startups, and the media dutifully report that “research and
inventions earn big bucks for American universities” (Masterson, 2009).
But, the dirty little secret is that for most U.S. universities, tech transfer and
academic entrepreneurialism do not function as “cash cows.” In fact, for most
universities, tech transfer is a money-losing proposition. Although the blockbuster
successes are well known, they are rare; the vast majority of university patents and
43

startups generate no income, and when they do, typically the gains range from negligible
to modest. The most credible analyses suggest that fully half of all universities engaged
in tech transfer lose money on the operations, as their licensing revenues are
insufficient to cover administrative costs and the legal expenses of filing and
maintaining patents (Powers, 2006; Stevens, 2005; Campbell, Powers, Blumenthal,
and Biles, 2004; Feldman, 2003; Ehrenberg, Rizzon, and Jakubson, 2003; Thursby and
Thursby, 2007; Bulut and Moschini, 2009). Among the universities that do produce net
revenues, only a select few actually generate significant income from academic
commercialization; most barely scrape by with very modest net returns. “Clearly, while
some offices are generating substantial net income, there are a very large number for
whom the office is a net drain on university resources” (emphasis added) (Thursby and
Thursby, 2007, 629).34 This is a devastating indictment: not only does academic
commercialization generally not deliver regional economic development or an infusion
of net revenues to the university, but in a substantial number of cases,
commercialization apparently drains resources from other university activities.
Here are the basic numbers behind the risky finances of university licensing.
Thursby and Thursby (2007, 627-629) estimate, simply considering the legal and salary
costs of tech transfer offices (TTO) and ignoring all other costs, that a TTO with the
median number of employees and legal fees expended around $1.1 million in 2004.35 My
calculations from the 2004 AUTM licensing survey, displayed in Table 9, show that over
52 percent of universities responding to AUTM reported licensing revenues less than $1
million (with over 40 percent generating less than $500,000). Thus, assuming these
universities incurred the low-ball median expenses of TTOs calculated by Thursby and
Thursby, they unambiguously were net financial losers in the tech transfer business.
Another 12.9 percent of university TTOs generated between $1-2 million in 2004,
meaning some were undoubtedly net losers, while others squeaked out a tiny net gain;
in an event, there were no “cash cows” for universities in this group. In short, Table 9
confirms the assessment of other researchers noted above: over half of universities lose
money in academic commercialization, and nearly 40 percent generate so little licensing
income (under $500,000) that their expenditures in academic “venture capitalism” are
undoubtedly draining non-trivial resources from other areas of the university.36
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Table 9:
Gross Licensing Revenues Among U.S. Universities, 2004
Gross Licensing Income

% of all universities

> $5,000,000
$2-5,000,000
$1-2,000,000
$500,000-$1,000,000
<$500,000

23.2%
11.6%
12.9%
11.6%
40.6%

Source: AUTM, 2004

The distribution of licensing “winners” is astonishingly skewed, resembling a
“winner-take-all” distribution in which the rich keep getting richer. In 2007, among
universities responding to AUTM’s survey, the top 15 licensing revenue-generators alone
garnered a staggering 79.5 percent of all licensing revenues secured by U.S. universities;
just five universities took in 56.8 percent of total revenues in 2007. Although more and
more universities are becoming “entrepreneurial,” the skew has actually intensified over
the past decade: in 2000, for example, the top 15 universities took in “only” 65.2 percent
of licensing revenues, and the top 5 “only” 45.2 percent.37 Moreover, there is very little
turnover at the top: the same universities are the top 15-20 licensing income earners,
with just a few exceptions, year after year in the AUTM survey.
Not coincidentally, a similarly skewed distribution characterizes overall research
expenditures at U.S. universities. There is an incredibly high +.903 correlation between
the top 200 universities ranked by the National Science Foundation by total research
expenditures in 1985, and the 2007 NSF rankings. As in the case of university licensing
revenues, there is a fairly rigid hierarchy and strong path dependency noticeable in
research funding: essentially, with a few exceptions, the top 200 in 2007 are the same as
the top 200 in 1985, and in roughly the same order.
Entrepreneurial university administrators at perceived ”lower-tier” institutions often
talk of cracking the “top 100” in research expenditures as a measuring stick. Putting
aside whether such a gauge is meaningful, there is, to put it mildly, limited permeability
into this top grouping. Only seven academic research institutions from outside the “top
100” in academic R&D funding in 1992 cracked the top 100 in 2007 – 15 years later.
And all were already reasonably close to the top 100 in 1992, further illustrating the
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difficulties for “wannabe” institutions, much lower in the rankings, to make the leap into
the upper tier.
Moreover, with one exception, these institutions, shown in Table 10 below, were
either medical schools or universities housing a medical school. That’s the other little
secret of academic commercialism: unless you’re an MIT, it is almost impossible for a
university without a medical school to generate the levels of academic R&D and
licensing income that would make entrepreneurial activities financially remunerative.
This conclusion is echoed in Bulut and Moschini’s (2009) sophisticated regression
analysis. The authors confirmed that “only a few U.S. universities are obtaining large
returns” and most are generating “negligible or negative returns.” In particular, the
prospects for returns for public universities without a medical school were miniscule,
lagging well behind all other types of institutions (public with a medical school, private
with a medical school, and private without a medical school).38 They attribute this
“medical school effect” to the fact that most top revenue-generating university licenses
are from biomedical research.
In short, university leaders embarking on entrepreneurial strategies face startlingly
long –and almost always unacknowledged—odds. Generating serious revenue from
academic commercialism is not a tried and true path to success; on the contrary, it is
akin to trying to make money at a casino or buy a winning lottery ticket. This form of
“jackpot economics” is placing university leaders in roles for which most are
unequipped: acting as academic venture capitalists, trying to outguess the market and
pick commercial “winners” in research fields that might “hit the big one” and yield a
lucrative, blockbuster discovery. In this search for the “jackpot,” as Powers and others
have suggested, the entrepreneurial university strategy has more than a little in
common with the “irrational exuberance” and uncontrolled “animal spirits” of the
recently burst bubble economy (Shiller, 2000; Akerloff and Shiller, 2009).
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Table 10:
Cracking the “Top 100” in Research Funding
Academic Institutions Outside the NSF “Top 100” in 1992
That Were In the “Top 100” in 2007
Institution
Medical College of Wisconsin
Medical University of South Carolina
Florida State University
University of Texas Health Sciences Center
Dartmouth College
Oregon Health and Science University
SUNY Albany39

Rank 1992

Rank 2007

121
102
113
104
108
116
130

100
94
90
88
86
63
59

Source: National Science Foundation, FY Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities
and Colleges

Beyond the financial deficits of academic entrepreneurialism, there are potentially
devastating costs to the very fabric of the university and its core missions of creating and
disseminating knowledge. In a revealing interview with author Jennifer Washburn
(2005), Michael Crow – the trailblazing head of tech transfer at Columbia before
becoming president of Arizona State University—was blunt in criticizing this “jackpot”
mentality. “A lot of these places are hell-bent on trying to get the commercial operations
going. They get all messed up, because all of a sudden the universities have to start
thinking like companies and they’re bad at that.” In efforts to emulate Stanford and
MIT, said Crow, lower-tier universities risk turning into “job shops –marginal, industrydriven, technology transfer-driven enterprises…These institutions need to be very, very
careful because what they will turn into, in the end, won’t be a university.”40 Most
tellingly, Crow argued that any school ranked below the “top 15” on AUTM’s royalty
earners lacks the critical mass of research capacity or resources to do commercialization
successfully.41 “They’re basically getting nothing out of it, except a lot of economic
development rhetoric” (Washburn, 2005, 187-188).42
Yet, the intense focus of entrepreneurial universities on possible profits, industry
partnerships, and market potential threatens to divert resources from “blue sky”
research and the university’s role in nurturing human capital – and, ironically, in the
eyes of some, harm economic development. Indeed, Feller (2004) raises the alarm that,
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in the name of economic development, state governments will target university
appropriations to “niche technology areas,” while cutting investment in other vital parts
of the university and thereby contribute to an overall erosion of education and basic
research.43 As we will see below in the UW-Milwaukee case study, this is precisely what
is happening in the name of a so-called university/economic development “growth
agenda.”
J. Rogers Hollingsworth has done some fascinating work on how major scientific
discoveries –the paradigm-shifting breakthroughs-- have emerged over the past century
(Hollingsworth, 2008). Among his many insights –especially on the roles of
collaboration and patience in scientific discovery-- is how academic commercialism
potentially undermines basic research and long-term economic growth. “The
[entrepreneurial] sector has been heavily dependent on decision-makers with shortterm horizons. As a result, the sector has tended to emphasize incremental research,
designed to maximize profits in the short term. If society becomes excessively
dependent on this sector for the production of knowledge, there is not likely to be
enough new, basic knowledge necessary for high technological and economic growth
over the long run” (Hollingsworth, 2008, 341).44 The heart of the discovery process is
uncertainty, patience, and letting scientists follow their noses (Shapin, 2008, 132);
pressures to produce market-ready innovations that maximize profits can undercut that
creative process (Rae-Dupree, 2008). This is especially problematic, given the jackpoteconomics of university patents that create powerful incentives for faculty to find
“winning” patents. Is a casino-like academic structure, oriented toward interest-group
dominated economic development, the best framework to produce breakthrough
science?
Put another way, university-industry partnerships, designed with the value of
“economic development” elevated above all else and often marked by significant
corporate or donor influence over research, may actually have the perverse effect of
stunting innovation. Paul Berg, the Nobel Prize-winning Stanford University biologist
whose research helped lay the groundwork for the biotechnology revolution, noted that
corporate “partnerships” would have stifled the path-breaking work of the 1960s and
1970s. “The biotech revolution itself would not have happened had the whole thing been
left up to industry,” said Berg in an interview with Jennifer Washburn (2005, 241).
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“Venture-capital people steered clear of anything that didn’t have obvious commercial
value or short-term impact. They didn’t fund the basic research that made biotechnology
possible.” As Washburn notes: “The freedom of universities from market constraints is
precisely what allowed them in the past to nurture the type of open-ended fundamental
research that led to some of the most important (and least expected) discoveries in
history” (Washburn, 2005, 241).45 William Brody, the former president of Johns
Hopkins University, offers perhaps the most eloquent statement on the virtues of public
science as well as the dangers to science posed by academic entrepreneurialism:
Our scientists are by nature explorers – they are off sailing uncharted seas
in search of discoveries. Asking them to become managers, marketers and
accountants is unrealistic and ultimately inimical to the research
enterprise. Time spent in the boardroom is time away from the
laboratory, making them less productive and less likely to achieve the
things most suited to their abilities…When Hopkins scientists discovered
restriction enzymes, one of the bases of the biotechnology industry, we
put the discovery in the public domain – losing millions and millions in
potential royalties. Foolish? Perhaps. But I know we didn’t slow down
science or diminish the leading role [that] American industry plays in this
field (Brody, 1999).
A number of studies over the last decade have begun to appraise the ultimate
potential cost of the entrepreneurial university: the disturbing ways in which academic
commercialism threatens to undermine the canons of public, open science and the
credibility of university research. The extreme cases, most involving the pharmaceutical
industry, are marked by conflicts of interest and even corruption, and have received
extensive attention (Greenberg, 2007; Washburn, 2005; Angell, 2009; Blumenstyk,
2009). The recent revelations of drug company “ghostwriters” producing articles for top
medical journals under the names of academic authors, “suggesting that the level of
hidden industry influence on medical literature is broader than previously known”
(Singer, 2009), vividly underscored the dangers of university-industry partnerships and
academic entrepreneurialism (Wilson and Singer, 2009). Less dramatic but no less
worrisome are findings suggesting that research funding from industry is increasingly
associated with reports or studies favorable to industry sponsors (Campbell, et al,
2004), a kind of entrepreneurialism that effectively puts “science for sale” (Greenberg,
2007) and ultimately undermines the integrity of university research (Bok, 2003, 5749

78). At a minimum, entrepreneurial universities need vigilant and vigorous safeguards
against the kinds of research bias and even misconduct that commercialization can
encourage – and it is far from clear that most entrepreneurial institutions have put
sufficient safeguards in place, or, in some instances, even fully recognized the
dimensions of the issue.
Beyond the risks of excessive industry influence and research misconduct, academic
commercialism also appears to be creating a more subtle corrosion of “the culture of
inquiry that is the soul of the academy” (Powell, Owen-Smith, and Colyvas, 2007, 141).
As one critic puts it: “Does the injection of the profit motive into scientific research
distort the kinds of questions that get investigated and degrade the quality of the results
that get produced” (Deresiewicz, 2009)? There is, as Greenberg notes, “ample evidence
that scientific research is being delayed, deterred or abandoned due to the presence of
patents and proprietary technologies” (Greenberg, 2007, 65). Rebecca Eisenberg and
Michael Heller have raised the specter of a “tragedy of the anticommons,” an erosion of
the Mertonian “communalism” of the scientific enterprise, in which patenting reduces
the willingness of researchers to exchange results and materials, and research progress
suffers from “too many property rights” leading “to excessive transaction costs and risks
of bargaining failures” (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Eisenberg, 2008, 1098). Although
Eisenberg’s most recent analysis concludes, “it is rare for an ongoing project to be
stopped because of patents” (Eisenberg, 2008, 1098)46, other analysts, such as
Liebeskind and Oliver argue that the threats posed by academic entrepreneurialism to
collegiality and research collaboration, particularly in the biomedical sciences, are real:
Our research [found] that academics in the biomedical sciences
widely perceive that patenting has changed collegial relations in the
field. Scientists interested in patenting…may restrict the size of their
research teams to minimize disputes over claims to inventions.
Some scientists are even reluctant to engage in casual conversation
with their colleagues, present new ideas at meetings, or have
students or other faculty work in their laboratories on a visiting
basis… “Contracted exchange[s]” among academics [are] beginning
to substitute for the more informal, trust-based exchanges that took
place before intellectual property concerns became so important in
the life sciences (Liebeskind, 2001).
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Although Liebeskind concedes that there isn’t compelling evidence that burgeoning
university entrepreneurialism has had a “chilling” effect yet on research, the potentially
corrosive long-term impact, along the lines noted by Hollingsworth above, is serious –
and essentially ignored by boosters.
In short, given these tangible and potential costs of academic commercialism, does it
make sense to allocate scarce university resources to “economic development” activities
that, as we saw earlier, rarely produce the promised outcomes for communities and, for
most universities, are money-losing propositions? Jennifer Washburn puts the matter
succinctly and persuasively: “At a time when many schools are bleeding red ink, cutting
courses, downsizing full-time teaching, and increasing class size, is this really a wise
investment? When one factors in the other costs –the conflict-of-interest
entanglements, the threat to academic freedom, and the enclosure of the scientific
commons—is the investment justified” (Washburn, 2005, 270)? In short, is there any
compelling reason for universities “to turn academic science over to the logic of the
marketplace” (Deresiewicz, 2009)?
Part II:
Academic Commercialism and Local Economic Development: The Case
of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) has been, for many years, a widely
respected urban research university. Over the years, UWM has quietly attracted a solid
base of highly productive faculty researchers, many of whom are nationally and
internationally recognized scholars, across the natural sciences, social sciences, and
humanities. Several university academic departments and programs are ranked highly
nationally, and in 1994, UWM received the coveted designation of the Carnegie
Foundation as a “Doctoral/Research University-Extensive” institution. Between 19852004, according to data from the National Science Foundation arrayed in Table 11,
UWM more than tripled its total annual academic R&D expenditures (from $9.1 million
to $28.3 million) and more than quadrupled its total federal research funding (from
$3.2 million to $13.7 million). Over those twenty years, the federal share of UWM
research expenditures grew from 35.4 percent to 48.4 percent, a sign of the extent to
which UWM’s research activities were increasingly attracting extramural funding.47
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Table 11:
Research Expenditures at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1985-2007
By Source of Funding
(000$)
YEAR

FEDERAL

STATE
AND
LOCAL

INDUSTRY

INSTITUTIONAL

TOTAL

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

3,211
3,643
3,939
4,662
5,447
6,715
6,808
7,641
7,455
7,977
7,749
8,026
8,156
8,936
9,409
8,425
11,089
11,461
13,704
13,670
15,893
15,867
18,368

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
6,341
6,710
6,531
5,675
5,751
5,884
4,192
4,503
3,358
2,972
3,498
3,969
3,653
4,584
4,193
5,054

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
689
452
363
516
252
374
554
535
568
529
297
463
515
516
785
1,076

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
2,497
2,348
2,771
4,211
4,039
4,111
6,039
6,534
6,394
7,398
7,894
7,435
8,171
9,314
11,217
13,540

9,068
10,383
11,079
12,424
13,428
15,639
16,865
18,567
18,245
19,180
19,684
19,679
19,995
20,807
22,207
20,010
23,492
24,933
27,259
28,268
32,748
34,033
40,023

Source: National Science Foundation

Through the early 2000s, while UWM’s reputation as a research university grew
steadily along with the intellectual influence of its faculty in their respective fields, the
university’s academic commercialization efforts were decidedly low-key. The university
operated the obligatory technology transfer office and a few faculty participated in
“business-industry” partnerships, but these were not activities significantly subsidized

52

or even emphasized as an institutional priority by campus leadership. Patenting and
licensing were largely terra incognita at UWM; according to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, a grand total of eight utility patents were granted to the university
between 1985 and 2005 (USPTO, 2005).

Table 12:
Sources of Research Expenditures at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1985-2007
By % share
YEAR

FEDERAL

STATE
AND
LOCAL

INDUSTRY

INSTITUTIONAL

OTHERS

1985
1992
1998
2003
2004
2007

35.4
41.1
42.9
50.3
48.4
45.9

n/a
34.2
20.1
14.6
12.9
12.6

n/a
3.7
2.7
1.7
1.8
2.7

n/a
13.4
29.0
27.3
28.9
33.8

n/a
7.6
5.3
6.1
8.0
5.0

Source: National Science Foundation

In the early 2000s, however, UWM adopted the “university as an ‘engine’ of
economic development” strategy, and campus leadership declared its intent to become
“entrepreneurial.” In 2000, UWM’s then-Chancellor Nancy L. Zimpher asserted, in
language that will be vaguely familiar to readers of the first section of this paper:
“Universities drive industry and business competitiveness in the new high-tech
economy, as exemplified by Palo Alto, Boston, Austin, San Diego, and Durham/Chapel
Hill” (Zimpher et al, 2000, 17). Under Zimpher, UWM took the leading role, along with
a local business organization, the Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce
(MMAC), in the 2001 formation of TechStar, an entity to “pump emerging technologies
into the business community” by commercializing the technology developed by
academic institutions in southeastern Wisconsin: to “turn ideas into companies and
jobs” (Zimpher et al, 2000, 17; Gertzen, 2004). “We can be a major innovation engine to
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revitalize and reinvent manufacturing and lead technological advances,” said Zimpher
(Toosi, 2003).48
TechStar was explicitly envisioned as Milwaukee’s version of the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF), the celebrated research commercialization arm of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison; in addition, TechStar leaders talked of establishing a
$20 million “venture” fund that would make investments in young companies (Gertzen,
2004a). At one point, Zimpher floated the idea of a TechStar university research park,
possibly located in the city of Milwaukee’s deindustrialized and ramshackle Menomonee
Valley: a “TechStar Valley,” as Zimpher called it, that would house business start-ups,
research laboratories, and engineering programs (Toosi, 2003).49 Five years and $3
million in public “seed” funding later, though, TechStar folded, unable to generate longterm financial support from private sources (Gertzen, 2004a; McCormick-Jennings,
2006).
Zimpher left UWM in 2003, for the presidency of the University of Cincinnati.50 Her
successor, Carlos E. Santiago, however, didn’t miss a beat in making the transformation
of UWM into an entrepreneurial university the signature policy of his new
administration. Asserting to local media that he was hired to “reverse” UWM’s
“declining” research profile and “upgrade its role as an economic catalyst for the region”
(Schmid and Twohey, 2006), Santiago announced, barely a month into his
chancellorship -- and with no consultations with faculty yet underway-- that “a culture
shift [at UWM] has to occur. The faculty needs to think about commercialization”
(Gertzen, 2004b). “UWM’s mission,” Santiago would later say, “is as much about driving
economic growth as it is about education” (Schmid, 2007). UWM must adopt a “culture
of risk,” argued Santiago (Schmid, 2007a) – an ironic formulation given the casino- or
lottery-like economics of academic commercialism documented in part I of this paper.
Unless UWM adopted an entrepreneurial approach, warned the Chancellor, “our
survival as a major research university…will steadily and inexorably erode in the coming
years” (Santiago 2005).
Curiously, Santiago’s apocalyptic depiction of UWM research on a “downward trend”
(Schmid, 2005a) came, as Table 11 shows, after a four-year period (2000-2004), right
before his arrival in Milwaukee, in which the university’s federally funded research
expenditures had actually jumped by 65 percent.51 (By way of contrast, in the first three
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years of Santiago’s tenure as chancellor, federal research funding at UWM climbed by
only 34 percent, and federal funds as a share of total research expenditure at UWM
actually declined. See Tables 11 and 12).
Table 13:
UWM’s Ranking in Research Expenditures
Among U.S. Universities, 1985-2007
YEAR

TOTAL R&D

FEDERAL R&D

NON-FEDERAL R&D

1985
1992
1998
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

158
163
180
195
202
191
190
179

181
180
203
204
214
209
214
200

123
150
161
172
170
165
166
163

Source: National Science Foundation

Santiago’s case for remaking UWM into a center of commercialized research
consisted of the two standard –and, as we have already seen, highly dubious-components of the entrepreneurial university playbook. His primary argument for
investing in research at UWM was not about “blue sky” science or the magic of
discovery; it was about local economic development. “Academic research in
southeastern Wisconsin is too low,” said Santiago, “and that’s what’s keeping our growth
rate” slower than places like Madison or Chicago (Perez, 2008).52
Santiago relentlessly asserted that an entrepreneurial UWM, generating
commercializable technology and business spinoffs, would be the prime “catalyst” to
address Milwaukee’s “30 years of economic decline.” “UW-Milwaukee is the only
institution in this region,” he said, “that can take the lead as a catalyst for economic
development. If we do not step up to this role, the quality of life for Wisconsin’s citizens
will continue to decline compared to other states” (Santiago, 2008). 53 Santiago
frequently claimed – and Milwaukee’s one daily newspaper endlessly repeated without
analysis or scrutiny—that “no big metropolitan area has transitioned into the 21st
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century knowledge-driven economy without an [entrepreneurial] research university at
its core” (Schmid, 2007b). The economic case for academic commercialism at UWM was
summarized by Santiago’s short-tenured first “research czar,” who exhorted Milwaukee
(and UWM) to emulate Atlanta and Georgia Tech, where, supposedly, “there is a direct
correlation between the economic growth in Atlanta and research dollars attracted by
Georgia Tech” (Vanden Plas, 2006; Ourmazd, 2006, 6-10).
None of these propositions was ever subjected to rigorous analysis or in-depth
debate at UWM. As we have already illustrated (see Tables 2-8), there is little empirical
basis for them. It is unclear precisely what Santiago means by “transitioning” to a
knowledge-economy, but if we assume he means “economic well being,” we have already
seen that many high-performing cities and regions rank low in measures of academic
R&D and commercialization (Denver, Charlotte, Jacksonville, Boise, Kansas City – see
Table 6), while many cities and regions rank high in academic R&D and
commercialization but low in economic performance (Baltimore, Philadelphia, New
Haven, Rochester, Buffalo – see Table 5). Contrary to self-serving, simplistic, and
tendentious examples such as the alleged “Atlanta-Georgia Tech” connection54, as Table
8 showed, for the 55 large metropolitan areas examined in this paper, there is no
correlation between academic R&D or measures of academic commercialism (patenting
and licensing) and economic performance indicators in cities or regions. As Goldstein
and Drucker and others have demonstrated, there are simply too many other variables
explaining city and regional economic performance to make such a oversimplified (and
unwarranted) link between entrepreneurial universities and economic development.
In fact, Santiago’s statement should be turned on its head: have there been any
economically declining big cities or regions whose fortunes have been reversed by the
kind of academic commercialization Santiago wants to pursue at UWM? Pittsburgh has
been cited as an example of a city that has “made the turn” due to university
entrepreneurialism, but as we’ve seen that claim is grossly exaggerated; Pittsburgh’s
economic performance over the past twenty years has been no better than Milwaukee’s.
Perhaps the most plausible candidate for a university-generated turnaround city is
Boston, But, again, as discussed earlier (see pages 40-41 and especially endnotes 31 and
32), the Boston story is much more multifaceted than the entrepreneurial university
narrative suggests, involving open, not necessarily commercial, university science; the
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presence of not simply “research universities,” two of the best universities in the world;
a high stock of regional human capital; and massive public investments (in
infrastructure and defense contracts). As was the case with Silicon Valley, few cities can
hope to reproduce the unique combination of factors that underlay the post-1970 Boston
renaissance.
In short, the fundamental premise underpinning UWM’s entrepreneurial turn – that
academic commercialism is a sine qua non for economic growth or revitalizing a
declining city or region—is unsupported empirically. Indeed, as I argued earlier, the key,
unanswered question for boosters of entrepreneurialism at UWM is: on what basis is it
logical to believe that an entrepreneurial UWM can propel the economic revitalization in
Milwaukee, when such distinguished research universities as Yale (New Haven), Johns
Hopkins (Baltimore), Washington University (St. Louis), the University of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia), and the University of Rochester have failed to engineer economic
turnarounds in their distressed home cities?
The second component in Santiago’s entrepreneurial strategy was internal. In an era
of stagnant or shrinking funding for public universities, he asserted that academic
commercialism would be a prodigious and indispensable moneymaker for UWM. Since
1999, state appropriations as a share of the UWM budget have fallen from 36.7 percent
to 24.7 percent; in real, inflation-adjusted dollars, UWM’s state appropriations have
shrunk by almost 10 percent over the past decade (University of Wisconsin System,
2008; University of Wisconsin System, 2000). As UWM leaders pointed out: the
university is no longer state supported; rather, it has become an increasingly privatized,
modestly state-subsidized institution.55
In this context, Chancellor Santiago insisted that “grow[ing] funded research in the
sciences and engineering…has the greatest potential to create a large, ongoing revenue
stream that will benefit the university as a whole” (Santiago, 2008)(emphasis added).
The chancellor proclaimed a goal of raising UWM’s research expenditures to $100
million within five to 10 years (it was $28 million when he became chancellor)
(Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2005). To “keep more of the income from any licensing
deals for UWM” (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2009), Santiago withdrew from the UW
System’s technology transfer program (WiSys) to set up UWM’s own licensing and
patenting operation, the UWM Research Foundation.
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There is, of course, one giant problem with this logic: as we have documented, far
from being a cash cow supporting a wide range of university activities, academic
commercialism is a money-losing enterprise for most universities. Many of the nonlosers make just a little bit – hardly the lucrative stream of patenting and licensing
revenues Santiago envisions filling UWM’s coffers. Moreover, the 15-20 universities that
year after year draw the lion’s share (almost 80%) of all licensing royalties in the U.S.56
have a depth and breadth of scientific research that Santiago acknowledges he will not
have the resources to reproduce at UWM (Santiago, 2008a). As Michael Crow, George
Low and others have noted, the tech transfer “winners” among universities all have the
resources to sustain essentially Nobel-prize winning science.
As for Santiago’s objective of reaching the $100 million level in research
expenditures at UWM in “five to 10 years” (putting aside whether that metric is a
meaningful indicator of the creation and dissemination of knowledge at a university, or
of an institution’s financial health): perhaps that will happen, but recent history is not
encouraging. Over the most recent ten years for which data are available, only two
universities in the country reached the $100 million mark starting from the level of
research expenditure at UWM when Santiago arrived in 2004 ($28 million). Table 14
below shows a few other universities that got close, a much larger number that didn’t get
close, and a few that started at slightly higher levels than UWM and crossed the $100
million threshold.
In addition, as was the case with the few universities that cracked the “top 100” in
research expenditures between 1992-20o7 (see Table 10), all but one of the institutions
making rapid gains in research expenditures over the past decade housed medical
schools, which, of course, UWM does not. Moreover, as Table 14 shows, notwithstanding
the success of a few “lower-tier” universities at increasing their overall levels of research
expenditure between 1997-2007, few of these “gainer” institutions were generating
significant amounts of licensing revenue; indeed, given what we know of the economics
of tech transfer offices, only a handful of all the universities listed in Table 14 were
earning even a miniscule return on investment in their commercialization activities.57 In
short, Santiago was proposing a major reorientation of UWM’s mission –and, as we
shall see, a substantial reallocation of university resources—in a low-odds pursuit of a
winning jackpot in the academic commercialization casino. He truly was proposing a
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“culture of risk” -- but for community economic development benefits and university
financial gains that have proven more illusory than real across the country.

Table 14
Getting to $100 Million in Academic R&D in Ten Years?
The Record from 1997-2007 of Universities Starting
Near UWM’s 2004 R&D Level
University

1997 R&D Exp.
(in millions $)

2007 R&D Exp.
(in millions $)

2007 Licensing
Revenues

Mississippi (all campuses)
Central Florida
Florida International
Drexel
Louisville
North Dakota State
Oregon
Loyola (Chicago)
Southern Illinois-Carbondale
Clark Atlanta
Howard
Georgia State
St. Louis
Lehigh
Florida A&M
Michigan Tech
Notre Dame
William and Mary
Alabama

$26.2
$18.9
$17.4
$19.3
$33.4
$35.2
$31.5
$31.0
$30.0
$28.9
$27.8
$27.1
$26.5
$26.4
$25.4
$24.1
$24.1
$24.0
$23.7

$108.2
$111.6
$90.9
$96.5
$151.2
$106.2
$61.9
$34.9
$64.7
$8.5
$38.0
$51.4
$54.2
$36.4
$16.5
$55.0
$77.4
$49.8
$70.0

$1,503,647
$1,226,758
$6,166
$325,508
$87,629
$1,223,000
$5,125,837
$524,584
$156,015
$426,716
$84,059
$2,000
$1,117,135

Sources: National Science Foundation; AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity Survey

The post-2004 “entrepreneurialization” of UWM emerged in two broad phases.
First, in 2005, the university launched a “Research Growth Initiative” (RGI), designed to
use internal resources to seed research that might generate extramural funds, and, most
tellingly, “support the state’s economic development through innovation” (UWM
Graduate School, 2009). This was not an initiative primarily designed to seed blue-sky
science or research across the disciplines; indeed, the chancellor was clear about the
commercialization and entrepreneurial tilt of the RGI. “You’ll see, hopefully, more
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patents, more disclosures, more start-ups” as a result of the RGI, he said in early 2006
(Schmid and Twohey, 2006).
It was not surprising, therefore, that the chancellor’s priority of “economic
development”-relevant research has been reflected in first four years of RGI
expenditures. 86.5 percent of the funded proposals have been in the life sciences,
health58 and engineering, and other technology-related fields; 90.9 percent of the total
dollars distributed in the first two rounds of the RGI ($11.6 million of the $12.7 million
spent) were allocated to these fields.59 A trivial share of the RGI has gone to the social
sciences or humanities -- a token amount “to avoid an uproar on campus and
accusations that UWM is driven entirely by the economics of technology spinoffs”
(Schmid, 2006). But there is no question that the RGI has constituted a stealth
reallocation of internal resources at UWM towards disciplines that university leadership
believes will generate commercializable research, licensing revenues, and business
spinoffs in the years ahead.60 Indeed, lest anyone not grasp the focus of UWM’s
intended research expansion, the title of a glossy university report on its research made
it clear: “Partnerships powering economic prosperity” (UWM Graduate School,
2009a).61
Second, beyond the RGI, the university launched a “Growth Agenda:” a plan for
UWM to “power southeastern Wisconsin’s knowledge-based economy.” Once again,
there was little in the plan about traditional university goals of “discovery,” scientific
breakthroughs, or problem solving; the initiative was unabashedly all about profit, to
emphasize “research in emerging fields to attract federal and private research funding to
create new intellectual property and work with existing businesses to spur economic
development and job creation through technology transfer and new business start-ups”
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2006; 2007).
University leaders, acting as de facto venture capitalists, identified biomedical
sciences, engineering, and water research, as “clusters” within which future hiring and
investments would be targeted. It is unclear how these choices were made. No white
paper was presented indicating why they made sense either in the context of either
UWM’s academic strengths or the structure of the Milwaukee economy. No process was
established either for a probing and inclusive campus-wide vetting of these ideas or a
debate on a range of alternatives. UWM requested $30 million in increased state
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funding, phased in over six years, to hire faculty and expand research in these areas;
through 2009-10, the university had received only the first $10 million installment, as
well as potential access to as much as $180 million in state of Wisconsin bonding
authority to build facilities for these initiatives.62
Nevertheless, by mid-2009, UWM was well on the way to launching the two
cornerstones of the chancellor’s entrepreneurial “Growth Agenda”: a suburban
technology park, oriented around biomedical engineering; and a School of Freshwater
Sciences at UWM, which would be the centerpiece of Milwaukee’s emerging economic
development strategy to become the “Silicon Valley of water technology.”
Biomedical Sciences, Engineering, and the UWM “Innovation Park”
From the outset, Chancellor Santiago promoted a beefed up engineering research
program and a Stanford-style university technology/business park as linchpins in his
plan to make UWM the “engine” of economic development in Milwaukee. “The problem
is [that] engineering in southeastern Wisconsin is much too small,” argued Santiago; in
his view, expanding science and engineering at UWM would be the key to economic
revitalization of the region (Perez, 2008).
However, contrary to Santiago’s assertion and local conventional wisdom
(Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2009d), there is no evidence that this purported
academic weakness in UWM’s engineering programs had resulted in a shortage of
engineers in the Milwaukee region. Through 2008, metro Milwaukee ranked a
respectable 28th of the 55 large MSAs examined in this paper in the percentage of the
workforce employed in science and engineering occupations (4.2 percent). Indeed, this
figure is slightly above the percentage for all MSAs (4.1 percent), and is comparable to
some older, historically industrial regions such as Pittsburgh (4.2 percent) and Chicago
(4.1 percent) that UWM leadership often cited as successful examples of cities
“transitioning” to the knowledge-based economy (National Science Foundation, 2008).
The conventional wisdom in Milwaukee corresponds to the widely promulgated
belief nationally that the U.S. suffers from a shortage of scientists and engineers.
However, as researchers at the Urban Institute and Duke University have reported, this
is something of a myth. From 1985 to 2000 there were about 435,000 graduates
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annually with degrees in science and engineering from U.S. universities, but only
150,000 jobs added annually to the science and engineering workforce (Lowell and
Salzman, 2007, 30). Twenty-five to 40 percent of engineering graduates don’t become
engineers, and 80 percent of corporations reported filling their engineering job
openings within four months – hardly data reflective of a severe shortage of engineers
(Wadhwa, 2007; Wadhwa, 2006; Wadhwa, 2006a). “Forget the conventional wisdom,”
writes Wadhwa. “U.S. schools are turning out more capable science and engineering
grads than the job market can support” (Wadhwa, 2007).
Moreover, in terms of regional economic development, there is little evidence that
higher concentrations of scientists and engineers in a region’s workforce correlate
significantly with regional economic growth. For the 55 large MSAs examined in this
paper, the correlation coefficient between the proportion of scientists and engineers in
the workforce and regional GDP growth is -.080, conveying the lack of relationship
between the variables. Numerous regions with lower concentrations of scientists and
engineers than Milwaukee –Orlando (3.5 percent), Phoenix (3.8 percent), Tampa (3.7
percent), Charlotte (3.7 percent), Des Moines (3.9 percent), Nashville (3.2 percent), and
San Antonio (3.6 percent)—have posted higher rates of metro area GDP growth since
2000 than has Milwaukee. Several regions with high concentrations of scientists and
engineers – such as Rochester, Hartford, and Detroit—are economic development
laggards. Clearly, increasing the engineering sector of the local economy is hardly a
sure-fire path to economic prosperity.63
In short, the scenario of UWM engineering-led economic development in Milwaukee
is problematic on two levels. First, it is a “solution” for a non-existent problem: an
alleged shortage of scientists and engineers vital to local economic development.
Milwaukee does not lack for engineers; and, in any event, regional economic health
appears uncorrelated with the proportion of scientists and engineers in the labor force.
Second, as we have already examined in detail in Part I of this paper, the inputs of
university-based commercialization in science and engineering –academic R&D,
patents, and licensing—are not correlated with city or regional economic outcomes such
as GDP growth or employment gains. So boosting the commercialization of engineering
research at UWM is unlikely to have the economic impact touted by Chancellor Santiago
and his supporters among Milwaukee’s business elite and in the local media.
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The “marquee” component of the UWM engineering expansion was the plan to
develop a university research park, oriented around biomedical engineering. The tech
park would be located in suburban Wauwatosa, on land that the Milwaukee County
government agreed to sell to the university in May 2009. Enthusiasts dubbed this
planned “engineering campus” an economic “game-changer” for Milwaukee (Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, 2009a), an “idea hatchery” that would churn out inventions and
spinoff new businesses that would revitalize a stagnant city and region (Haynes, 2008).
“People will look back someday,” said a university spokesman on the day of the land
sale, “and say this was when we started the engine of economic development that we’ve
been building at UWM” (Daykin, 2009). Yet, beyond the hyperbole, there were troubling
questions about the plan, barely debated on campus or scrutinized in the media. Why
biomedical engineering? Why a university research park? And why, in a central city
starved for investment, locate these activities in suburbia, miles from the main
university campus, students, and faculty?
First, on what cost-benefit calculus was it sensible for UWM to make major
investments in biomedical engineering? After all, this is a field in which UWM
heretofore possessed no depth or breadth of expertise, and no national ranking or
reputation. Yet, like so much university science-based economic development, it is also
a field in which only the very best programs have even a modest economic impact, and
the financial costs of “jumping rank” are prohibitively high (Hill and Lendel, 2007) –
costs that Chancellor Santiago acknowledges UWM will never have the “flagship
campus-style” resources to absorb.
Moreover, in terms of regional economic development, biomedical engineering is
already a relatively “mature” industry, with high entry costs and clusters across the
country far more developed than Milwaukee’s. Unsurprisingly, almost all of the major
biomedical engineering clusters are located in regions housing expensive, top-ranked
biomedical engineering graduate programs. As Table 15 shows, in 2008 Milwaukee
ranked only 22nd of the 39 metropolitan areas identified by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) as employing biomedical engineers. What’s more, this list does not
include 11 other metropolitan areas whose employment totals for biomedical engineers
were not disclosed by the BLS , to protect the confidentiality of large employers. This
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Table 15
Regional Concentrations in Biomedical Engineering in the US
Biomedical engineers as % of total employment, 2008
Metropolitan Area

# of Biomedical
Engineers

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

% of total regional
employment

San Francisco
1,430
0.141
Boston
2,140
0.125
College Station-Bryan TX
100
0.110
Philadelphia
1,840
0.067
Seattle
840
0.058
Washington, D.C.
1,200
0.042
Minneapolis
740
0.041
Madison WI
140
0.041
Charlottesville VA.
40
0.041
San Jose
380
0.041
Worcester MA
100
0.041
Salt Lake City
220
0.035
Durham NC
80
0.029
Memphis
170
0.027
Oakland
270
0.026
Gainesville FL
30
0.025
Rochester NY
110
0.022
Baltimore
260
0.020
Cleveland
210
0.020
Pittsburgh
200
0.018
Newark
170
0.017
Milwaukee
120
0.014
Springfield MA/CT
40
0.013
New York
1,070
0.013
Edison NJ
120
0.012
Denver
140
0.011
Dayton OH
40
0.010
Knoxville TN
30
0.009
Buffalo
40
0.007
Houston
190
0.007
Albany NY
30
0.007
Dallas
130
0.006
Atlanta
140
0.006
Portland
60
0.006
Tampa
50
0.004
Phoenix
60
0.003
Cincinnati
30
0.003
Los Angeles
120
0.003
Allentown PA
40
0.001
*Metropolitan areas reporting employment of biomedical engineers, but whose totals BLS has
suppressed to preserve employer confidentiality, are: Santa Ana (CA), Fort Collins (CO), New Haven (CT),
Wilmington (DE), Miami (FL), Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, San Diego, and St. Louis.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009.
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“non-disclosure” list includes regions such as San Diego, Santa Ana (CA), Chicago, St.
Louis, Detroit, and New Haven – all places (save one) boasting top 20
bioengineering/biomedical engineering programs (University of California-San Diego,
Northwestern University, Washington University in St. Louis, and the University of
Michigan-Ann Arbor)64 and all regions that likely have more robust biomedical
engineering sectors and research operations than does Milwaukee (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2009).
In brief, biomedical engineering is hardly a field in which the Milwaukee region or
UWM either start in an advantageous position or have obviously propitious prospects.
There are numerous regions that already have a much more solid economic toehold in
the sector; in addition, given the eminence of other universities in the field as well as the
massive resources required to penetrate the top tier, the likelihood is small that UWM
can be a significant research center in biomedical engineering. Furthermore, given the
more mature biomedical engineering economic infrastructure in regions elsewhere, the
probability is that whatever success UWM has in generating discoveries or inventions,
the economic benefits of commercial development and job creation will “leak” to those
leading regions, as Fogarty and Sinha’s important analysis of Cleveland’s engineering
research cluster noted earlier would suggest.
How, then, given these realities, was biomedical engineering chosen as a multimillion dollar investment in “entrepreneurial” UWM’s future? Certainly, no rigorous
cost-benefit study was ever presented by university officials to justify the investment.
Vague rhetoric about “aligning university research with the economy,” and potential
“partnerships” with the Medical College of Wisconsin and GE Healthcare, passed for
analysis of the strategy – an approach, as we examined earlier, that is not only dubious
for universities as a means of producing good science, but also increasingly problematic
for UWM in 2009 and beyond as GE and other putative potential partners increasingly
disinvest in Milwaukee.65 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, as has often been the
case with the biotechnology sector in regions across the U.S., that no small bit of “fad
chasing” and a “herd mentality” was involved in UWM’s entrepreneurial focus on
biomedical engineering (Hoover, 2005; Dewan, 2009).
The second key question: why invest millions in building a new university research
park? One small fact seemed lost in the hyperbole about a UWM research park as a
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“game-changer” for the Milwaukee economy: the Milwaukee region already has a
technology research park. Located on the very same county-owned land on which UWM
proposed to develop its park, the 175-acre Milwaukee County Research Park opened in
1987 as a “university-related research park,” designed to “nurture technology-based
companies, strengthen Milwaukee County’s business base, create new employment
opportunities, and facilitate technology commercialization…by bringing together the
substantial academic, intellectual, business and entrepreneurial resources of the
metropolitan Milwaukee area in a physical environment conducive to such activities”
(Milwaukee County Research park, 2009). What would a UWM Park add to a
technology park already on site at the county grounds, and still, after 22 years, not at
100 percent occupancy (The Business Journal of Milwaukee, 2009a)? Concomitantly,
there’s another inconvenient fact for the “game-changer” argument: no one would
seriously argue, after 22 years of operation, that the Milwaukee County Research Park
has jump-started the Milwaukee economy. If, after 20 years, this tech park hasn’t been
decisive in “transitioning” Milwaukee into the 21st century economy (as the UWM
chancellor likes to put it), why is it likely that UWM’s “Innovation Park” would be the
“game-changer?” Proponents of the UWM Park failed to even address these questions,
let alone satisfactorily respond to them.
As we have seen, it is not surprising that Milwaukee’s existing tech park has had little
impact on the city or region’s economic trajectory: the studies of Wallsten, Felsenstein,
and others examined earlier made clear the spotty record of science and tech parks as
engines of economic development. In addition, far from being “cash cows” for fiscally
strapped universities, virtually all science parks operate in the red (see pp. 15), some
incur serious cost overruns in construction (e.g. Innovista), and few deliver significant
revenue streams from early stage investments in business startups or intellectual
property licenses. Yet, UWM will spend, in its entrepreneurial aspirations, an estimated
$150 million on a redundant and speculative development, oversold as the new “driver”
of the modern Milwaukee economy. Perhaps this is the type of gambling the chancellor
had in mind when he proclaimed a new “culture of risk” at UWM. What’s more, not only
is the $150 million tech park a highly risky expenditure, but it also represents a huge
opportunity cost for UWM. The university has desperate needs for on-campus physical
refurbishing, as well as the unique opportunity to secure a long-coveted, soon-to-be
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abandoned facility adjacent to the campus (Columbia Hospital), a collection of buildings
ideal for retrofitting into a science research installation. Yet, campus leadership’s
determination to pursue the tech park essentially pushed such alternatives off the table,
with little analysis or debate, and consequently constrained the university’s master
planning process.
In short, the tech park proposal made little academic or economic sense. But, even if
it had, what was logic behind locating it in the Milwaukee suburb of Wauwatosa, 12
miles from the UWM campus, with poor public transit connections between the two
sites? Ostensibly, the tech park is all about economic development; but what is the
economic development logic of a major urban university disinvesting in a central city
that has been buffeted over the past 30 years by growing joblessness, poverty, and the
suburbanization of industry? Urban universities have increasingly become anchor
institutions in city economies, yet UWM was preparing to invest an estimated $150
million outside the city, contributing to a further decentralization of economic activity in
the region. Ironically, for an initiative deemed crucial to the economic future of
Milwaukee, UWM’s suburban tech park, by reinforcing patterns of sprawl, will help
undermine the economics of agglomeration that economists and urban planners concur
is a central ingredient of economic development.
Equally ironic: UWM is planning a suburban park at a time when even proponents of
university research parks increasingly regard suburban sites as obsolete, a relic of the
1950s and 1960s when the iconic Stanford and North Carolina Research Triangle Parks
were built. As Anthony Townsend, a leading national consultant on tech parks, has
written: “It is increasingly clear that the post-war model of a single-purpose science park
is no longer viable…Over the next decade, we will continue to witness a broad shift
around the world in the design and siting of new R&D facilities, from science ‘parks’ to
science that is embedded in the city” (Townsend and Pang, 2007, 1). Yet, in promoting
an anachronistic and off-the-shelf suburban park, UWM’s leaders seem oblivious to the
“New Urbanism” trend that emphasizes cities as “science and engineering innovation
zones...attracting and retaining world-class scientific and technical talent and often
reinventing older industries for the global age” (Townsend and Pang, 2007, 1).
By the same token, UWM’s leadership utterly failed to explain how a suburban tech
park would have a salutary impact on either teaching or research at the university. There
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was great ambiguity concerning how many faculty would be located in Wauwatosa:
accounts ranged from building a new campus for the entire College of Engineering to
simply relocating a small contingent of perhaps 10 or so biomedical engineers. If a large
number of engineering faculty were relocated to Wauwatosa, what would be the impact
on the education of students at UWM’s main campus? Concomitantly, how would
isolating engineers in Wauwatosa, away from other scientists at UWM’s main campus,
be good for scientific research and innovation, which thrives on collaboration, informal
discussion, and the easy exchange of ideas? And if only a small number of biomedical
engineering faculty were to be housed in Wauwatosa, ostensibly to be near potential
partners such as the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW) or GE Healthcare, why not
simply rent space nearby, perhaps at MCW or even in the Milwaukee County Research
Park, rather than soaking up precious resources for a huge, risky, and potentially
counterproductive investment in a UWM Research Park?
Some city officials and university faculty raised concerns about the academic and
economic logic of the Wauwatosa location, but the chancellor brushed off such critics as
naysayers (Daykin, 2009a; Perez, 2009). With little campus debate on alternatives and
little public scrutiny of the plans, UWM was poised to break ground in mid-2010 on the
“Innovation Park.” In September 2009, however, a monkey wrench was thrown into
these plans when wealthy Milwaukee businessman/philanthropist Michael J. Cudahy,
after whom the “Innovation Park” was to be named and whose offer to finance the lion’s
share of land acquisition costs in Wauwatosa was a crucial component of the deal,
withdrew his pledge (Daykin, 2009c). University officials cavalierly dismissed the
stunning development as “a minor issue in a multimillion-dollar initiative” (Daykin,
2009c), but it remained to be seen whether the resources would be available for the
misguided Wauwatosa plans to move forward.

The “Silicon Valley” of Water Technology
In 2009, UWM also launched the second key initiative in its entrepreneurial
aspiration to become the driver of economic development in Milwaukee: a School of
Freshwater Sciences (SFS). During the preceding two years, Milwaukee’s civic
leadership had coalesced behind a regional economic development strategy, led by
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business executives who organized something called the “Milwaukee 7 Water Council,”
to “brand itself as the global capital of freshwater research” (Schmid, 2007c).
“Milwaukee can be the Silicon Valley, or the hub, of water technology,” said U.S. Senator
Russ Feingold, reflecting the emerging consensus -- and exuberance—of the region’s
corporate and political elite (Schmid, 2008). UWM leaders portrayed the new School of
Freshwater Sciences as a “magnet or anchor tying together the water cluster” (Schmid,
2007c), while boosters trumpeted the school as the vital ingredient, “by providing
research and graduate students,” to “help make southeastern Wisconsin ‘the Silicon
Valley of water’” (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2008).66 Corporate Milwaukee
anticipated “substantial increases in the number of faculty…who will work with local
businesses” (Milwaukee 7 Water Council, 2009).
Few would dispute the academic merits of building an interdisciplinary graduate
degree program in freshwater studies. The SFS promised to “advance, create, and
disseminate new knowledge that would protect, restore, and sustain the health and wellbeing of freshwaters and the lives of people and other living beings dependent upon
them” (Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 2009, 1). The Great Lakes, of course, are a
vital, but increasingly fragile freshwater ecosystem, facing a myriad of complicated
environmental and resource management issues (Annin, 2006). UWM’s long-standing
tradition of research excellence in Great Lakes studies and freshwater sciences,
including work on “chemical pollution from PCBs, mercury, and other contaminates,
new sources of pollution by pharmaceuticals and personal care products, invasive
species and exotic pathogens, and sewer overflows,” would be enhanced by the new
school (Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 2009, 2). Finally, the new SFS would also
be a locus of much-needed interdisciplinary public policy research and teaching on
issues of water economics and resource management, sustainable development, public
health, and environmental infrastructure.
However, the main selling point for the new school by UWM’s leaders was its
ostensible contribution to regional economic development – and this was what excited
and galvanized Milwaukee’s business and political elite. “We can be and we will be the
water capital of the world,” enthused Rocky Marcoux, commissioner of Milwaukee’s
Department of City Development (BizTimes Daily, 2008). The economic development
case for Milwaukee as a global hub of water technology contained three premises: (1)
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Water technology is a “gargantuan industry, rapidly growing in importance as we
confront worldwide water issues;” (2) Milwaukee is “uniquely positioned,” to become
the world’s center of water industries, already a “leader” in water technology, because of
its Lake Michigan location and unparalleled “cluster of water-related companies;” and
(3) A School of Freshwater Sciences at UWM would establish in Milwaukee a unique
research facility, positioning the region as a hub for the development and attraction of
water technology companies; in turn, the water hub would be a core driver of job
creation and economic growth in the region (Meeusen and Jones, 2009). As we shall
see, however, each of these premises is either exaggerated, oversimplified, misleading,
or simply spurious.
At the outset, though, it is important to point out that, “strictly speaking there really
is no such thing as the water industry” (Maxwell, 2009, 12).
What there is instead is a balkanized and teeming “bazaar” of
fundamentally quite different businesses –all of which have something
to do with delivery of clean water, but which can’t all be quite
accurately classified under any single heading. As most observers
loosely use the term, the ‘water industry’ includes a very broad array of
sectors: steel and concrete pipe manufacturers; specialty chemical
producers; measurement; monitoring and testing firms; tank
manufacturers; all kinds of treatment equipment manufacturers; new
technology developers of all stripes; manufacturer’s representatives
who sell all of these things to different end users; engineers and
consultants; contract operators of water plants, and many others –
companies which may be quite different and whose only similarity is
that they are somehow involved in the process of providing clean water
(Maxwell, 2009, 12).
This fragmented and diffuse nature of the water business has two crucial
implications for local economic development that have been completely ignored by
Milwaukee’s water boosters. First, since companies in the water business are
“fundamentally quite different” and only superficially linked by involvement “in the
process of providing clean water,” what is the likelihood that any region, let alone the
Milwaukee region, will emerge as the hub, a proverbial “Silicon Valley” of water? What
interdependencies or synergies exist between the disparate businesses in the water
industry that would propel the same kind of geographic clustering that occurred in
electronics, computers, and information technologies in Silicon Valley? To what extent
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do water industries exhibit the tendency of “increasing returns” from agglomeration that
economists such as Paul Krugman argue is the cause of such clustering?
In fact, the locational dynamics of the water business may be less like computers and
more like, say, the multi-sectoral health care industry. Although some cities and regions
have more robust health care sectors than do others, virtually all medium- and largesized regions in the U.S. contain a critical mass of health care institutions and
enterprises -- there is certainly no “Silicon Valley of health care.” Similarly, as we shall
see shortly, the locational geography of the water industry in the U.S. is quite diffuse,
and claims about incipient clustering in Milwaukee are more myth than reality.
Second, in light of the segmented nature of the water industry, rhetoric on the
“gargantuan” global significance of water –as if that observation itself establishes the
water sector as a ripe local economic development opportunity-- is misleading and,
indeed, almost meaningless.67 The key questions are: which segments of the water
industry are growing, and does a given community possess strengths in those growth
segments?
Analysts seem to agree that subsectors likely to be the fastest growing in the years
ahead are in “higher-technology sectors,” chiefly in water purification: filtration
(including microfiltration and ultrafiltration membrane treatment and ultraviolet (UV)
disinfection systems); desalination (including reverse osmosis and thermal
desalination); water test equipment; and engineering/consulting services (Dray,
Samuelson, Zepf, and Kejriwal, 2008, 10-11; Maxwell, 2009, 12). In a recent Goldman
Sachs research report on the water sector, no Milwaukee-headquartered companies
were listed among the high-tech sectoral leaders – not exactly a promising point of
departure for a putative water technology hub (Dray, Samuelson, Zepf, and Kejriwal,
2009, 46-50).68 This analysis squares with the appraisal of respected Milwaukee water
engineer/consultant John Tonner, who notes that the “big trend” in global water
technology “is to remove smaller and smaller materials from water,” chiefly via
desalination and various membrane technologies, “and Milwaukee is not in that space”
(Schmid, 2008a). “We can and should have a key role in the Great Lakes,” says Tonner,
“but should remember that the necessary science and skills don’t automatically apply to
other areas of the nation, never mind the world” (Haynes, 2009).
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Given these observations, on what basis do Milwaukee’s water boosters claim the
region is “uniquely positioned” as a global water technology hub? The case hinges on a
couple of widely publicized statistics and assertions. The Milwaukee region supposedly
is already home to a vibrant and growing water sector, comprising somewhere between
76 and 120 “water-related” companies (including local branches of five of the world’s 11
largest water companies).69 According to water boosters, these numbers are larger “than
in any other city in the United States” (BizTimes Daily, 2008); they confirm that
Milwaukee is “already a leader in water technology” (Meeusen and Jones, 2009); and
they confer on the region significant “first-mover” advantages in the race to become the
“Silicon Valley” of water.
All of these claims, however, are problematic. Is Milwaukee truly home to “far more”
water-related companies than other regions (White, 2008, 7; italics added)? Is 76 or 120
companies a large roster? Nationally, to what extent are water technology companies
concentrated in certain cities or regions, or dispersed throughout the country?
Curiously, no one in Milwaukee has done the comparative research on the water sector
in other metropolitan areas that would be necessary to confirm whether a uniquely large
“cluster” of water companies is located in the region.70 The white paper prepared for the
M-7 Water Council by UWM’s Sammis White, on which this contention is based, did not
provide any comparative urban or regional statistics. Nonetheless, Milwaukee’s water
business boosters have made this bold assertion repeatedly, as if it were fact and
represents prima facie evidence that Milwaukee should invest economic development
resources to become the “Silicon Valley of water.”
As it happens, even a cursory analysis suggests that metro Milwaukee hardly stands
out as a place with uniquely high concentration of water companies -- let alone as a
“hub” or a “first-mover” in the water technology business. For example:
•

Fresno, California claims 12o water technology companies in the region
(McEwen, 2007), with 5,000 employees (ICWT,2005). Since 2002, Fresno
leaders have aggressively targeted water technology as the “perfect” industry
for the region, “a natural outgrowth of the [San Joaquin] Valley’s rich
agricultural heritage” (Nax, 2004). Building on this foundation, corporate
leaders there have proclaimed (just like their counterparts in Milwaukee):
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“Fresno…can become the Silicon Valley of water technology” (St. John, 2007),
and “the epicenter of the water technology industry, just as San Jose became
the epicenter for electronics” (Steinberg, 2002). Fresno State University has
launched an “International Center for Water Technology,” and, along with
local businesses, raised $4 million to build the Claude Laval Water and
Energy Technology incubator, a testing center that can also house up to five
startup water technology businesses (St. John, 2007). “After decades of
missed hunches, high unemployment and low wages,” enthused one Fresno
observer, “we’re on the verge of economic revolution” (McEwen, 2007). In
short, far from being unique or a “first-mover,” Milwaukee is following the
post-2002 Fresno playbook, apparently almost word-for-word.
•

Toronto, while not a U.S. city but certainly a major Great Lakes presence and
regional “competitor” for Milwaukee, boasts that it is home to “over 400
companies providing water-related products and services,” including global
heavyweights GE Water and Processes; Pipeline Inspection Company;
Pathogen Detection Systems; Siemens Water; and Veolia Water. (Toronto
Region Research Alliance, 2008). Toronto universities received $11 million in
water-related research grants in 2007, in fields including drinking water;
wastewater and water resource management; and aquatic ecosystems and
species.

•

Minneapolis houses an impressive collection of global powerhouse waterrelated companies, including the headquarters of three of the world’s 40
largest water companies (Pentair, 3M, and Dow Water Solutions), local
operations of GE Water and Siemens, and, from a preliminary scan of the
region’s business directories, over 100 water-related firms. In 2008, Dow
announced the third expansion of its Minneapolis (Edina) manufacturing
operation in the past eight years, an $88 million investment to produce
additional reverse osmosis and nanofiltration membranes –cutting-edge
products in the high-growth end of the water technology business (Water
Technology, 2008). As one analyst put it: “[Minnesota] is an emerging hub in
a multibillion-dollar [water] business…I don’t know if there is another state
that has seen as much activity (Beasley Allen, 2005).
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•

Internationally, several locations have emerged as substantial centers of water
technology. Israel reports 270 water technology companies operating in the
country, employing 8,000 workers, proving that location near a large body of
freshwater is not a necessary –let alone sufficient-- condition for building a
world-class water technology industry. Israel is a world leader in desalination
and filtering technologies, with annual exports over $1 billion (Wrobel, 2007).
It boasts a combination of rapidly growing indigenous water technology
companies, increasing multinational corporation investments in Israel, and
heavy public investment in the goal of becoming, in the words of government
officials, the “Silicon Valley of water technology” (HaLevi, 2007; IEDC, 2009).
Ironically, an Israeli company (Miltel Communications), is a major licenser of
technology to Badger Meter in Milwaukee, one of the corporate leaders of the
Milwaukee water campaign – which may offer a hint regarding the relative
positions of Israel and Milwaukee in the global water technology hierarchy
(The Business Journal of Milwaukee, 2008).
Another major international center is Singapore, which has declared its
intention to become a “global hydro-hub,” backed up by a five year, $219
million government investment “to position Singapore as an R&D base for
environment and water solutions” (EDB Singapore, 2009). Singapore has
attracted major investments from global firms such as Siemens, Black &
Veatch, GE Water, and CH2M-Hill, nurtured scores of local companies, and
aims to capture three percent of the global water technology market in the
next decade (Goh, 2009), much of it in the cutting-edge areas of desalination,
including ultrafiltration membrane technologies (Water and Wastes Digest,
2009).

Beyond these anecdotal cases, a few more systematic comparative indicators also
suggest that local boosters have exaggerated Milwaukee’s place as the “hub” or even an
“emerging hub” of the U.S. water industry.
Water company headquarters. Of the 40 global water companies listed by a
Goldman Sachs report as generating the highest revenues (Dray, Samuelson, Zepf, and
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Kejriwal, 2008, 15), none have their U.S. headquarters in Milwaukee. Headquarters
cities are at the top of the hierarchy for any industry; they are the “command and
control” centers that determine investment flows, shape strategy, and foster
development around them. The real Silicon Valley, of course, is headquarters to scores
of top-tier electronics and computer-related companies; it is Silicon Valley, in part,
because Apple, Intel, Google, Hewlett-Packard, etc. are headquartered there. There is no
equivalent concentration of headquarters in the water industry, but the leading U.S.
headquarters locations for the global “top 40” water companies are New York (4);
Minneapolis (3); and Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, each with
two. One such headquarters office is located in metro areas such as Atlanta, St. Louis,
Omaha, Spokane, Houston, Kansas City, Sacramento, Sarasota, and Washington, DC.71
But none are based in Milwaukee.
Water company plants and offices. What about the locations of all U.S. plants
and offices –not simply headquarters-- for global “top 40” water companies? Chart 1
shows the U.S. metropolitan areas with the highest number such plants and offices. This
count does not speak to the size of these operations, or to the employment or valueadded generated at them. Nor does it fully reveal the highly diffuse geography of the
U.S. water industry: over 50 metro areas are home to at least one U.S. plant or office of
the global water “top 40.”72 What’s more, as in the case of headquarters noted above,
the vast majority of these facilities are located in the suburbs, exurbs, and small towns of
metropolitan areas, generally not in the central cities. Thus, as suggested earlier, this
suggests that the economics of clustering and agglomeration may not be at a premium in
the fragmented water technology industry, and that no one place is likely to emerge as a
“Silicon Valley” of water.
Nevertheless, Chart 1 perhaps gives us a rough idea of what U.S. regions are in the
mix as leading players in the global water industry. Milwaukee is certainly in the picture,
with 8 of the global top 40 having some presence in the region. But by no means do
these locational dynamics signify, as one local business reporter put it with typical
hyperbole, “consolidation in the water-driven industries around Milwaukee” (Schmid,
2008c), especially given the diffuse geography of water companies already noted. The
Boston and Houston regions are home to offices or plants of 13 of the global “top 40,”
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while Chicagoland houses facilities from 12 of them. Moreover, given the number of
headquarters, as well as major plants and offices in places such as Minneapolis, Los
Angeles, and Philadelphia, it would appear that Milwaukee is in a visible, but secondary
position in the national hierarchy of water industry locations.

Chart 1
Leading U.S. Locations of Offices and Plants
“Top 40” Global Water Companies
number of plants and offices in metro area
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Patents. A third possibly revealing indicator of regional hierarchies in the water
industry is the geography of water technology patents. As I argued earlier in this essay in
a different context, patent counts are an often-used but quite imperfect indicator of
regional innovation. Nevertheless, it is at least a plausible hypothesis that metropolitan
areas generating the highest number of water technology patents are the locations
where the industry is most likely to flourish. Given the fragmented and diverse nature of
the industry, there is no one patent class called “water technology” for which the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) aggregates data. However, as a rough metric, we
can examine which regions in the U.S. have produced the most patents in water
purification technology73 -- a critical, high-growth sector of the industry.
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Table 16
U.S. Regional Leaders in Water Technology Patents
Top 40 US Metropolitan Areas in Liquid Purification
Patents per 100,000 population, 1995-1999
Metropolitan Area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

# of “Class 210”
Patents, 1995-1999*

New Haven
Boulder, CO
Boston
Wilmington, DE
Reno, NV
Minneapolis
Madison, WI
Ann Arbor, MI
Houston
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Hartford
Denver
Nassau-Suffolk, NY
Toledo
Louisville
Orange Co, CA
Milwaukee
Salt Lake City
San Jose
Raleigh
Charlotte
Boise
Newark
Grand Rapids
San Francisco
Oklahoma City
Tucson
Buffalo
Seattle
Austin
Cleveland
Oakland, CA
Atlanta
West Palm Beach, FL
Jacksonville, FL
San Diego
Akron
Cincinnati

51
18
190
26
14
116
16
19
115
227
63
132
30
53
69
15
24
63
33
29
36
23
29
8
36
19
30
18
14
19
38
19
34
36
61
16
15
37
9
21

Patents per
100,000 pop
9.41
6.18
5.58
4.44
4.13
3.91
3.75
3.28
2.75
2.74
2.67
2.59
2.54
2.51
2.51
2.42
2.34
2.21
2.20
2.17
2.14
1.94
1.93
1.85
1.77
1.74
1.73
1.66
1.66
1.62
1.57
1.52
1.51
1.50
1.48
1.41
1.36
1.31
1.30
1.28

*USPTO Patent class “210” = liquid purification and separation; Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office
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The leading U.S. metropolitan areas generating water purification patents are
arrayed in Table 16. USPTO aggregated data on metropolitan areas are only available
through 1999, so these figures are somewhat dated.74 Be that as it may, the patent data
give little support to the characterization of Milwaukee as a hub of water technology
innovation. Clearly, Milwaukee ranks respectably in the middle of the 40 metro areas
registering the highest rate of water purification patent production, but hardly in the
vanguard.
Occupations. Labor market indicators offer a final angle to examine Milwaukee’s
place in the national water market. There isn’t, of course, an occupational category of
“water jobs” for which data is collected; and we know that water technology employment
will be spread across a range of occupations (production workers, engineers, lawyers,
scientists, accountants, lobbyists, etc.).
But there is one water science occupation for which data is collected: hydrologists,
who study the “quantity, distribution, circulation, and physical properties of bodies of
water” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009a). Says one expert: “Any research or problems
having to do with water, there’s a hydrologist working on it” (Zimmerman, 2009). This
is an imperfect indicator of the state of a region’s water industry, to be sure, but it seems
plausible to think that a putative water sector hub would likely exhibit particularly high
concentrations of hydrologists in the workforce.
Table 17 below lists the metropolitan areas in the U.S. in which the BLS finds
employment of hydrologists. Once again, although Milwaukee is certainly a prominent
location, the data do not suggest a dominant, “hub-like” status for the region. In
addition, the data reveal again the diffuse geography of the water sector in the U.S.:
hydrologists are found in metropolitan areas throughout the nation, with no obvious
physical locational advantages accruing to certain places (e.g. proximity to freshwater).
In short, the rhetoric of Milwaukee water boosters about the region’s place in the
water technology industry has been riddled with spurious claims. Milwaukee does not
have a “far more” developed water technology sector than places around the U.S. or
elsewhere in the world. Nationally, the water industry is highly dispersed: collections of
water companies can be found in a large number of metropolitan areas; and, within
metropolitan areas, water companies are generally sprawled to the far corners of regions
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Table 17
Regional Concentrations of Hydrologists in the US
Hydrologists as % of total employment, 2008
Metropolitan Area

# of Hydrologists

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

% of total regional
employment

Carson City, NV
30
.1000
Albuquerque
310
.0784
Ren0-Sparks, NV
120
.0549
Tucson
150
.0397
Fort Collins, CO
50
.0378
Madison, WI
120
.0355
Columbia, SC
100
.0287
Trenton, NJ
60
.0268
Raleigh, NC
80
.0268
Sacramento
220
.0246
Boise, ID
70
.0245
Boulder, CO
40
.0243
Anchorage, AK
40
.0243
Denver
210
.0167
Tampa
190
.0157
Austin
120
.0155
Seattle
210
.0145
Hartford, CT
80
.0139
Portland, OR
140
.0134
Minneapolis
210
.0118
Milwaukee
90
.0106
Washington, D.C.
230
.0099
Miami
230
.0099
Phoenix
170
.0090
Las Vegas
80
.0086
Baltimore
110
.0085
Salt Lake City
50
.0079
Oakland, CA
80
.0077
San Diego
100
.0075
Oklahoma City
40
.0070
Indianapolis
60
.0066
Boston
100
.0058
Pittsburgh
60
.0053
Columbus, OH
50
.0053
San Francisco
50
.0049
Edison, NJ
50
.0049
Santa Ana, CA
70
.0046
New York
370
.0044
San Antonio
30
.0036
Atlanta
80
.0033
Philadelphia
60
.0022
Houston
50
.0019
Los Angeles
60
.0014
Metropolitan areas reporting employment of hydrologists, but whose totals BLS has suppressed to preserve
employer confidentiality, are: Fort Lauderdale, Port St. Lucie, FL, Dallas, Tacoma, WA, Detroit, West Palm Beach, FL,
and Nassau-Suffolk, NY.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009.
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rather than concentrated in central cities.75 Milwaukee is certainly on the map in the
economic geography of water. But, whether we look at headquarters locations, offices
and plants, patents, or certain occupations, the Milwaukee region is hardly a “unique”
presence in the industry, or even a “first-mover” in attempting to promote water
technology as a local economic development strategy. Several regions, in the U.S. and
abroad, do seem to have a leg up in growing and attracting water technology companies,
but the industry doesn’t appear to exhibit a clustering that remotely resembles a “Silicon
Valley.” And to the extent that there is a nascent Silicon Valley of water out there,
Minneapolis, Toronto, Israel, or Singapore all seem like better bets at this point than
does Milwaukee.
***

The primordial objective for any local economic development strategy is simple:
job creation. Clearly, the underlying premise of the water initiative in Milwaukee --and
the economic logic underpinning entrepreneurial UWM’s School of Freshwater
Sciences— is that the water sector supposedly represents the region’s most promising
sector to create jobs. As Paul Jones, CEO of A.O. Smith and co-chair of the Water
Council put it: “We’ve already got 20,000 people working in this area on water related
things. That could be 50,000 or 100,000 in a very short period of time, just by attracting
industries” (Gunn, 2009).
Let’s put aside the exaggerated claim that the water industry currently employs
20,000 in Milwaukee. (A generous tabulation of total water-related employment in
Milwaukee at the companies in the Water Council directory reveals that the figure is
closer to perhaps 7,500).76 Or the hyperbole that 100,000 local jobs in the sector is a
realistic possibility “in a very short period.” The best estimate is that around one million
workers are employed nationally in the water sector, with little anticipated growth
(Grigg, 2007); apparently, notwithstanding the diffuse locational dynamics of the
industry, Milwaukee’s water boosters think that the region can capture 10 percent of all
water sector jobs in the US. By way of comparison, New York (finance hub) holds 7
percent of the nation’s financial industry jobs, Charlotte (banking hub) is home to 2
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percent of US banking employment, and Silicon Valley is the location of 8 percent of US
jobs in computer systems design.
Milwaukee’s recent employment history in the water sector, though, belies this
roseate job growth rhetoric. We have been able to collect employment information,
covering 2000 and 2008, for 39 of the 76 companies listed in the M-7 Water Council’s
directory of the region’s water companies (including almost all the larger ones). In the
past decade, employment reported at these companies declined by around 20 percent –
not exactly the jobs trend one would expect in an incipient water technology hub.
This doesn’t necessarily mean that water industry employment has declined by 20
percent in Milwaukee since 2000; the calculation doesn’t include those companies,
albeit mostly small ones with low employment, that arrived or emerged in the region
after 2000. Nevertheless, the data do suggest that water-related industries have not
been generating anything approaching the job growth in Milwaukee implied by the
overheated “Silicon Valley” rhetoric of local boosters. Symbolic in this regard was the
announcement in late 2008 by Minneapolis-based Pentair, whose presence in suburban
Milwaukee had been touted as a sign of the Milwaukee region’s growing status as a
water technology hub, that it would be eliminating 560 Milwaukee-area jobs –over onethird of its local workforce (Schmid, 2008b; Schmid 2008c).
Employment trends in recent years at the two companies spearheading the
Milwaukee water campaign – A.O. Smith and Badger Meter—hardly provide grounds for
thinking that water companies will drive job growth in the Milwaukee region. A.O.
Smith employs a mere 110 staff at its “world” headquarters in Milwaukee. Moreover, the
headquarters of A.O. Smith water products are not even in the self-proclaimed
Milwaukee water “hub;” they are in Ashland City, Tennessee, outside of Nashville, where
approximately 1,600 are employed at the headquarters and in “the world’s largest water
heater manufacturing plant” (A.O. Smith Corporation, 2003).
In addition, since 1986, A.O. Smith has been an active participant in the offshoring
of American industry, first moving jobs to Mexico, and then expanding their
employment base south of the border. By the early 1990s, even before NAFTA, A.O.
Smith was already employing “more production workers in Mexico than in their home
state” (Fauber and Norman, 1991). NAFTA, of course, accelerated the offshoring of US
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manufacturing, and A.O. Smith currently employs about 5,500 workers in Mexico,
including 4,000 in the border city of Juarez (Rovito, 2009; Bracamontes, 2009).
But A.O. Smith’s growth away from Milwaukee in recent years has not been
limited to Mexico. In 2006, with the purchase of GSW Inc., A.O. Smith acquired a
1,200-employee water heater manufacturing plant in Johnson City, Tennessee (The
Business Journal of Milwaukee, 2006). Most extraordinarily, for a company whose CEO
touts Milwaukee as a research-driven water technology hub, in 2008 A.O. Smith
announced a $1.5 million investment in a “high-tech research and development facility”
and engineering design center --- in Johnson City. “We believe that Johnson City’s
vision of becoming a technology center would enable us not only to attract, but retain
the engineering talent that we need to be competitive in the industry,” said Kevin
Wheeler, an A.O. Smith executive (NETVRIDA, 2008).77 In short, A.O. Smith has not
only favored for many years low-wage locations such as Mexico and Tennessee over
Milwaukee for its manufacturing facilities and water products headquarters operations,
but also now is locating high-end, technology and engineering jobs away from
Milwaukee’s putative water “hub” as well.
Similarly discouraging employment trends are evident at Badger Meter, a
manufacturer of meters and other devices that measure and control the flow of liquids.
Richard Meeusen, the CEO of Badger Meter, is co-chair of the M-7 Water Council and,
by far, the most conspicuous corporate face of the Milwaukee water “hub” campaign.
Employment at Badger Meter’s suburban Milwaukee headquarters rests at 500,
including around 210 production workers; and total Milwaukee employment at Badger
Meter has declined by around 10 percent since the mid-19990s. In the meantime, the
company has expanded outside Milwaukee, beginning in the 1970s when it built a preNAFTA “maquiladora” plant in Nogales, Mexico, in search of cheap labor (Fauber and
Norman, 1991; Fauber, 1991). In 2008, post-NAFTA Badger Meter opened a second,
$8.5 million plant in Nogales; all told the company now employs about 600 in Mexico
(Rovito, 2009a).
In April 2009, at the same time that CEO Meeusen was extolling almost daily in
speeches and media appearances the job-creation possibilities in Milwaukee’s “Silicon
Valley of water,” he announced that Badger Meter would be shifting an undetermined
additional number of jobs from its Brown Deer production facility, located just outside
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the city of Milwaukee, to the new plant in Nogales (Rovito, 2009a). The attraction of
cheap labor elsewhere has always been the key factor explaining Badger Meter’s failure
to expand in Milwaukee; but, at various points, Meeusen has also invoked “health care
costs” (Lank, 2006), Milwaukee’s “tax climate” (Schwartz, 2002), and, most feebly,
labor force “skills” as reasons for investing in Mexico rather than Milwaukee (“It is
easier to hire people [elsewhere], said Meeusen in 2006. “It has been getting harder to
hire skilled people” in Wisconsin) (Lank, 2006). This was truly a novel explanation for
creating jobs in Mexico rather than Milwaukee: the search of skilled labor. Nevertheless,
whatever the excuse, over the past decade Badger Meter has invested more in Mexico
than it has in Milwaukee.
Indeed, it is perhaps emblematic of the disconnect between the rhetoric and the
reality of water sector economics in Milwaukee that both of the leading companies in the
Water Council have generated more economic development away from Milwaukee in
recent years than in the region they vaunt as a water technology hub. “Somebody’s going
to do it,” says A.O. Smith’s Paul Jones on the race to become the “Silicon Valley of
water.” “I think it should be Milwaukee. And I’m going to do everything I can to make
sure that happens” (Gunn, 2009). As we’ve seen, however, Jones certainly had a
peculiar way of doing “everything” possible to make Milwaukee a global hub for water
technology: building an R&D center in Johnson City, TN and offshoring employment to
Juarez.78
Stanford University sociologist Walter Powell, among others, has advanced an
“anchor-tenant” theory of economic development. “Just as an anchor store will define
the character of a mall,” anchor-companies or anchor-institutions will “define the
character of an economic community” and “set the norms” (Gawande, 2009, 42). If A.O.
Smith and Badger Meter are the anchors or “bellwether” companies of the Milwaukee
water “hub” (Schmid, 2009b), then surely the recent job-creation record at these
companies –in particular, their consistent pattern of investment in places other than
Milwaukee-- should be troubling to local boosters of the water technology sector as the
“driver” of the future Milwaukee economy. At a minimum, advocates of public support
for water tech development need to answer a basic question: if the “bellwether” water
companies have not been creating jobs in Milwaukee, what is the likelihood that water
companies will be a source of future employment growth? Is the structure of the
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industry, with its extensive reliance on the offshoring of production, such that few jobs
will be created in places like Milwaukee? In a city where employment has declined 14
percent over the past fifteen years, which ranks 45th among the nation’s 50 largest cities
in employment “growth” over the past decade, and where black male joblessness is over
51 percent, these are crucial questions (Levine, 2009; Levine 2008). Astonishingly, they
haven’t even been raised, let alone answered, as Milwaukee’s leaders have rushed to
become water tech boosters.
The dismal job creation history of these “bellwether” companies casts considerable
doubt on the wisdom of betting the city and region’s economic future on water
industries, especially given the reality that, by any reasonable comparative measure,
Milwaukee is not a leading-edge, first-moving “hub” of water technology. Moreover,
notwithstanding the stunning speed with which the water bandwagon has gained
political traction in Milwaukee, the fact is that water sector employment represents
about one percent of regional employment, and water technology patents constitute less
than two percent of patents generated in metro Milwaukee. Only around one-third of
the region’s water companies are located in the city itself. This is not, by any serious
economic reckoning, one of Milwaukee’s “base” industries.
Despite these realities, the M-7 Water Council has proven to be an extraordinarily
adroit lobbying and public relations organization. It has raised the profile of its industry,
shaped the terms of local economic development discourse, and lobbied effectively to
“brand” Milwaukee in ways that advance the economic interests of its corporate
members. Milwaukee’s political leaders, desperate to shed the image of the city as an
industrial relic and lacking many ideas on how to create jobs, have enthusiastically
embraced the water strategy, without any serious vetting. They are eager to create an
“identity” for Milwaukee as the “Fresh Coast” or the “Silicon Valley of water,” as if
branding or imagineering can change the city’s economic trajectory. There is, however,
much reason for skepticism about whether the economic interests of this alliance of
water companies is in the larger public interest of generating jobs and raising incomes
in a city and region desperately in need of both.
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***
Squarely in the middle of this dubious local economic development strategy is
“entrepreneurial” UW-Milwaukee and its School of Freshwater Sciences (SFS). In the
eyes of the water boosters, UWM and its new school would play the same role in
Milwaukee’s “Silicon Valley of water” as they imagine Stanford did in the creation of the
real Silicon Valley. “We’ve had preliminary conversations with water-related
companies,” said UWM Chancellor Santiago, “and in many respects, they’re just waiting.
They just want to know where we’re going to plant the UWM flag and then they make
decisions themselves about where they may be located. Or we can attract new
companies” (WUWM, 2009). The water industry, insisted A.O. Smith’s Paul Jones, is
“going to go where the scientists are that can work with them” (Gunn, 2009).79
This, then, is the premise: that UWM’s SFS will be a “one-of-a-kind” center for
water technology research, making location in Milwaukee indispensable for
entrepreneurs and established water companies alike, and conferring “first-mover”
advantages for the region in the race to become the global hub of water technology.
However, like so many of the claims surrounding the general issue of university-based
entrepreneurialism as well as the specific case of the Milwaukee water initiative, this
premise does not hold up to scrutiny. In particular, the uniqueness as well as the
relevance of the SFS to economic development has been dramatically overstated.
Belying the notion that the UWM venture will be a “one-of-kind” entity, the map is
already dotted with both university-based and corporate water technology research
programs around the world. A sampling:
•

As already noted, Fresno State University runs an “International Center for
Water Technology,” including a water technology business incubator. The ICWT
is self-described as “the world’s leading center for state-of-the art water
technology and related applied fluid sciences” (ICWT, 2005),80 and claims to
represent “500 businesses, non-profits, public agencies, and individuals from
around the world” (Regional Jobs Initiative, 2007).

•

Several university-based water research programs cluster in the Toronto region:
the University of Waterloo (industrial research chair in water treatment); the

85

University of Toronto (drinking water research group); the University of Guelph
(water security, water management, and groundwater contamination research
groups); and McMaster University (water resources and hydrologic modeling
laboratory; water resource public policy; Great Lakes studies). (Toronto Region
Research Alliance, 2009).
•

UCLA’s School of Engineering and Applied Science formed, in 2005, a “Water
Technology Research Center” (the Wa TeR Center), to “develop technologies to
turn brackish or seawater into freshwater” (UC Newsroom, 2005). In other
words, UCLA’s center, unlike UWM, has substantial expertise and research focus
on next-generation desalination, purification, and reclamation technologies,
widely recognized as the cutting-edge frontier in dealing with world water
scarcity. By 2009, according to their web site, the Wa Ter Center had filed for a
number of patents in key water technology areas: desalination methods,
membranes, and reverse osmosis. (Wa Ter Center, 2009).

•

In 2005, Purdue University (Calumet) launched the Purdue Water Institute
(PWI), designed to “use water as a competitive advantage to attract and retain
companies that depend on the availability of abundantly clean and secure sources
of water for the success of their core businesses.” The PWI works with the Purdue
Technology Center “on incubation and commercialization efforts to create new
start-up companies with water-related technologies,” and collaborates with the
U.S. Department of Energy’s Argonne National Laboratory (outside Chicago) “on
applied research to advance knowledge in water resources and support regional
economic development” (Argonne National Laboratory, 2005).

•

In addition to university efforts, numerous, well-funded corporate water
technology R&D centers have been built around the world in recent years. GE
Water and the National University of Singapore are investing $100 million in a
Singapore Water Technology Center, “which will focus on the development of
new technologies for low-energy seawater desalination, water reclamation and
more efficient water reuse” (Water and Wastes Digest, 2009). In 2009, Dow
Water Solutions began construction of a “Water Technology Development
Center” in Tarragona, Spain (Dow, 2009). The $15 million center will employ 25
86

researchers, “will do product application development and component testing
and is designed to accelerate Dow’s commercialization of its membrane and
ultrafiltration technologies” (Water Technology, 2008). Finally, IBM has
established of “IBM Centre of Excellence for Water Management” in Dublin,
designed to apply IBM’s sensor, monitoring, and modeling technologies to key
“environmental challenges such as the movement of pollutants in fresh water,
marine, and oceanic environments.” The Dublin center aims to foster
collaborative development with small and medium-sized enterprises and create
“new business for Irish technology companies” (IBM, 2008). IBM has also
established a similar global research center in Amsterdam (IBM, 2008a).
These are just a few examples; there are several other prominent university water
research centers in California, as well as Minnesota, Arizona, Maryland, and
Washington, to name a few, and corporate water R&D operations scattered across the
country. In addition, cutting-edge water technology research does not occur solely in
“water centers;” commercially relevant water technologies can emerge from a wide
variety of academic departments or programs. For example, at Yale University’s
program in environmental engineering, a doctoral student and his adviser recently
devised a new desalination technique –“forward osmosis”—to produce freshwater from
seawater or industrial waste water, using a small fraction of the energy of conventional
desalination systems employing reverse osmosis (Yale, 2009). Patents have been filed
on the technology and Yale helped start the commercialization process via a universitybased startup company called Oasys Water Inc.81
In short, even a cursory overview reveals that if water technology companies are
likely to “go where the scientists are,” UWM’s SFS will not be a “one-of-a-kind”
attraction. Amidst all the hyperbolic rhetoric about Milwaukee becoming the “Silicon
Valley of water,” none of the water boosters have explained, in a world brimming with
water research programs, how UWM and Milwaukee will suddenly emerge as the place
for research-driven companies to locate. This logic is especially flawed in light of the
reality that UWM is nowhere near the forefront in cutting edge areas of water
technology, such as desalination research, likely to be high-growth fields in the years
ahead; at best, UWM would be playing catch-up -- and with limited resources. As we
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have seen, millions have been invested in water technology research facilities around the
world – much of it corporate, and many more dollars than have yet been committed, or
are likely to be committed, by corporate Milwaukee. Moreover, when that reality is
added to the diffuse locational dynamics of the water industry we observed earlier, it
becomes increasingly clear that the scenario of a UWM-driven “Silicon Valley of water”
in Milwaukee verges on fantasy. But it is not an innocuous fantasy; it is one that
threatens to misdirect considerable public and private economic development and
educational resources in Milwaukee.
That said, it should be underscored that the academic rationale behind the UWM
School of Freshwater Sciences is unassailable. It offers an opportunity to build on the
university’s historic excellence in the important field of Great Lakes ecological studies
and freshwater research, and do what academic programs are supposed to do: create
and disseminate knowledge. But, conceptualizing the school as the cornerstone of a
flawed, business-dominated local economic development strategy risks compromising
this scientific mission. To what extent, for example, will the M-7 Water Council
influence the hiring, curriculum, and research agenda of the SFS? As the Nobel prizewinning pioneers in biotechnology quoted earlier in this paper made clear, had
researchers in the 1960s been constrained by close partnerships with business and
followed the ideas of existing companies regarding what constituted worthwhile
research in the field, the great breakthroughs in biotech might not have happened. Will
the faculty in the SFS, which the M-7 Water Council explicitly states will be hired “to
work with local businesses,” be able to follow their noses and conduct blue-sky research
– the hallmark of open science that underpins genuine scientific and technological
progress? Or will self-interested corporate leaders exert undue influence?
The blurred lines between corporate interests and the university scientific mission
in the water initiative were epitomized in mid-2009 by UWM’s plan to locate a $25
million “signature” building for the new freshwater sciences school on prime real estate
at the Milwaukee lakefront (Millard, 2009). All of the serious scientific research and
teaching of the SFS would occur elsewhere, at the laboratories of the current Great
Lakes WATER Institute located within the Port of Milwaukee. The proposed lakefront
building would house a small number of administrative offices of the school, but mainly
it was envisioned as a “showcase” headquarters for the M-7 Water Council and its
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member companies to “strut their stuff” to the world (Milwaukee 7 Water Council,
2009; Taylor, 2009). As the ubiquitous Rich Meeusen explained, “other cities closely
tied to a specific industry all boast bricks-and-mortar structures to denote their status.
Paris has the Louvre…New York has the Broadway theater district…and Nashville…the
Grand Ole Opry” (Kirchen, 2009).
No one – not the chancellor, not corporate leaders, not supportive newspaper
editorialists—argued that the lakefront building would primarily serve scientific
functions; nor did anyone explain why it would make academic sense to divide the SFS
between two sites, physically separating administrative and academic activities. The
lakefront building was backed, above all, as a public relations-oriented “keystone
structure,” symbolizing Milwaukee’s branding as the “global center for water
technology” (Kirchen, 2009), and providing “a prominent, attractive location to impress
visiting business executives” (Daykin, 2009a).82 “It’s important,” said Chancellor
Santiago, “to have a front door to the water industry” (Daykin, 2008).
What a vivid example of how academic entrepreneurialism can inappropriately
elide a university’s academic mission with private business interests. Instead of locating
the school’s administrative offices where the actual scientific research will occur, and
rather than allocating university resources to upgrading these facilities83 (as well as
other pressing physical refurbishment needs on campus), university leaders proposed
squandering precious funds from UWM’s hard-earned capital improvements budget on
a “showcase” building so that the local water business lobby could “impress visiting
business executives.” The UWM lakefront building looked suspiciously like a back-door
effort to provide public dollars (the university’s capital budget) for private purposes (a
“signature” Water Council “headquarters”), and a public cover (the SFS) for private
business use of prime lakefront property that would ordinarily be prohibited by the
Public Trust Doctrine governing Wisconsin waterways.84
Surprisingly, in September 2009 UWM abruptly reversed direction and withdrew
its proposal for the lakefront building, claiming that the location had become too
politically divisive, and that the university didn’t want to jeopardize the transformation
of “Southeastern Wisconsin into the water technology capital of the world” over “siting
issues” (Daykin, 2009d). Nevertheless, there was no indication that UWM was
retreating from the flawed economic development logic that produced the lakefront
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plans in the first place. Although some boosters urged UWM officials to reconsider
giving up on the lakefront site (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2009e), early reports were
that UWM officials and M-7 Water Council executives were “looking outside the city of
Milwaukee” (Millard, 2009a), at suburban locations in St. Francis and Port Washington,
to locate a building with “the high-profile image that supporters want and need to draw
in visitors and companies from around the world” (The Business Journal of Milwaukee,
2009b). If such suburban or even exurban location plans go forward, then combined
with building a technology park in suburban Wauwatosa, UWM will be a prime
contributor, through its investment decisions, to amplifying the three-decade long
economic decline of the city of Milwaukee. This from an entrepreneurial university
touted as a “game changer” for the local economy.

Whither UWM?
The UW-Milwaukee story is a classic tale of the false promise of the
entrepreneurial university. Every trope of academic commercialism has been on display
in Milwaukee: university research as the “engine” of local economic development;
visions of lucrative patents and licenses generating revenues to fill university coffers; the
building of a technology research park; and forging partnerships with local business
“clusters.” Nationally, as we saw in the first part of this essay, the claimed benefits of
university entrepreneurialism have been overhyped and oversold – and the potential
costs to the very fabric of universities have been minimized or ignored. Yet, in
Milwaukee, the case for the entrepreneurial university has been promoted with little
analysis or serious debate, the presumed benefits accepted at face value.
Touting the university as the engine of a new Milwaukee economy has become
UWM’s calling card. But, as we’ve seen, the evidence from around the country illustrates
the limited efficacy of entrepreneurial universities in revitalizing regional economies;
and the two economic development initiatives at the center of UWM entrepreneurialism
–the suburban technology park and the water hub fantasy—are deeply flawed. On the
flip side, the perils of academic commercialism – the financial burdens, the cozy ties to
corporate interests, the potential undermining of open science and the intellectual
commons-- have been documented at all types of universities. But these dangers are
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especially palpable at mid-tier universities such as UWM, which lack the resource base
and the depth and breadth of scientific research of a Yale, Stanford, Berkeley, Johns
Hopkins, or UW-Madison, and thereby risk a major mission distortion when the
“entrepreneurial sector” of the university is put on steroids.
Recall the admonition of Michael Crow quoted earlier: mid-tier universities,
spouting economic development “rhetoric” and trying to be the next Stanford in the next
Silicon Valley, risk becoming “job shops,” “industry-driven enterprises” that in the end
“won’t be a university” (Washburn, 2005, 187-188). Certainly, in realigning resources
internally for “economic development,” pledging to hire faculty to “work with business,”
ticketing the lion’s share (if not the entirety) of the university’s augmented capital
budget for construction of a suburban technology park and a local water industry
headquarters, and enhancing business influence over the university in the name of
“partnerships,” UWM risks transformation into a glorified R&D arm of corporate
Milwaukee. Perhaps that is what the chancellor meant when he spoke of “aligning”
university research with the economy – thinking of the university “almost as a
consultancy,” in the approving words of a local editorialist (Haynes, 2008).
Ironically, the UWM plans have been presented as an upgrading of the university’s
stature as a research institution. But conflating “research” with a new primary mission
of running an economic development “consultancy” for local businesses may, in the end,
undercut the open, blue-sky, peer-reviewed research that is the true fount of scientific
breakthroughs. And it does nothing to support the myriad of research areas of liberal
arts universities that have nothing directly to do with business development. Yet, in
many of these areas, UWM has already established national and even international
research eminence that may be threatened by overall budget cuts and a reallocation of
resources towards the entrepreneurial sector of the university.
One of the extraordinary features of UWM’s entrepreneurial turn has been the
degree to which this radical reshaping of the university has occurred without extensive
internal campus debate and with minimal public scrutiny. The local Milwaukee media
have been particularly vociferous and uncritical boosters of UWM’s entrepreneurial
agenda. In the five years since Carlos Santiago became UWM’s chancellor, Milwaukee’s
one daily newspaper, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, has run over 200 articles and
editorials touching on UWM “research” and “growth plans” -- far more than in the
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entire preceding decade. Almost without exception, these articles enthusiastically
backed every aspect of the university’s plans, accepted virtually all the university’s
claims at face value, and manifested no discernible inquisitiveness over whether the
plans were likely to produce the economic impact claimed by boosters, or whether there
might be unacknowledged and unacceptable costs to the university’s plunge into
academic commercialism.
This lack of journalistic probing was all the more surprising given the newspaper’s
growing reputation for “watchdog” coverage of major public institutions during this
period, culminating in 2008 with a well-earned Pulitzer Prize for local reporting. Lapses
of this sort, of course, are not unique to Milwaukee: as science journalist Daniel
Greenberg notes, the academic commercialism “that routinely thrives on America’s
campuses receives overwhelmingly laudatory attention in the popular press, with little
or no skeptical scrutiny or inquiry about the actual profits and losses, in dollars and
academic and scientific values” (Greenberg, 2007, 64). But it has not helped the larger
Milwaukee community to weigh the costs and benefits of the UWM initiatives when the
region’s only daily newspaper, in editorials and editorializing articles, promotes rather
than vets those policies.85
Insufficient scrutiny and debate on the radical reshaping of a critical, multi-million
dollar public institution is serious enough under normal circumstances. But it took on
added significance in 2009 when UWM, like virtually all U.S. universities, faced major
budgetary compressions in the wake of the recession-induced state government fiscal
freefall. The university incurred across the board budget cuts, including hiring freezes in
most departments, obligatory salary “concessions” by faculty and staff, and layoffs of
some instructional staff. Students faced tuition hikes, larger classes, and fewer available
courses. And at a university purporting to raise its research profile, UWM’s
administration slashed the library acquisitions budget, eliminating vital subscriptions to
scholarly journals.
Yet, with cuts occurring throughout the university, UWM’s “Phase I”
entrepreneurial activities – including the hiring of twenty engineering faculty—
continued unimpeded. And notwithstanding the fiscal crisis, the university moved ahead
with plans to build a technology park in the suburbs, an initiative not only of
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questionable scientific logic and oversold economic impact, but one that could be a
financial albatross constraining UWM’s budget for years to come.
“Phase II” of the entrepreneurial plan –another $10 million for faculty hiring and
new program development in engineering, public health, and freshwater sciences—did
fall victim, at least in the 2009-2011 budget cycle, to the state’s fiscal constraints.
Nevertheless, the fiscal crisis of 2009 accelerated the restructuring of UWM and, I
would argue, the skewing of the university’s priorities. While most UWM departments
and programs, many with national and international research reputations, were
incurring serious budgetary reductions, major expenditures continued in the
“entrepreneurial” activities -- all on the chimerical premise that academic
commercialism in these targeted units would be a tonic for Milwaukee’s troubled
economy and boon to UWM’s finances. Ironically, by cutting the university’s core while
earmarking expenditures for things like an suburban technology park, UWM’s leaders
not only ignored how a university truly contributes to community economic well being,
but also put the very mission of a vital public institution at risk.

Conclusion: Beyond the Entrepreneurial University

I have argued in this essay that the entrepreneurial university model is both
wrongheaded and shortsighted. As a strategy of urban and regional economic
development, it is naïve and empirically unsupported. As an approach to university
finance, it is unsound. As a way of advancing research and science, it is flawed and
counterproductive. And as a concept of the place of the university in society, it is narrow
and parochial. Former Harvard president Derek Bok puts it well: “There’s a lot more to a
liberal education than improving the economy. I think that is one of the worst mistakes
that policy makers often make – not being able to see beyond that” (Cohen, 2009). In
her 2007 inauguration speech, Drew Gilpin Faust, Harvard’s current president, offered
a soaring vision of universities as places for “where learning and knowledge are pursued
‘because they define what has over the centuries made us human, not because they can
enhance our global competitiveness’” (Rimer, 2007).
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That said, however, there is an important role for universities, properly
understood, in the economy of cities and regions. Academic commercialism is narrowly
premised on what might be called the “technology push” argument: “if the university
can just push more innovations out the door, those innovations will somehow magically
turn into economic growth” (Florida, 1999, 72). Yet, as Florida observes, this is “a naïve,
partial, and mechanistic view of the way the university contributes to economic
development” (72). The university is not so much an engine of economic development as
a “crucial piece of the infrastructure of the knowledge economy,” generating talent and
ideas (Florida and Cohen, 1999, 590). This was the profound insight of Powell’s study of
Boston’s knowledge economy, which placed much more emphasis on open science, the
intellectual commons, and a culture of collaboration and exchange, than on the value of
proprietary science and university technology transfer. In this regard, as I have argued,
far from propelling economic development, the entrepreneurial university may, in fact,
jeopardize long-term innovation and growth. As Dasgupta and David put it:
Policies intended to promote greater transferability of basic science
findings by eradicating the open science culture in order to forge “a more
perfect union” between academic and corporate researchers may indeed
be successful in capturing some immediate economic rents by more
intensively exploiting the extant stock of basic scientific knowledge, but
risk fragmenting the networks in which tacit elements of that knowledge
base resides, and so are likely to jeopardize not only the future growth of
basic knowledge, but also the flow of economic benefits derivable from
the existing stock of knowledge (Dasgupta and David, 1994, 516).
In a similar vein, Richard Lester criticizes the “one-size-fits-all approach to
technology transfer,” with its emphasis on “patenting and licensing discoveries made in
university laboratories” (Lester, 2005, 30). In fact, argues Lester, “in most cases the
indirect support provided by universities for local innovation processes is likely to be
more important than their direct contributions to local industry problem solving” (30).
And the most important of these “indirect contributions” is, of course, education.
As the work of Glaeser, Goldstein, and others have shown, the local stock of human
capital –educated residents—is, by far, the best predictor of local economic development
success (e.g. income or employment growth) – much more important than levels of
university patents or even research funding. It logically follows, therefore, that
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expanding access to higher education and improving learning are the truly crucial ways
in which universities contribute to local economic growth. Thus, when universities like
UWM increase the tuition burden on students and slash core areas of research and
teaching, while simultaneously investing in what Irwin Feller calls “niche technology
areas” in the name of entrepreneurialism, they are, in fact, undercutting the university’s
central contribution to economic development. William G. Bowen and collaborators’
important recent study calls attention to the distressingly low (less than 60 percent)
graduate rates at U.S. flagship public universities (Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson,
2009); strategies to raise this rate would do much more to promote local economic
growth than the standard arsenal of academic commercialism.
In Milwaukee, the UWM six-year graduation rate rests at only 48 percent, and
although the majority of UWM graduates remain in the region, the urban core has
experienced a significant net out-migration of college-educated residents in recent
years, the vast majority moving from the central city to outlying suburbs (see Table 18).
In Milwaukee and in troubled cities across the country, universities need to be part of a
comprehensive strategy to generate, attract, and retain human capital in the city;
generating talent, not patents and licenses, is how universities most effectively
contribute to local economic development.
Table 18
The Migration of College-Educated Residents
in Metropolitan Milwaukee: 1995-2000
COUNTY

INMIGRATION

OUTMIGRATION

NET
MIGRATION

Milwaukee
25,091
38,823
Ozaukee
5,894
3,486
Washington
4,349
3,424
Waukesha
21,498
14,077
Metro Milwaukee (excluding
35,775
38,753
intra-regional migration)
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census, Migration Tables
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-13,732
+2,408
+925
+7,421
-2,978

Universities also contribute mightily to local economies as investors, employers,
and real-estate developers, and as institutions engaged in community problem-solving.
In recent years, urban institutions such as Penn and Yale have led the way in using
university investments to bolster local economic development, through such programs
as purchasing preferences for local, minority-owned businesses and joint university-city
development projects in troubled neighborhoods (Rodin, 2007). Penn’s “West
Philadelphia Partnership” has become a model for how an engaged university can
mobilize a wide range of resources, including research from departments across the
campus, to improve neighborhood housing, schools, health care, and business
formation. In cities like Milwaukee, suffering from chronic disinvestment and an
outflow of capital, jobs, and population to the suburbs, the university can be a crucial
anchor of central city revitalization. Investing $150 million in a university technology
park in the suburbs, supposedly in the name of research-driven economic development,
not only squanders the opportunity of university investment to nurture urban growth,
but in fact contributes to city decline by spearheading a further outflow of capital and
workers. In a very real way, this kind of entrepreneurial university, insensitive to the
true nature of the economic challenges in its community, becomes part of the problem,
rather than part of the solution.
Local economic development is a public policy field with a checkered history, prone
to fad chasing and a “herd mentality” among decision-makers and often dominated by
powerful business interests. Over the past three decades, for example, despite
overwhelming evidence from academic studies that such projects yield little community
economic benefit, cities and states have invested billions in convention centers and
sports stadiums as “engines” of local economic development. In many ways, the
entrepreneurial university is the “next new thing” in this long line of oversold economic
development fixes. In Buffalo, for example, economic development officials call plans to
make the SUNY-Buffalo campus more entrepreneurial “the single most important
economic development project for this region” (Carlson, 2009). In Milwaukee, a
bipartisan collection of metro area state legislators has declared, “One of the driving
economic engines for Milwaukee will be a research-based UWM” (Schmid, 2009c). But
these are the latest local economic policy sound bites and slogans, not the product of
serious analysis or debate by decision-makers. As we have seen, the evidence shows that
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academic commercialism rarely functions as the engine of economic development; and
what’s worse, in recent years most state governments have been underfunding and
slashing outright public support for the core activities of universities that truly matter
for community well being, while funneling dollars into “niche technology areas.” As a
funding strategy, entrepreneurial university leaders promote academic commercialism
and “growth agendas” as a way of selling the value of the university to economic
development-minded governments. But this is shortsighted and counterproductive: in
the long run, the strategy has not shored up university finances. Rather than offering the
false economic promise of academic entrepreneurialism, university leaders need to
more effectively to make the case for adequate funding based on the true importance of
higher education in their communities and in a democratic society.
Entrepreneurial university leaders like to cast themselves as “change agents,”
shaking up hidebound, traditional universities, adding “economic development” to the
mission of their institutions, and bringing universities into contact with the “real
economy” of the “global” era. UWM’s leadership, advocating a new “culture of risk,”
certainly is portrayed that way. In Buffalo, to take another example, the president of the
SUNY campus is another self-styled entrepreneurial change agent, with a “bold” vision
to “lift up the entire region” (Carlson, 2009). “What we are trying to do,” he says, “is
chafe at that status quo…The status quo is what has put this university in a long, slow,
downward trajectory” (Carlson, 2009). His vision: essentially the standard
entrepreneurial “public-private” emphasis on economic development, implemented
chiefly through deregulation and privatization of the Buffalo campus from a state
university system he derides as “a socialistic enterprise” (Carlson, 2009).
But turning universities into academic extensions of corporate R&D, or institutions
engaged in a casino-like search for jackpot patents or licenses, is hardly the kind of
change such institutions or their communities need. Almost a century ago, the great
economist Thorstein Veblen wrote scathingly of the damage done to science and
scholarship at universities by “business principles” and the criterion of “pecuniary” gain
(Veblen, 1957)—the kinds of marketplace values that dominate entrepreneurial
universities. “It is possible,” writes Chris Armbruster, that universities can
“commercially exploit a patent, conduct an initial public offering of shares, and grow
very wealthy indeed. But would that organization not be better described as a firm
97

(Armbruster, 2008, 77)? As we have seen, the “change” embodied in academic
commercialism threatens the mission of universities, and generally fails to deliver on the
economic development promises of proponents. The alternative is clear: reaffirmation
of the vital place of the university in a democratic society as, above all, a place for
discovery, understanding, public science, blue-sky research, and social problem solving
– an engaged university, not a patent and licensing machine.
Scientific research and the advancement of knowledge thrive on what University of
Virginia microbiologist Martin A. Schwartz has felicitously called “productive stupidity.”
“One of the beautiful things about science,” he writes “is that it allows us to bumble
along, getting it wrong time after time, and feel perfectly fine as long as we learn
something each time…The more comfortable we become with being stupid, the deeper
we will wade into the unknown and the more likely we are to make big discoveries”
(Schwartz, 2008). The values of the entrepreneurial university –“aligning” university
research with the profit-maximization economic interests of regional businesses,
privatizing science, and turning universities into quasi-“consultancies”-- are inimical to
the “productive stupidity” that is at the heart of discovery, the thing that makes
universities special places. In the end, those entrepreneurial values will damage the
core mission of universities and undermine the true contribution universities make to
their communities and to society.
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Endnotes
1

Bartik and Erickcek conclude, after reviewing the literature, that the “human capital effects of eds
expansion are modest in the short-run, but loom larger in the long-run. There is some question about the
exact mechanism by which these human capital effects occur, that is whether they take place through
encouraging entrepreneurship or by making workers more productive” (Bartik and Erickcek, 2007, 57).
2

Bartik and Erickcek re-estimate Shapiro’s analysis of the impact of college graduates in a regional
economy (Shapiro, 2006), pointing out that Shapiro’s estimates for 1940-1990 include a long period in
which average educational achievement was much lower than today. Using 1980 as a base year, they use
Shapiro’s data to calculate that an increase in the local percentage of college graduates of 3.26% will
increase a metro area’s employment after ten years by 1.38% (Bartik and Erickcek, 2007, 33).
3

I say “implicitly” because, as Goldstein and Renault point out, “beliefs” about the importance of
university technology transfer and entrepreneurialism “tended to be based upon neither sound empirical
evaluations nor theoretical arguments. Instead, they emanated from a few well-known and celebrated
‘success’ cases, such as Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 in Massachusetts, and the Research
Triangle in North Carolina” (Goldstein and Renault, 2004, 734).
4

The contribution of endogenous growth theory was to highlight the role of knowledge, technology, ideas,
and innovation in the growth process. The theory does not specify a privileged mechanism of technology
transfer (e.g. publication of university research vs. patents and licenses), or even an explicit role for
universities as opposed to other knowledge-creation institutions – this has been an extrapolation by
proponents of the entrepreneurial university.
5

For a thoughtful critique of the “competitiveness” trope, see Bristow, 2005.

6

The “triple helix” label is obviously an hommage to Crick and Watson’s path-breaking and worldchanging work on DNA that is the building block of biotechnology. Ironically, however, as the
distinguished historian of science Steven Shapin points out, Watson “did not cross the line into
identifying commercially consequential entrepreneurship as central to [the scientific] life. Indeed, when
Watson was heading the Human Genome Project in the early 1990s, he exploded in anger at the idea that
gene sequences might be patented, saying it was ‘sheer lunacy’” (Shapin, 2008, 221-222).
7

The classic argument on science as a “communal,” public, and open enterprise is Robert Merton’s: that
the “scientific ethos is incompatible with the definition of technology as ‘private property’ in a capitalist
society” (Merton, 1973, 268).
8

On the other hand, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, (2000) argue that patent citations are correlated with
the market value of knowledge and, as such, are reliable indicators of innovation.
9

Of the total 313 MSAs in Goldstein-Drucker’s analysis, 105 are “large” (over 200,00 employment); 100
are “medium” (between 75,000 and 200,000 employment); and 108 are “small” (under 75,000
employment).
10

A possible explanation for this variation is that the benefits of patenting are likelier to “leak” out of
medium-sized MSAs that lack the larger economic infrastructure to bring inventions to market. However,
this hypothesis is undermined by Goldstein-Drucker’s results for small MSAs (employment under
75,000), in which they find a reasonably strong positive relationship between university patents and
regional wage growth (35). The incoherence of these results suggest that either Goldstein-Drucker’s
dependent variable (regional earnings growth) or the way in which they measured the independent
variable of university entrepreneurialism (university patents in one year –1986) is flawed. In my view,

100

both indicators are problematic. Earnings growth is one among many plausible indicators of regional
economic performance, and can be strongly distorted simply by the sectoral composition of the local
economy. Taking patent counts in just one year can also be distorting; one year may be atypical.
Aggregating patents through the entire period of analysis (1986-2001), or at least over some multi-year
time period, would be a more reliable way of accounting for entrepreneurial activity.
11

This employment, however, is highly skewed towards the largest research parks. According to AURP,
each of the seven largest research parks employ more than 10,000, and together they constitute 54
percent of the total research jobs in North American university research parks (Battelle, 2007, 6). Put
another way, there are lots of university research parks – the majority-- with very modest employment.
According to AURP, the median university research park employs 750 persons.
12

Earlier employment projections on the park were even more outlandish; during the planning phase,
predictions were made of 50,000 jobs in the park and another 100,000 spinoff jobs. As Wallsten wryly
puts it, we’ve still got a few years to go before 2020, but “it does not look promising” (Wallsten, 2004, 4).
13

These 55 MSAs represent a sample of medium and large regions: essentially, the list comprises largest
metropolitan areas in the U.S., adjusted to include geographic variety and sufficient balance of regions
with and without research universities, and with varying types (top tier and lower tier) of research
universities.
14

The NSF “FY Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges” collects
data on the separately budgeted R&D expenditures in science and engineering fields reported by
universities and colleges. In addition to the total university R&D reported, the NSF survey provides
breakdowns on the sources of R&D, including federal, state, industry, and institutional, as well as
breakdowns by fields (life sciences, engineering etc.).
15

Many state university systems, for example, report patents on a system-wide basis, precluding break
out by individual universities and hence by city or region. Thus, we have patent data for 47 of the 55 metro
areas.
16

Licensing data are limited by the fact that not all universities respond to the AUTM survey. Moreover,
some state universities report on a system-wide basis, precluding break out by individual universities and
hence by city or region. Consequently, we are able to analyze data on 38 0f the 55 metro areas for this
variable
17

The obvious exception is the rather unimpressive rate of metro area GDP growth reported in San
Francisco and Boston since 2001.
18

A few explanatory points on this table:
• As noted earlier, since some universities report patents on a system-wide basis, state university
patent counts for metropolises in California, New York, Tennessee, and Nebraska are unavailable.
The patent count for Chicago universities in this table is also understated, as it does not include
patents generated by the University of Illinois-Chicago, which were included by the USPTO under
the broader category of “University of Illinois,” and not broken down by campus.
• The Detroit calculations in this table include the University of Michigan, which is located outside
the Detroit PMSA but within a distance (43 miles) claimed by proponents as falling within the
impact zone of an entrepreneurial university (Goldstein and Drucker, 2006, 30).
• Calculations for the Newark region include Rutgers University and Princeton University, both
located close enough to Newark to fall within the supposed entrepreneurial university “impact
zone.”
• Allocations to specific metropolitan areas of total academic research expenditures for certain Bay
Area universities (chiefly, Stanford and the University of California-Berkeley) was done as
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follows: 1/3 to San Francisco; 1/3 to Oakland; and 1/3 to San Jose. All R&D expenditures of the
University of California-San Francisco were allocated to the San Francisco PMSA.
The indicator “university patents per 100,000” is calculated for the 1990-1999 period, to facilitate
comparison with the “metropolitan area patents” indicator, which are only available from the
USPTO on an aggregated basis for the 1990-1999 period.

19

The time periods used for the economic performance indicators are, in part, shaped by data availability.
City job data, made available by HUD through special tabulations of County Business Patterns data, are
available from 1992-2004. BLS “employed resident” data, for both cities and metropolitan areas, are
available on a monthly basis from 1990 to present. I have used the “annual average employment” figures
for the calculations in this table. Finally, the BEA provides inflation-adjusted metro area GDP data from
2001 to their latest release, which is for 2006.
I calculated academic R&D per capita by aggregating academic research expenditures of local
universities between 1985 and 2006, and dividing that total by the metro area population in 2000.
20

This should especially be true in small to medium-sized cities and regions such as New Haven,
Rochester, Buffalo, and Birmingham, where the university is a more influential local institution than in
more economically diverse and complex larger regions. However, as we shall see, university
entrepreneurialism has not been a “game changer” in these smaller cities and regions – other factors are
more decisive in shaping the local economy.
21

This ranking is artificially slightly high, as patent counts are unavailable for metro areas such as San
Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Diego, among others, because of the way in which
patents are registered by certain state university systems. Nevertheless, the data do suggest that
Baltimore is among the metro area leaders in university patenting.
22

Again, the licensing data is skewed by the absence of figures for individual universities in the University
of California or State University of New York systems.
23

In 2007, Lyme sold its holding in Science Park to BioMed Realty Trust, a San-Diego-based real estate
investment trust.
24

According to a recent report from the Milken Institute, only two metropolitan areas – New York and
Los Angeles—reported more than 10,000 workers employed in biotechnology in 2007 (DeVol et al, 2009,
93). Nationally, biotech employment is estimated at only 200,000. According to BioAbility, a consulting
firm, only 43 biotechnology companies in the United States employ more than 1,000 people (Dewan,
2009). On path dependency: Cortright’s 2002 study, relying on 1990s data, identified only nine
metropolitan areas as true “biotechnology centers.” The same nine topped the biotechnology “location
quotient” rankings compiled by the Milken Institute in 2007.
25

Astonishingly, given the millions invested by states and cities in chasing biotechnology as an economic
development holy grail, “profit levels essentially hover close to zero throughout the life of the industry.
Furthermore, the picture becomes even worse if we take the largest and most profitable firm, Amgen, out
of the sample. Without Amgen, the industry has sustained steady losses throughout its history” (Pisano,
2006, 114).
26

Yale president Richard C. Levin said that the acquisition of the labs would enable Yale to attract top
scientists and undertake research programs that the university would not have had the space to develop
for a decade or more. “It’s an exciting opportunity for Yale to accelerate its progress in the sciences and
medicine,” said Levin. “We want our university to be among the very best in the world in advancing
scientific knowledge and we see great potential with this expanded space for contributing to humanity’s
struggle against disease” (Christofferson, 2007). It remains to be seen how the substantial erosion in
Yale’s finances after 2008, flowing from a 30 percent decline in the university’s endowment, will affect
these plans.
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In a bracing historical irony, the University of Rochester’s emergence as an eminent academic
institution in the 1960s was due in no small measure to a sudden infusion of wealth from the growing
value of shares held by its endowment in the city’s two stalwart companies: Eastman Kodak and Xerox
(Fox, 2009, 161). Now, in effect, the university was being called upon to replace these companies as the
driver of Rochester’s economy.
28

Data available from the “Pittsburgh Indicators project” provide another nugget on the somewhat
mythical narrative of Pittsburgh’s newfound economic dynamism: on average, since 2002, universityfueled Pittsburgh has registered a rate of new business formation around half that of regions with modest
academic R&D, such as Milwaukee, Kansas City, and Denver. This is a rather inconvenient fact for
boosters of the “Pittsburgh model” of academic entrepreneurialism. See:
http://www.pittsburghtoday.org/web/datatable.jsp?type=graph&id=3_7_2&gr=mcya_cb_n
29

The misapplication of the “lessons” of Stanford and Silicon Valley – or the lessons of other “success
stories”— without conducting systematic analysis of the complexities surrounding the replicability of the
cases, is an excellent example of what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls the “narrative fallacy.” “We like stories,
we like to summarize, and we like to simplify, i.e. to reduce the dimension of matters…The [narrative]
fallacy is associated with our vulnerability to overinterpretation and our predilection for compact stories
over raw truths. It severely distorts our mental representation of the world…” (Taleb, 2007, 63). In other
words, we construct a narrative about the role of Stanford as an “engine” of growth in Silicon Valley-- or
MIT, Texas, or the RTP in their respective regions-- and then “impose” that often-simplistic narrative on
all research universities and all regions.
30

A study of universities across the country has found evidence that the increasing preoccupation of
public universities with tech transfer has not translated in local spillovers. “There is little in the
[regression] results to conclude that public university commitment to their states is definitely reflected in
the geography of their research spillovers” (Hedge, 2005. 382).
31

These “historical flows of government funding” include: 1) Massive defense contracts – Boston has
consistently ranked near the top regions in the country in prime contracts received since the 1950s
(Markusen et al, 1991; Leslie, 1993; Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992); by the 1980s, Boston ranked
consistently in the top 3 regions in defense contracting, and averaged over $7 billion annually in prime
contracts (Levine, forthcoming); 2) Major public infrastructure investments, including the $3.9 billion
cleanup of Boston Harbor (a 24 year project completed in 2000), and the $15 billion “Big Dig,” completed
in 2007, which “provided new transit lines, moved Boston’s central highway underground, replaced a
1950s-era elevated highway with an expansive green boulevard, and opened access to the city’s much
cleaner shoreline” (Schneider, 2009); and 3) Over $17 billion in federally funded R&D expenditures at
Boston universities since 1985. Explanations of Boston’s economic trajectory that focus exclusively or
even primarily on academic commercialism and ignore these factors –as well as the role of open science
and human capital development in Boston—are seriously deficient.
32

Even in the case of Boston, it is unclear how much weight to place on university entrepreneurialism, as
opposed to the general level of human capital development in the region and interaction between
knowledge generation (mainly through “open science”) and a “culture” of human capital. Several scholars
put emphasis on the latter factors, rather than academic commercialism. See Glaeser, 2003; and Porter,
Whittington, and Powell, 2006.
33

This expectation of industry funding for entrepreneurial universities flies in the face of recent trends.
In real dollars, industry support for university R&D actually declined between 2000-2006. And since
2000, the industry share of university R&D funding has dropped from 7.2 percent to 5.4 percent
(although it remains higher than the 3.9 percent of 1980, the final year of the pre- Bayh-Dole era. All
calculations are from data in the NSF academic research expenditures survey).
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Mowery’s analysis of tech licensing in the University of California system –one of the leading recipients
of licensing revenue in the country—is instructive. Between 1999-2003, according to Mowery, the UC
system took in $75 million in gross licensing revenue; however, once legal and operating expenses were
subtracted, as well as payments to the inventor, net licensing income was only $15 million. This amount
represented a small fraction (less than one percent) of the annual research budget of the UC system. See
Mowery, 2004, 13. As Chris Armbruster has written: “If the UC system is not making a significant profit
from its IPR [Intellectual Property Rights], then it is very unlikely that universities ever will” (Armbruster,
2008, 384).
35

The mean expenditures were much higher, but since there is quite a skewed distribution in both TTO
expenditures and revenues, using the median figure is probably the fairest way of analyzing the costs and
revenues of TTOs (so the overall analysis is not skewed by the relatively small number of blockbusters –
or exceptionally high spenders).
36

I have also calculated these licensing returns using the 2007 AUTM survey, the most recent AUTM data
available. In 2007, almost 40 percent of universities responding to AUTM reported licensing revenues
less than $1 million (30 percent reporting under $500,000). Thus, just taking the Thursby and Thursby
2004 calculation for median TTO expenses ($1.1 million), almost 40 percent of universities in 2007 were
net TTO losers (and, of course, this understates the percentage of net losers as the 2007 median TTO
expenses are likely to be somewhat higher than the 2004 figure). Another 15.6 percent of university TTOs
generated between $1-2 million in 2007; some of these were net losers as well. In short, there is little
indication from the more recent data that a licensing “gold rush” is sweeping university tech transfer
operations.
37

I have calculated the 2007 data from the publicly available AUTM survey. The 2000 data, also from the
AUTM survey but no longer publicly available, can be found in Graff (2002).
38

Bulut and Moschini (2009) calculate the net” yield from commercial licensing –licensing income as a
percent of research expenditures—at 4.25% for private universities with a medical school; 2.80% for
private universities without a medical school; 2.06% for public universities with a medical school; and a
paltry 0.43% for public universities without a medical school.
39

SUNY Albany is the one institution without a medical school that made the leap into the NSF top 100
in academic R&D during this period. However, two-thirds of the increase in Albany’s research
expenditures came from institutional reallocation and targeted state funding; only a small fraction
resulted from an increase in federal grants secured.
40

George Low, the entrepreneurial president of RPI in the 1980s, also recognized that only a select few
universities would have the depth of essentially Nobel-level science necessary to do effective tech transfer.
“An institution which heavily focuses on research and graduate training but does not achieve Nobel
quality might become a bucket shop, being forced to do whatever anyone is prepared to pay us for,
resulting in a loss of standards and quality” (Leslie, 2001, 243).
In this regard, the history of the University of California-San Diego is instructive. UCSD stands with
Stanford, MIT, and the Duke-UNC-NCState combination as an entrepreneurial university success story.
But, as Smilor et al. point out, the UCSD entrepreneurial success was built on a foundation of massive
public investment and top-tier research excellence. “Revelle’s approach [Richard Revelle, the architect of
the UCSD] to creating scientific and technologic excellence was brazen. He wanted the best researchers in
the world for an institution without a single student. He recruited Nobelist Harold Urey, physicists Keith
Brueckner and James Arnold, and geneticist David Bonner…If the university did not have the money to
hire the best professor in a particular field, the university went without that department until it could
afford the best” (Smilor et al., 2007). Ultimately, UCSD created top-ten departments across the university
(from political science to biomedical engineering), something wannabe entrepreneurial universities today
rarely have the resources to accomplish.
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In a more rigorous way and with a different optic, Hill and Lendel (2007) lend support for this “top 15”
argument. Their data suggest that research universities with top ranked (by NRC surveys) bio-life science
and engineering doctoral programs have an impact on local economic development. But, they point out
that it is difficult for universities to “jump rank,” to radically improve the quality and reputation of science
and engineering doctoral programs. “Jumping rank is expensive and requires consistent long-term
strategic investment” (238).
42

Crow didn’t exactly follow his own insights upon becoming president of Arizona State University.
Despite telling Washburn in his interview that he was concerned about the “economic development”
expectations for his presidency at ASU, he immediately launched series of entrepreneurial initiatives,
promising to turn ASU into “the New American University” doing “cutting-edge research and
entrepreneurship to drive the new economy.” (Lewin, 2009; Rosen, Aspinall, and Cheng, 2009). By 2009,
however, in the midst of the national economic crisis and the popping of Phoenix’s real-estate bubble,
“Mr. Crow’s plans have crashed into new budget realities, raising questions about how many public
research universities the nation needs, and whether universities like Arizona State, in their drive to
become prominent research institutions, have lost focus on their public mission to provide solid
undergraduate education for state residents” (Lewin, 2009). In March 2009, Crow slashed 500 jobs,
closed 48 programs, and announced widespread employee furloughs.
43

As Deresiewicz notes, “scientific fields less amenable to the new mission of technology transfer –
astronomy, paleontology—find their institutional fortunes declining, to say nothing of the humanities and
social sciences” (Deresiewicz, 2009).
44

Hollingsworth offers the apposite example of Crick and Watson’s work on DNA – a breakthrough
scientific discovery with little economic payoff in the short-term, but which reaped considerable dividends
decades later.
45

A powerful and revealing statement along these lines was offered by one of the scientist “informants” in
Steven Shapin’s detailed study of the changing “vocation” of science in the 20th century (Shapin, 2008).
The informant, a distinguished computer scientist who eventually resigned from his university, offered
the following observation on the dangers of commercialism: “With respect to research, I believe our
attention has become confused about the relative roles of the INTELLECTUAL PURSUIT OF
QUESTIONS worthy of research and the FUNDING necessary to pursue them. Most research costs
something and funded research plays a pivotal role in the support of graduate students. But it is not an
end unto itself. During my time here I have seen this confusion deepen and expand, to the point that
activities appropriate within a university and those typical of a commercial setting are almost
interchangeable. Involvement with commercial enterprise has gone from anomaly to commonplace to a
badge of honor It is no wonder “conflict of interest” has become a confused, artificial charade. Worse, our
research agenda is being skewed towards questions that can be connected to “thrusts” of a short-term
economic consequence. University research must retain its focus on difficult, long-term research
questions of foundational consequence; innovations that will make someone money will happen on their
own (p.238-239, emphasis in original).
46

Eisenberg’s explanation for this trend, though, hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement of academic
commercialism: “Within the academy, scientists generally ignore patents and rarely face patent
enforcement. Perhaps this reflects the continuing vitality of sharing norms in academic science, or
perhaps patent owners conclude that enforcement of patents against academic researchers is not worth
the cost” (Eisenberg, 2008, 1098).
47

UWM’s federal share of research expenditures peaked at 50.3 percent in 2003. See Table 12.

48

Zimpher’s embrace of academic commercialism followed her signature initiative at UWM: the
“Milwaukee Idea,” which was wide-ranging effort to enhance the university’s engagement with the
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community, in areas such as education, public health, sustainable development, and neighborhood
economic revitalization. For Zimpher’s own account of the engagement initative, see Zimpher, Percy, and
Brukardt, 2002.
49

An alternative “research park” proposal, favored by some state government officials, was to have a tech
park/business incubator, perhaps jointly owned by UW-Milwaukee and UW-Madison, located on the
western periphery of metro Milwaukee, to encourage synergy between Milwaukee industries, nascent
UWM entrepreneurialism, and Madison’s strengths in research commercialization. This plan went
nowhere and quietly was abandoned. See Berquist and Gertzen, 2000; Trewyn, 2004.
50

In June 2009 Zimpher left Cincinnati to become chancellor of the State University of New York (SUNY)
system.
51

Santiago also left a misleading impression in interviews with local media, presumably to bolster his
“crisis” narrative, that not only was UWM’s research spending declining prior to his arrival, but that
research expenditures were “already so low that UWM is at the bottom of most national rankings”
(Schmid and Twohey, 2006). In fact, in 2006, when this interview ran, UWM ranked, according to NSF
tabulations of academic R&D expenditures, 190th of 640 U.S. colleges and universities and 214th of 637
institutions in the all-important federally funded research expenditures – not top-tier, but hardly the
“bottom” of the rankings. Among a peer group of institutions, the so-called “Urban 13” (which actually
consists of 21 universities), UWM ranked 13th of the 20 for whom research expenditures were published
by NSF in 2006; and all but three of the “Urban 13” ranked ahead of UWM were institutions with medical
schools.
52

Santiago presented no analysis to support this assertion. There are, of course, myriad variables other
than “academic research” explaining differences in the economic fortunes of Milwaukee compared to
Madison and Chicago over the past decades. State capitals, for example, have done much better
economically than other cities over the past two decades; to what extent is Madison’s performance mostly
a manifestation of this “state capital effect?” (Levine, forthcoming). And identifying “academic research”
as the central causal factor differentiating Milwaukee and Chicago’s economic trends made little sense.
First, as Table 2 shows, among the metro areas studied in this paper, Chicago ranked 32nd in academic
R&D per capita between 1985-2006, while Milwaukee ranked 37th – hardly a major disparity. And on the
key measure of regional economic performance – real GDP growth—Milwaukee has actually grown
slightly more rapidly than Chicago since 2001 (although neither metro area ranks particularly high on this
indicator).
53

As for Santiago’s astonishing statement that the “quality of life” for the citizens of entire state of
Wisconsin depended on building an entrepreneurial university in Milwaukee – needless to say, he
presented no evidence or analysis to support that assertion. In fact, his argument seems contradictory on
the face of it. The University of Wisconsin-Madison is acknowledged as one the country’s great research
universities and a powerhouse of academic commercialization, ranking near the top of all lists of academic
R&D, patenting, and licensing. If UW-Madison’s entrepreneurialism has been insufficient keep the
“quality of life” in Wisconsin from declining, why did Santiago believe that his self-acknowledged “much
more modest than UW-Madison” (Santiago, 2008a) approach to entrepreneurialism at UW-Milwaukee
would be decisive?
54

The “evidence” for this connection, presented by former UWM research dean Abbas Ourmazd, was a
graph charting increased R&D funding at Georgia Tech and GMP growth in Atlanta (Ourmazd, 2006, 9).
Needless to say, there are countless variables beyond Georgia Tech’s research funding that have
influenced Atlanta’s growth over the past two decades; Ourmazd’s single-variable anecdotal “analysis”
was simplistic and unpersuasive. In fact, Margaret Pugh O’Mara’s rich historical analysis suggests a quite
modest impact of Georgia Tech’s entrepreneurial activities in shaping the Atlanta economy – certainly
nothing akin to the presumed impacts of Stanford or MIT on their regional economies. See O’Mara, 2005,
182-224.
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This is, of course, a national trend at public universities. “While no public college is likely to free itself
entirely from fiscal ties to its state, many of the nation’s largest public institutions, like Michigan, have
evolved to operate nearly like private colleges. Public research universities in Colorado, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont are so reliant on tuition that students are paying, on average, for more
than 70 percent of the cost of their education, compared with a national average of 51 percent”
(Kelderman, 2009).
56

And even these universities, as we’ve documented, derive a relatively trivial share of their university
revenues from commercialized research activities.
57

The one exception is the University of Oregon, which reported over $5 million in gross licensing income
in 2007.
58

I have included the RGI grants in psychology in this category, since most are in the areas of
physiological psychology and biologically based neuroscience, and all deal with health. On UWM’s
organizational chart, though, the Department of Psychology is part of the division of the Social Sciences in
the College of Letters and Science.
59

Data are from the UWM Graduate School web site. Figures on the dollars expended are available only
for the first two rounds of RGI; but, since we know that only 6 of the 69 RGI grants in rounds three and
four were outside these “science and tech” related fields, it seems certain that the dollar allocation has
remained constant, at the very least, and perhaps has become even more skewed towards science and
technology fields. See: http://www.graduateschool.uwm.edu/research/growth-initiative/
60

Another, somewhat indirect way to gauge the reallocation of resources at UWM in support of science
and technology research: as the NSF data arrayed in Table 11 shows, 58 percent of the increase in research
expenditures at UWM between 2004-2007 came from growth in “institutional” outlays and state funds
($6.7 million of the $11.8 million increase). Presumably, these increased institutional outlays reflect
resources taken from other areas of the university budget and devoted to science and engineering
research. It seems reasonable to assume that these state and institutional figures will rise in the 20072009 tabulations as the “Growth Agenda” allocations are included.
61

An interesting indicator of the intent of RGI as well as the audience of Milwaukee’s business elite to
whom the chancellor was trying to appeal with his restructuring of UWM: the first round of RGI awards
was announced not to the higher education reporter at the local newspaper whose daily beat involved
covering UWM; rather, the announcement went to the newspaper’s business reporter and was covered in
the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s business pages. I’ll have more to say about the role of the Journal
Sentinel as an unabashed and uncritical booster of UWM entrepreneurialism later in this paper.
62

Technically the bonding authority was for $240 million; but UWM was required to raise $60 million
from private sources for capital improvements, which would then be matched at a 3-1 ratio by the state
government (making the state funding amount equal to $180 million).
63

For a more systematic and rigorous analysis of the relationship between concentrations of scientists
and engineers and rates of urban growth, see Beckstead, Brown, and Gellatly, 2008. Their regression
analysis of 242 North American metropolitan areas shows a positive relationship between
scientists/engineers and urban growth, but chiefly through “interaction effects” between scientists and
engineers and other forms of human capital. In other words, confirming Glaeser’s analysis noted earlier,
the key factor explaining urban growth is a large stock of human capital, not the specific presence of any
one occupational group, such as scientists and engineers.
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The most recent (and now outdated) National Research Council program rankings are from 1995. For
what they are worth, the 2008 U.S. News rankings place all of these institutions in the top 20 biomedical
engineering programs. The one exception is Yale University, which notes: “We are a young department –
founded in 2003—but we build on decades of research and education in medicine and engineering at one
of our nation’s oldest and most distinguished universities.” See http://www.seas.yale.edu/departmentsbiomedical.php
65

As the pioneer scientists in biotechnology quoted earlier made clear, “aligning” a university program
with the interests of specific companies might, in fact, have the perverse impact of inhibiting innovation
and long-term breakthroughs in the field. “Breakthrough” science, as Hollingsworth, Berg and others
noted, thrives when short-term, profit-seeking interests are not in the equation. Yet, UWM’s explicit plan
was “to hire faculty to work collaboratively with area biomedical and healthcare corporations,” an
approach that sounded dangerously like the “bucket shop” model (as opposed to basic science-driven
model) warned against by leaders such as RPI’s George Low that I discussed earlier. Moreover, the
economic rationale of “aligning” UWM research with a company such as GE Healthcare, questionable
enough in terms of the impact on university science, has become especially dubious, as “GE is in the
throes of the steepest decline in its medical businesses since it began making X-ray tubes in Milwaukee in
1947.” By 2009, GE was making deep cuts in its Milwaukee-area employment, and, once based in
suburban Waukesha, had already moved in 2004 its corporate headquarters to London (Schmid, 2009).
All things considered, GE seemed hardly a promising corporate partner on which to bet the future of the
university.
66

Sometimes the exuberance of the water boosters went even further. Recently, Richard Meeusen, the
CEO of Badger Meter and co-chair of the M-7 water council gushed: “Actually, Milwaukee has always
been the Silicon Valley of water technology. The problem is that we’ve forgotten it” (Gunn, 2009).
Emphasis added.
67

Perhaps the most amusing variant of this argument in Milwaukee is the uncredited repetition in the
media and by local boosters –as if it is a profound intellectual discovery—of a line from the James Bond
movie Quantum of Solace, that water will be the world’s most precious resource in the 21st century, that
“water is the new oil.” (This insight is then usually coupled with the equally profound observation that
Milwaukee is located on Lake Michigan, as if this geography will accord Milwaukee in the 21st century the
same resource advantage that sitting on the world’s largest oil reserves bestowed upon Saudi Arabia in the
20th century). For an (unintentionally) risible version of this sloganeering and boosterism by the city of
Milwaukee’s commissioner of city development, see Rocky Marcoux, “Milwaukee’s Fresh Coast
Advantage” (accessed at: http://www.getsim.com/about-sim.cfm?id=63).
68

GE and Pentair, headquartered elsewhere but with a significant presence in suburban Milwaukee, were
listed in the Goldman Sachs report as leading companies in the filtration subsector. However, as we
examine below, Minneapolis-based Pentair’s commitment to Milwaukee appeared to flag significantly in
the 2009 recession, and GE’s major investment in a “water hub” in 2009 was not in Milwaukee, but in
Singapore.
69

The identification of “120 water-related companies” was from a paper prepared for the M-7 Water
Council by Sammis White of UWM (White, 2008). However, in the Water Council’s 2009 directory of
active companies, only 76 were listed (Milwaukee 7 Water Council, 2009a).
70

It is “Economic Development 101” to conduct a scan of the competitive environment before targeting
any industry in a local strategy, to see how the “home” city or region stacks up against other places. That
this was not done in the case of the Milwaukee water initiative speaks volumes about the degree to which
rhetoric, business interests, and politics, as opposed to research and analysis, drive the strategy.
71

I use the term “headquarters city” here, but, in fact, most these companies’ U.S. headquarters are
located in suburbs, exurbs, and small towns of metropolitan areas –in places like Warrendale, PA
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(Pittsburgh), Naperville, IL (Chicago), Edina, MN (Minneapolis), Trevose, PA (Philadelphia), or
Chesterfield, MO (St. Louis). This is a typical tendency for water technology companies, not only in
headquarters locations but also in the location of all offices and plants. The locational dynamics of water
technology companies do not favor big cities.
72

Even this observation understates the geographic dispersion of water technology companies in the U.S.,
as it includes only big firms. If we drill down to the small company, highly entrepreneurial level, we’re
likely to find water companies scattered even more widely across the country. For anecdotal evidence of
this, see Bluestein, 2008.
73

Technically, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office patent class 210 – liquid purification and separation.
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These metro area data, however, track closely the place of Wisconsin in state-level USPTO data, which
are available through 2008. Thus, there is every reason to believe that Milwaukee’s place in these metro
area rankings has not improved significantly in the past decade.
75

This is true in Milwaukee as well; two-thirds of the “water-related” companies listed in the M-7 Water
Council directory are located outside the central city, as is over 70 percent of water industry employment
in metro Milwaukee.
76

It is unclear precisely how Jones and others arrive at the oft-quoted and exaggerated figure of 20,000
total employment, but it appears that they include all employment at Rockwell Automation (which,
according to Goldman Sachs’ analysis derives about 4% of its revenues from water-related activities),
employment at the Kohler Company (mainly a plumbing fixtures producer, located outside metropolitan
Milwaukee, in Kohler/Sheboygan, WI), and perhaps, by mistake, some of the non-Milwaukee
employment of companies such as Siemens, GE, Pentair and Veolia that have Milwaukee operations.
77

Presumably, A.O. Smith did not invest in the engineering facility in Johnson City because that’s where
the “talent” is, in comparison to, say, Milwaukee. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, a mere 16.6% of
Johnson City adults possess college degrees, compared to 28% in metro Milwaukee.
78

The gap between rhetoric and reality was equally striking with Rich Meeusen at Badger Meter. On the
same day that an article appeared in the local business newspaper about Badger Meter’s plans for send
more jobs from Milwaukee to Mexico, an interview with Meeusen was aired on local television in which he
said: “My dream is that some day, some kid is going to be at the kitchen table and say, ‘I’m thinking about
starting a water technology company,’ and his grandmother is going to reach across the table with her
cane and smack him along the head, and say, ‘Get to Milwaukee. That’s where you belong’” (WISN.com,
2009).
79

This comment betrays a stunning lack of self-awareness, coming from the CEO of a company that had
just built an R&D facility in Johnson City, Tennessee, and employs the vast majority of its workforce far
away from Milwaukee.
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Apparently, not only is water technology research not unique to Milwaukee, but neither are branding
campaigns and exaggeration.
81

However, further confirming the geographic “leakage” of technological innovation we discussed earlier,
and the consequently limited impact of university-generated commercial development on local economic
development, Oasys has left New Haven and is now located in Cambridge, Mass. The interests of science
and perhaps world water policy certainly benefit from Yale’s research here; it remains unclear, however,
how much economic benefit the city of New Haven will ultimately have derived.
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Meeusen further argued against building the SFS building at the site of UWM’s existing university
water science facility on Greenfield Avenue, in an industrial area near the Port of Milwaukee.
“Milwaukee’s going to be a center for water technology and we’re going to build our keystone structure
down by the coal piles on Greenfield Avenue? Makes no sense to me. It has to be right there in the heart of
the city” (Kirchen, 2009). This from the co-chair of a Water Council whose directory reveals that over twothirds of Milwaukee-area water companies are located outside the city entirely, and very few “in the heart
of the city.” And Meeusen himself is CEO of a company whose headquarters are located not in the city, but
in a Milwaukee suburb, employs the majority of its workforce in not in Milwaukee but in Mexico, and, as
we’ve seen, is planning to shift more Milwaukee jobs to Mexico in the near future.
83

The university’s hope was that federal dollars might be available from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (the “stimulus package”) to pay for refurbishing and expansion of the Greenfield
Avenue research facilities.
84

In a February 2009 letter, Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources (DNR) expressed such
reservations about the Water Council’s presence on the proposed lakefront site: “In general, office suites
for private, non-governmental or governmental organizations (including DNR) are not public trust uses,
and are not appropriate to be located on public lakebed” (Kaiser, 2009).
85

In some ways, the newspaper actually went beyond the university’s own hyperbole, describing the
entrepreneurial strategy as a “game-changer,” “economic driver,” “economic piston,” “hothouse of patents
and innovation,” and an “idea hatchery.” And sometimes the boosterism went beyond simple hyperbole.
For example, a Journal Sentinel headline in April 2009 declared: “U.N. names Milwaukee a water
technology hub” (Schmid, 2009a). In fact, the U.N. did nothing of the sort: it approved an application by
Milwaukee to become a participant in the U.N.’s “Global Compact City” program, and Milwaukee’s
proposal centered on a series of water quality projects. The U.N. designation had nothing to do with
whether, compared to other cities or other university programs, Milwaukee had been independently
evaluated and designated a global water “hub.” Other cities in the U.N. program pledged to work on
projects such as climate change, sustainable tourism, health care delivery, and traffic safety. Jinan, China,
for example, is working on traffic safety; by the Journal Sentinel’s logic, Jinan must be the U.N.
designated traffic “hub.” Participating cities, by the way, pay an “engagement” fee for this U.N.
designation.
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